


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AUTHOR: F. F. Proctor Jr.  
ON 9 August 1977

**ANNEX HOW  
TO  
FOURTH MARINE DIVISION  
OPERATIONS REPORT  
IWO JIMA  
RCT 25 REPORT**



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HEADQUARTERS

1975 TWENTY FIFTH MARINES, FOURTH MARINE DIVISION,  
JRL/efk c/o FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

Serial No. 125-45.

15 April, 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.  
To: The Commanding General, Fourth Marine Division.  
Subject: Operation Report (IWO JIMA, VOLCANO ISLANDS).  
Reference: (a) Division SOP No. 1-45.

1. Annex HOW to Division Operation Report, IWO JIMA,  
VOLCANO ISLANDS is submitted herewith in accordance with refer-  
ence (a).

*J. P. Langan*  
J. P. LANGAN  
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HEADQUARTERS  
TWENTY FIFTH MARINES, FOURTH MARINE DIVISION,  
c/o FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

15 April, 1945.

ANNEX HOW TO DIV OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA, VOLCANO ISLANDS

RCT-25 OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA, VOLCANO ISLANDS

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SECTION I

PLANNING AND PREPARATION

A. Task Organization:

RCT-25 was organized for the attack on IWO JIMA, as follows:

25th MARINES  
1st Band Sec  
Co "A", 4th Tank Bn  
Co "A", 4th Engr Bn  
Co "A", 4th M.T. Bn  
Co "A", 4th Med Bn  
4th Pion Bn (less Co "A"; plus Co "D", 133d MC Bn and  
Hq Det, 8th Fld Dep)  
1st Plat, 4th M.P. Co  
1st Plat, S&S Co, 4th Serv Bn  
Det, 1st JASCO  
5th Amph Trac Bn  
Co "A", 2d Arm Amph Bn  
7th Mar War Dog Plat (less 2d and 3d Secs)  
Det, 8th Fld Dep (SP)  
1st Plat, 442d Port Co  
1st Sec, 1st Prov Rocket Det  
Ln & FO Parties, 1/14

The organization of the BLT's was derived from the above attachments and is shown in the BLT reports. The organization of the 25th Marines had only a few variations from the Tables of Organization. These variations consisted chiefly of those men necessary to carry the flamethrowers, bazookas, and demolitions that are not provided for in the Tables of Organization. Two of the BLT's organized an anti-sniper platoon in their Headquarters Companies.

B. PLANNING:

Preliminary planning for the attack on IWO JIMA started on 28 October, 1944, when Div issued Special Div Trng Memo No. 2-44, "Planning an Amphibious Operation". Div Op Pl No. 4-44-A (Training) was issued at this time and included intelligence information on IWO JIMA and the basic order showing the scheme of maneuver, objectives, the Task Organization, etc. RCT-25 drew up a basic order based on the Div order, issued it to the BLT's who also drew up Con Orders. The basic plan was not changed

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materially after its original issue although details were constantly changed to fit increased intelligence and changes received from higher echelons.

Briefly, the plan of attack of RCT-25 was as follows: RCT-25 would land on the right flank of the Div on Beach BLUE 1 with two BLT's abreast, assist the advance of RCT-23 on the left in the capture of AIRFIELD No. 1, rapidly seize Beach BLUE 2, continue the attack and seize that portion of O-1 in its zone of action, and protect the Div right flank. Since the width of Beach BLUE 1 was only 500 yards and two BLT's were landing abreast, it was ordered that the right BLT land in a column of companies to reduce the number of LVT's landing at any one time. The reserve BLT was originally to be landed in LCI(L)3's but this plan was changed shortly after the initial plan was issued to provide for the landing to be made in LCVP's and LCM's. The BLT's were assigned the following formation: BLT-1, on the left, BLT-3 on the right and BLT-2 in RCT reserve. Upon landing, BLT-1 was to push straight inland and seize the RCT O-a line, assist the advance of RCT-23 by fire, and then, on conjunction with BLT-3 on the right, continue the attack and seize O-1 within its zone of action; BLT-3 was to rapidly seize Beach BLUE 2 and the RCT O-a line, then in conjunction with BLT-1, continue the attack and seize O-1 within its zone of action, and protect the RCT right flank. BLT-2 was to be boated and prepared to land and support the attack by H plus 60.

The 5th Amph Trac Bn was attached to land the assault waves of the assault BLT's. Co "A", 2d Arm Amph Bn was to form the 1st Wave and upon landing of assault troops was ordered to support the attack of BLT-3 northward along the coast from positions on the right flank of the beach and in the water offshore. Co "A", 4th Tank Bn was divided into two sections, one section attached to each assault BLT. The plans were later changed so that the tanks were landed in three LSM's on order of RCT Comdr. These changes were made because the medium tank was found to be too heavy forward for the LCM; and conditions on the beach might be such as to prevent the tanks from moving off the beach until mines had been removed or roads constructed.

Co "A", 4th Engr Bn was assigned so that each assault BLT had one engineer platoon attached. The remainder of the company was held in the RCT Support Group. A detachment of the Collecting Section of Co "A", 4th Med Bn was attached to each BLT to augment its medical personnel. A Pion Co was attached to each assault BLT from the 4th Pion Bn to provide the Shore Party. The Naval

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Const Bn Company and the remainder of the 4th Pion Bn were held in the RCT Support Group. Co "A", 4th M.T. Bn; the 30th Repl Draft; the Det, 1st JASCO; and FC parties were broken down and attached to each of the BLT's; the remainder of the task organization remained in the RCT Support Group.

The basic plan as set forth above was not altered appreciably after the planning draft, however, details of embarkation, formation of landing waves, naval gunfire and air support plans, supply, and communication were constantly and continually altered as more intelligence data was obtained and changes ordered by higher echelon. With a few exceptions, the planning for the attack on IWO JIMA was adequate and started at an early enough date. Comments and recommendations of the planning are given in Section V, Comments and Recommendations.

#### C. TRAINING:

Training of the 25th Marines had reached the Bn problem phase when the preliminary planning was started. The training prior to that time had been in accordance with directives as issued by Div and had concentrated on individual and small unit training with emphasis being placed on the attack of fortified positions. Upon receipt of information on the type of terrain to be encountered on IWO JIMA, the basic scheme of maneuver, and the landing formation, all units began using this information in company and battalion problems. Every effort was made to simulate as nearly as possible the conditions that were expected on IWO JIMA. Regimental, Division, and Corps CIX's were held on the basic plan of the attack on open exposed terrain where emphasis was placed on camouflage. From 22 to 26 November, 1944, RCT-25 held amphibious training maneuvers in MAALAEA BAY with TransDiv 48 and with fifty (50) training LVT's of the 10 Amph Trac Bn. Landings were made on the west coast of MAALAEA BAY, Island of MAUI, T. H. Since only one BLT could land at a time in LVT's and since LCVP's were simulated to be LVT's by the other BLT, the benefit that could have been derived from this training was greatly reduced. This training was chiefly beneficial in that it exercised the Navy in control functions. The limited maneuver area prevented any worth-while tactical problem ashore.

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During training every opportunity was used to work with units of the task organization in field problems. The companies of the 30th Repl Draft were assigned to the BLT's for training during November and December. These companies were treated as a part of each BLT and received much the same training as the organic companies, with the exception that the 30th Repl Draft companies were equipped with only individual arms and the other Co weapons had to be loaned to them from the BLT. There was an insufficient amount of Tank-Infantry training, due chiefly, to unsuitable tank training areas and the inability of the tanks to move freely from their park to the training areas. BLT firing problems were held using air, artillery and tanks but these problems were inadequate for the following reasons: Artillery fire could not be called for and placed upon an objective that could be seen by the infantry and then attacked following the preparation; the air unit was not the same unit that rendered support in the actual operation and live bombs could not be dropped; all naval gunfire support was completely simulated; tanks were not yet equipped with infantry radios or telephones.

During the training period there was a sufficient quantity of ammunition of all types except bazooka, hand grenades, and demolitions. Training supplies were extremely short and only the bare minimum was available. Such articles as barbed wire, targets, lumber, etc, were very limited. Flamethrowers of the new type, complete with filling attachments, were not issued until shortly before embarkation and not enough personnel were instructed in their proficient use prior to departure from MAUI.

RCT-25 was estimated to be 90% prepared for combat at the time of embarkation. The major deficiencies have been noted above.

#### D. Rehearsal

##### 1. Embarkation.

RCT-25 commenced embarkation on 27 December, 1944, with RCT-25 Support Group, BLT-2, BLT-3, and BLT-1 (less rifle companies) embarking on four APA's of TransDiv-44. The rifle companies of BLT-1 and 50 training LVT(2)'s of the 10th Amph Trac Bn were embarked on three LST's on 5 January, 1945. Trans Div-44 departed from MAUI on 29 December, 1944, and arrived at

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HONOLULU, T.H. on the afternoon of the same day.

TransDiv-44 remained in HONOLULU until 6 January, 1945. During this period numerous conferences were held and the rehearsal order issued. Fifty percent of the troops were given liberty daily, while the remainder attended schools and were given physical exercises.

## 2. Training Exercises.

On 6 January, 1945, TransDiv-44 sailed for MAALIEA BAY to engage in exercise in boat control and formations, and debarkation of troops and cargo. While enroute, debarkation drills were held for troops. On 7, 8, and 9 January, 1945 landing exercises were held, simulating, as far as possible, the landing plan for the actual operation. Since no LVT's participated, LCVP's were substituted and used the same formation. Troops were loaded into LCVP's formed into waves, and dispatched from the line of departure. No actual landings were made and waves approached to within 300 yards of the beach and withdrew. The exercises for each day were essentially the same. Many alterations to the preferred plan were necessary in order to meet the limitations imposed by the lack of LVT's, shortage of LCVP's, and of control vessels. The troops received very little benefit from this rehearsal. On the ship of BLT-1, artillery and engineer personnel acted as assault troops since only the BLT Hq was embarked. The imposition of different debarkation schedules and boat assignment tables on the minds of the troops was misleading. It is felt that the ships should have received their training prior to embarkation of assault troops for the operation.

On 8 January, 1945, the Hq Group of BLT-1 (less the BLT CO and Staff) transferred to their respective LST's for the rehearsals to be held from 12-17 January. On 9 January, 1945, Trans-Div-44 sailed for HONOLULU, OAHU, T.H., arriving there in the afternoon of the same day. Further conferences were held, 50% liberty granted, schools and physical exercise conducted, and plans drawn and orders issued for further rehearsals.

## 3. Rehearsal.

On 12 January, 1945, TransDiv-44 sailed for MAALIEA BAY, Island of MAUI, T.H. Debarkation drills, in accordance with the rehearsal plan, were held while enroute.

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For the rehearsal, all of BLT-3 was embarked on an APA and utilized LCVP's substituting for LVT's; since the 5th Amph Trac Bn would not be available until the staging area at SAIPAN was reached. BLT-1 used 50 training LVT(2)'s of the 10th Amph Trac Bn. One LST of BLT-1 assigned for the operation was not available and one LST of BLT-3 was substituted; the remaining three LST's were assigned to the 5th Division for the rehearsal. The rehearsal was to approximate as closely as possible the landing plan and scheme of maneuver of the preferred plan for the attack on IWO JIMA.

LEX-1, 13 January, 1945.

H-hour was set at 0930. All waves formed at the LD, were dispatched to beach, approached the beach to within 300 yards, returned to their respective APA, or LST and troops were reembarked. There were many mistakes noticeable: BLT-3 waves were late in arriving at the line of departure, control of BLT-1 waves was completely inadequate, control boats were frequently off station, control officers did not know their duties and control communications were completely ineffective. Upon completion of the exercise, critiques were held on each ship and LST for the Navy control and debarkation officers on their respective duties.

LEX-2, 14 January, 1945.

H-hour was set at 1030. All waves formed at the LD and were dispatched to the beach. Waves of BLT-1 (LVT's) were dispatched and landed on time. Waves of BLT-3 (LCVP's) were again late in arriving at the LD but were able to land on schedule by traveling at full speed. Troops debarked and advanced inland approximately 100 yards and were secured. BLT CP's were set up ashore and communications were well established prior to the securing of the problem. BLT Shore and Beach Parties landed, organized the beach, and received token loads. All communications were checked. The noon meal was eaten ashore and troops were reembarked prior to 1600.

The exercise was much improved over the previous day, although there were still some difficulties. The control PC boat for Beach BLUE 1 constantly shifted station making the dispatch of waves and crossing of the LD on schedule difficult. LVT Wave guide officers still did not fully carry out their duties and Navy boat control communications still were not functioning properly.

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LEX-3, 15 January, 1945.

H-hour was set at 0930. All waves formed at the LD, were dispatched and landed on time. The control PC was out of station thus requiring the use of a different azimuth to the beach by the landing waves. All troops were landed according to plan. The troops moved inland in accordance with the tactical plan. BLT-2 (RCT Res) was landed and passed through BLT-3. All CP's were established ashore and the tactical problem continued throughout the night. Air strikes were called by the front line BLT's during the day. Naval gunfire sections simulated the calling and spotting of NGF throughout the day. The shore and beach parties were set up and token loads landed. A thorough check was made of all communications.

At 0700, 16 January, 1945, the problem secured and reembarkation began. The troops of BLT-3 to be embarked on LST's for the movement to the staging area were transported to Camp MAUI and the Div troops to be embarked on BLT-3's APA were loaded from the beach. The reembarkation of all troops was completed by 1700.

LEX-4, 17 January, 1945.

LEX-4, provided for a simulated landing on the north coast of KAHOOHA E, T.H., under an actual naval gunfire and air bombardment. H-hour was set at 0930. All waves formed at the LD and were dispatched on schedule. The control PC was off station and the waves did not follow the correct boat channel. The simulated landing was made on time but nearly 800 yards from the proper beach. The Res BLT and RCT Support Group were dispatched. After making a run to within 300 yards of the beach all troops reembarked on their respective APA's and LST's. The Hq personnel of BLT-1 were transferred from the LST's to their APA. Naval gunfire teams were sent ashore and conducted actual call and spotting missions. All troops were reembarked by 1300. TransDiv-44 then proceeded to HONOLULU, OAHU, T.H.

It is felt that the rehearsal was successful in that the Navy control personnel were given some instruction and practice and that communications were thoroughly exercised, and checked. The rehearsal was not successful in that (1) the LST's

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assigned BLT-1 for the rehearsal were not the same as for the operation (2) BLT-3 had to substitute LCVP's for LVT's and its control officers therefore lacked training in guiding LVT's. (3) The Arm Amph Bn assigned for the operation did not participate. (4) The Amph Trac Bn assigned for the operation did not participate. (5) The tactical problem ashore was not complete due to the limited maneuver area available.

## SECTION II

### MOVEMENT TO OBJECTIVE

#### A. REHABILITATION

Troops were given 25% liberty daily while in WESTLOCK and HONOLULU. Physical exercise and schools were held for those not on liberty. 25% of troops were given recreation parties at a LA MOANA Park daily. Conferences were held by BLT's and the RCT in order to issue final orders prior to departure. All orders were issued for the operation and for the forward area rehearsal to be held off TINIAN (or SAIPAN).

On 22 January, 1945, the LST's and LSM's sailed for ENIWETOK and arrived on 5 February, 1945. The convoy sailed from ENIWETOK on 6 February, 1945 for SAIPAN. Daily schools and physical exercise were held aboard the LST's and LSM's. A thorough study of IWO JIMA was made and the troops completely briefed on all pertinent phases of the operation.

TransDiv-44 sailed from HONOLULU, OAHU, T. H., on 28 January, 1945, and arrived at ENIWETOK on 6 February, 1945, after the LST and LSM convoy had sailed. Schools and physical exercise were held enroute and all troops thoroughly briefed on all phases of the operation. A thorough study was made of the latest intelligence information and photographs. This study revealed two centers of activity believed to contain very strong defenses and large caliber guns. In view of the limited fire being placed on one of these areas it was requested that the NGF Support Plan be changed to place 300 rounds of 14 inch and 16 inch on the area in TA 183-B-C-D-E-H-I-J-O, 184-A-F- on D-day, prior to H-hour.

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To the rear of the cliff line on the right flank of RCT-25 zone of action a suspected tank assembly and mortar position area was found. Since it was defiladed from the fire being placed on that area by NGF it was requested that a napalm, bomb and rocket attack be made by aircraft on the area in TA 183-W with the runs being made from west to east. Div concurred in these two requests but they were not incorporated in the plans due to the fact that the NGF and Air Support plans could not be readily changed at such a late date.

At ENIWETOK a conference of BLT Comdrs and Staffs was held on the RCT APA and last minute difficulties settled prior to the rehearsal scheduled for TINIAN (or SAIPAN). TransDiv-44 sailed from ENIWETOK on 6 February, 1945, for staging area at SAIPAN, and arrived there on 11 February, 1945. On 10 and 11 February, 1945, the LVT's of the 5th Amph Trac Bn and the LVT(A)(4)'s of Co "A", 2d Arm Amph Bn were loaded on their respective LST's. The rehearsal scheduled for 12 February, 1945, to be held off TINIAN, was cancelled due to rough weather.

On 13 February, 1945, a Corps rehearsal was held off the west coast of TINIAN simulating as closely as possible the actual landing to be made on IWO JIMA. H-hour was set at 0900. The LVT waves formed behind the LD on schedule. All waves were dispatched on time but some of the later waves did not cross the LD on schedule, due to the fact that the control PC boat shifted station just prior to the dispatch of the 1st Wave, and the guide boats of the later waves did not automatically bring their waves up to the LD as the preceding waves were dispatched. The control PC boat was off station nearly 1000 yards when the last LVT wave had been dispatched. At about H-hour, in order to reload the LVT's in calm water, the LST's were ordered to move to the vicinity of TINIAN Town anchorage. When the LST's moved from position behind the LD, the Res BLT, the RCT Support Group and some of the assault BLT Res waves followed the LST's to TINIAN Town. This caused a long delay in the dispatching of these units. All waves were finally dispatched and, after making a run to within 300 yards of the beach, returned to the parent vessel for re-embarkation. The NGF Teams were sent ashore on 11 February, 1945 and simulated call and spotting missions during the rehearsal. This rehearsal was the first time that RCT-25 had had an opportunity to work with either the LVT's or LVT(A)(4)'s. Upon completion of the re-embarkation the assault BLT's were re-embarked on the LST's.

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Navy and Marine officers who were to participate in the operation and the errors that occurred during the rehearsal were discussed.

On 15 February, 1945, the LST's and LSM's sailed for IWO JIMA. On 16 February, 1945, TransDiv-44 sailed for IWO JIMA.

### SECTION III

#### SHIP-TO-SHORE MOVEMENT

##### A. LANDING PLAN

The plan for landing RCT-25 on Beach BLUE 1 on the south-east coast of IWO JIMA was based on the problem of landing two BLT's abreast on a 500 yard wide beach on the exposed right (north) flank. To accomplish this without overcrowding the beach with LVT's the left BLT (BLT-1) was landed with two companies abreast and the right BLT (BLT-3) was landed in a column of companies. The landing schedule and diagram below shows the composition of the various waves and scheduled time of landing:

#### LANDING SCHEDULE AND DIAGRAM

BEACH BLUE 1			
BLT-1		Wave No & Time of Landing	BLT-3
11 LVT(A)(4)'s		No. 1 H-hour	6 LVT(A)(4)'s
7 LVT(2)'s Co "A"	7 LVT(2)'s Co "B"	No. 2 H plus 2	7 LVT(2)'s Co "I"
1 LVT(2) 5 LVT(4)'s Co "A"	6 LVT(4)'s Co "B"	No. 3 H plus 7	2 LVT(2)'s 5 LVT(4)'s Co "I"
		No. 4 H plus 12	7 LVT(2)'s Co "K"

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<u>BLT-1</u>	Wave No & Time of Landing	<u>BLT-3</u>
11 LVT(4)'s Co "C"	No. 5 H plus 17	7 LVT(2)'s Co "K"
8 LVT(4)'s Hq Co - 81mm	No. 6 H plus 22	6 LVT(4)'s Co "L"
	No. 6A H plus 25	10 LVT(4)'s Co "L" - 81mm
2 LSM's Med. Tanks	No. 7 or call H plus 30	1 LSM Med. Tanks
8 LCVP's 2 LCM's Co "B", Pion, 2 H/T	No. 8 Call	8 LCVP's Co "C", Pion
5 LCVP's 1 LCM 4 37mm - 1 TD	No. 9 Call	4 LCVP's 3 LCM's 4 37mm - 2 H/T - 1 TD
5 LCVP's 5 Jeeps	No. 10 Call	4 LCVP's 4 LCM's 4 Jeeps - 4 1 ton trks
1 LCVP 4 LCM's 1 Amb Jeep - 4 1 ton trks	No. 11 Call	4 LCVP's 4 Jeeps
2 LVT(4)'s Bn CO and Party	Free	3 LVT(4)'s Bn CO and Party

BEACH BLUE 1		
WAVE NO.	BLT-2 (Res Bn)	LAND
No. 1	4 LCVP's Co "E"	4 LCVP's Co "F" R - hour
No. 2	4 LCVP's Co "E"	4 LCVP's Co "F" R plus 7.

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No. 3	7 LCVP's Co "G"	R plus 14
No. 4	8 LCVP's 37mm-81mm-Hq Co.	R plus 21
No. 5	6 LCVP's      3 LCM's 1 E/T-2 1 ton trks-Jeeps	R plus 28
No. 6	6 LCVP's 6 Jeeps	Call
Free	1 LCVP Bn CO and Party	Free

NOTE: BLT-2 (Res Bn) lands at R-hour, as set by RCT Comdr.

RCT SUPPORT GROUP		
Free	7 LCVP's RCT Comdr-Reg Hq	Free
1	1 LCVP      3 LCM's R/W Co Hq 1st Sec. 1st Prov Roc	Call
2	2 LCVP's      1 LCM Co "A", Engr 1 TD-14	Call
3	6 LCVP's H&S Co, 4th pion Bn	Call
4	7 LCVP's Co "D", 133d NG Bn-MP Plat	Call

The LVT(A)(4)'s of Co "A", 2d Arm Amph Bn were all loaded in one LST. Each assault BLT had three LST's in which were loaded the LVT's of the 5th Amph Trac Bn. The BLT's were so loaded that one rifle company was embarked on each LST and the Hq Co of the BLT scattered over each of the LST's.

The support waves of the assault BLT's consisting of LCVP's and LCM's boated the remainder of the BLT Hq, the attached 37mm AT platoon, the attached 75mm half-tracks, the bulk of the Shore Party and Beach Party, and supply and communication vehicles

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of the BLT's. All of these waves were to be landed on order of the RCT Comdr, as requested by the BLT Comdrs. One LSM was assigned each BLT for the landing of Shore Party and engineer equipment, and was to be landed as soon as conditions on the beach would permit.

The Res BLT (BLT-2) was boated in LCVP's and LCM's and ordered to be in the LCM-LCVP Rendezvous Area behind the LST's by H plus 60, prepared to land on order. The RCT Support Group was boated in LCVP's and LCM's and consisted of the RCT Hq, six one ton 4x4 rocket trucks of the 1st Sec, 1st Prov Rocket Det, the 4th Pion Bn Hq, the Hq and res platoon of Co "A", 4th Engr Bn and the Hq Plat of R/W Co. Individual waves of the RCT Support Group were to be landed on order of the RCT Comdr.

Initial supply was provided by 16 LCVP's loaded with emergency supplies of ammo, water, barbed wire, demolitions and medical supplies. They were to report to the RCT Loading and TQM Officer on board the Control Boat for Beach BLUE 1 at H plus 60. As the BLT's requested supplies the boat or boats with the desired supplies were to be dispatched to the appropriate BLT beach. A number of LVT(4)'s were also to be loaded with pre-designated supplies upon their return to the LST's after the 1st trip to the beach and were to stand by prepared to launch and land on order.

#### B. CONTROL PLAN

The actual control of landing waves was primarily a Navy responsibility until the waves reached a point 300 yards from the beach. All LVT waves of the whole Corps were scheduled to land at a definite time interval and the dispatching of the first six waves was to be from one central control boat. Beach BLUE 1 was controlled by the TransDiv-44 Control Officer on a PC boat stationed on the LD between the BLT boat approach channels. Two SC's marked the right and left flanks of the LD of Beach BLUE 1. Each LVT wave for each BLT had 2 LCVP guide boats, one to lead in the wave and the other to follow behind the wave. The boat group commander from the AFA on which the BLT was embarked, was to be the leading guide boat for the 1st wave of the assault BLT's.

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The TransDiv-44 Control Officer, the RCT Comdr with the RCT Operations and Assistant Operations Officer, the Supply Officer, the NGF Liaison Officer, the Communications Officer, the RCT Loading and TQM Officer, and the CO, 5th Amph Trac Bn were to be embarked on the PC Control Boat. The TransDiv-44 Control Officer was to have radio communication with TransRon Control, each wave guide, the ships of TransDiv-44, the LST's and LSM's and the boat group comdrs from each ship. The CO, 5th Amph Trac Bn was to have radio communication with each LVT, each LVT(A)(4), the two liaison officers with the assault boat group commanders, and with each LST. The RCT Comdr was to have radio communication with each BLT, Div Hq, Div Control embarked with Trans-Ron Control, the remainder of the RCT Hq, and with the various attached units.

Waves were to be called to the LD by the hoisting of the numeral flag for the wave on the port or starboard vardarm as appropriate. The wave would then be dispatched by the lowering of the flag. This was to be supplemented by calling the waves over the radio.

#### C. Description of Landing.

The transports arrived in the transport area at 0640 on D-day (19 February, 1945) and the LST's arrived in their area at 0710. The LVT's were launched at 0740 and waves formed and moved into position behind the line of departure. The transports commenced debarkation of troops and equipment upon reaching the transport area. In spite of the previous exercises held by the transports, much difficulty was experienced in the unloading of vehicles and equipment. Hatches were slow in being stripped, winch crews inexperienced, guide lines for the vehicles not initially used and then used improperly. The RCT Comdr, his staff, and the CO, 5th Amph Trac Bn reached the control PC (1081) at 0810. The latest information on the beach as received from the underwater demolition team that had landed on D-2 day was given to the CO's of BLT-1 and BLT-2.

At 0825 the control PC (1081) for Beach BLUE 1 was south of its proper position approximately 700 yards and the whole LD for the Corps was approximately 500 yards south of its proper position. The wave of LVT's and LCI(G)'s were formed

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200 yards shoreward of the LD and were dispatched with the 1st wave at 0830 on schedule. The table below shows the time of dispatch and landing of the waves of the assault BLT's:

Wave No.	BLT-1	Time of Landing	:	BLT-3	Time of Landing
	Time of Dispatch			Time of Dispatch	
1	0830	0903	:	0830	0903
2	0832	0904	:	0832	0904
3	0837	0906	:	0837	0906
4	None	None	:	0842	0911
5	0847	0914	:	0847	0914
6	0852	0920	:	0852	0921
7	None	None	:	0855	0924
8	1005	1017	:	1005	1017
9	0945	1002	:	0955	1008

The waves crossed the line of departure in good formation and headed toward the beach. As the waves approached the beach it was necessary for them to travel more and more to the right (north) to offset their crossing the line of departure 700 yards to the right (south) of its proper position and also to offset a drift of the current of 1/2 to 1 knot to the south. The wave of LCI gunboats preceeding the first wave fired their rockets as they came within range and then stopped dead and allowed the 1st and 2d Waves to pass through them. The LCI gunboats then headed out to seaward and got slowly under way. The LCI(S)'s on the right flank in Beach BLUE 2 boat lane turned to the right (north) and slowly steamed up the beach firing on the cliff line on the right flank with their 40mm's.

The first wave landed on the proper beach at 0903 and moved inland to the base of the first terrace. When the 1st wave

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passed through the line of gunboats the LVT(A)(4)'s opened fire on the beach and continued to fire until the 1st wave of troops pushed forward blocking their fire. The 2d wave landed at 0904, debarked from the LVT's and pushed inland. Up to this time there had been very little fire placed on the leading waves, however as the troops moved inland they came under very heavy MG and small arms fire from positions near the airfield to the front and from the cliff line on the right flank. The remaining waves landed at the times shown above. The following waves did not land on the proper beach: Wave 5 of BLT-1 landed 300 yards south of the proper beach, Waves 4, 5, 6, and 6A of BLT-3 landed from 200 to 500 yards south of the assigned portion of Beach BLUE 1. The landing of units at the wrong spots was due largely to the initially incorrect LD positions and confusion of the wave guides as to which of the beached enemy APD, LSM's and lugger was which.

At 0915 the enemy began placing intense mortar, rocket, and artillery barrages on the landing beaches and the area inland from the beach although the heaviest concentrations were on the beaches. After the LVT's unloaded they re-entered the water and returned to their parent LST's. A few tractors were disabled by enemy fire and several in the later waves received direct hits, but not until troops had disembarked.

At 0935, the Co Hq, 4th Engr Bn with an armored TD-14 bulldozer was dispatched to the beach. The Co Hq landed on the left of Beach RED 1.

At 0945 and 0955 the first waves of LCVP's (8th wave), consisting chiefly of the Shore Party, were dispatched. The 8th wave landed at 1002 and 1008 but mistook the beached lugger on Beach YELLOW for the APD on Beach BLUE 1 and landed 500-700 yards south of the proper beaches. At 1005 the three LSM's carrying the medium tanks were dispatched and landed on Beach BLUE 1 at 1017. As the LSM's approached the beach they drew very heavy artillery and mortar fire and each LSM received several hits. All tanks were unloaded however, and the LSM's retracted from the beach.

At 1233 the first wave of BLT-2 (RCT Res) was dispatched and succeeding waves followed at seven minute intervals. The first wave of BLT-2 landed at 1246 and the last wave at 1327. At

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1545, one battery of 1/14 was dispatched to the beach; the other units of 1/14 landed at intervals as ordered by the Battalion Comdr of 1/14. BLT-1/24 started landing at 1632 and completed landing at 1710. The forward RCT Command Post was dispatched at 1505 and the RCT Comdr moved from the PC 1081 to the RCT Command Post ashore at 1700.

The following personnel were left on the Beach BLUE 1 Control (PC 1081): Assistant Operations Officer, Supply Officer, RCT Loading and TQM Officer, Bn C.O., 5th Amph Trac Bn, and sufficient radio operators to man the RCT SCR 300 and 610 channels. These radios served as relay to Div Hq afloat throughout the night and handled the supply requests from the shore parties and BLT's.

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SECTION IV

NARRATIVE OF THE OPERATION

D-day, 19 February, 1945.

The first wave, composed of LVT(A)(4)'s landed at 0902 and moved inland to the base of the first terrace. The LVT(A)(4)'s on the right flank moved to the right on the beach and in the water to cover the debarkation of troops in later waves. The second waves (first wave of troops) landed at 0904 and disembarked troops about 20 yards inland. The first and second waves reported that there was only light enemy fire until the troops disembarked and moved approximately 25 yards from the LVT, when they came under very heavy MG, mortar, artillery and rocket fire. BLT-1/25 on the left although at least 200 yards south of its proper position had no contact with the unit on its left and extended to the left to make this contact. At 0932, BLT-1/25 reported that troops were still under heavy fire of all types but had moved inland 300 yards. At 1007, BLT-3/25 reported that troops had moved north along the beach 350 yards and that its left flank was inland 400 yards and in contact with BLT-1/25. BLT-3/25 also reported receiving very heavy and accurate small arms fire from the cliff line in 183-V-W-X. At 0945, an armored bulldozer and a section of Co Hq of Co "A", 4th Engr Bn was sent to the left of Beach BLUE 1 to prepare a roadway off the beach for the tanks. This bulldozer was actually landed on Beach RED 2, a distance of 1000 yards to the left (south) of Beach BLUE 1, and did not reach Beach BLUE 1 until the following day. At 1017, the tanks had landed and were moving inland from Beach BLUE 1. Co "B", 4th Tank Bn, less one platoon was attached to Co "A". As the three LSM's carrying the tanks approached the beach they drew heavy artillery and mortar fire. Although this fire did not prevent the landing of the LSM's it did slow the launching of the tanks. All three LSM's were hit by enemy fire but were able to launch all tanks and retract from the beach. At 1025, BLT-3/25 reported its lines approximately on the RCT-O-a line on the right flank and within 150 yards of the road in 183-V. BLT-3/25 further reported that casualties had been very heavy and that its companies were considerably disorganized due to the heavy casualties and the fact that some of the waves had landed on beaches to the left

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(south) of its assigned area of Beach BLUE 1. At 1022, BLT-1/25 reported that its lines were 400 yards inland, that there was a gap of approximately 100 yards on the right flank, that a portion of the Res Co had been committed, that heavy casualties had been received, particularly to key personnel, that heavy small arms, mortar and artillery fire was still being received along the whole front and on the beach. At 1130, BLT-1/25 had nearly reached a line abreast of the airfield.

By 1200, it was seen that it was vital for RCT-25 to seize the high ground to the NE of the Beach (TA 183-V-W). In view of the gap that had developed between BLT-1/25 and BLT-3/25 the C.O. of BLT-2/25 (RCT Res) on board the BLUE control boat (PC 1081) was ordered to land his BLT on Beach BLUE 1, attack in a column of companies astride the boundary between BLT-1/25 and BLT-3/25, to seize the high ground to the NW of the quarry and to assist the advance of BLT-3/25. Permission to use the second Co was given to the C.O. BLT-2/25 but the remaining Co was not to be employed without approval from the RCT Comdr. By 1400, BLT-2/25 had moved one company into the line between BLT-1/25 and BLT-3/25 and a coordinated attack was started. At 1530, "F" and "G" Co of BLT-2/25 were passed through "I" Co and the attack continued. It was requested by the C.O. RCT-25 that artillery be landed and at 1545 one battery of 1/14 had been dispatched from the line of departure with the other batteries to follow at appropriate intervals. 1/14 was in position and ready for fire missions by 1700. At 1632, BLT-1/24 started landing on Beach BLUE 1 and became attached to RCT-25 upon landing but with the provision that it would not be employed without authority from Div. An Assembly Area in TA 165-E, 166-A was designated by the RCT-25 Comdr. At this time BLT-2/25 was given authority to commit its companies without prior approval of the RCT Comdr. At 1730, the heavy casualties and disorganization of BLT-3/25 were such that the RCT Comdr requested and received permission to use one Co of BLT-1/24. By 1830, the high ground on top and inland of the quarry had been seized by BLT-2/25 and BLT-5/25, but extremely heavy casualties had been received. Co "A" of BLT-1/24 was attached to BLT-3/25 at 1845. At 1900, BLT-3/25 reported its front line strength as being only 150 men and, in view of the counter-attack expected on the right flank, permission was requested from Div to use one Co of BLT-3/24 (Div Res) which was in position immediately to the rear of BLT-3/25. This request was

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denied but permission to use one more Co of BLT-1/24 was granted and Co "B" of BLT-1/24 was attached to BLT-3/25. Units commenced digging in at 1700 and firm contact was established along the RCT front except on the left flank where there was a gap of 75 yards. This gap was covered by fire and observation during the night. By 2330, "A" and "B" Co of BLT-1/24 had moved into line, and the three companies of BLT-3/25 had been pulled out, and had taken up a secondary defensive line in rear of BLT-1/24.

The total area occupied by RCT-25 was under continuous artillery, mortar and rocket fire from shortly after the landing of the initial waves until well after dark. Evacuation of casualties and the bringing in of supplies was exceedingly difficult, for when any boat approached the beach, it was immediately subjected to accurate mortar and artillery fire. The effectiveness of the Shore Party was consequently greatly reduced and no roads for wheeled vehicles could be constructed. It was not until well after dark that any re-supply of front line units could be effected and this was done only by use of balanced loaded LVT(4)'s running directly to the front line units.

The advance RCT CP was established ashore at TA 165-J at 1530 by the RCT Executive Officer and the RCT Comdr moved ashore at 1700. For the final line for the night, see Appendix "I" to Section 4 (Progress of the Attack Overlay).

D plus 1, 20 February, 1945.

The night of D-day was marked by local counter-attacks and enemy infiltration attempts. Accurate enemy mortar and artillery fire fell on the front lines and on the beach areas throughout the night causing many casualties and destroying the beach dumps of BLT-3/25.

Div Op Or No. 1-45 was received during the night and ordered a continuation of the attack at K-hour (0830) to seize O-1. BLT-1/24 and Co "B", 4th Tank Bn was attached to RCT-25. The plan of action for RCT-25 was as follows: BLT-1/24 relieve BLT-3/25 prior to K-hour; BLT-3 revert to RCT Res; BLT-1 on the left make the main effort; and BLT-2/25 in the center complete the seizure of the high ground to its immediate front and its seizure of

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BLT-1/25 by fire. BLT-1/24 remain in position until such time as BLT-1/25 and BLT-2/25 could advance and come abreast.

At 0715, the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer and Operations Officer of BLT-2/25 were wounded by a mortar burst in the BLT CP. Lt. Col. James Taul, Executive Officer of BLT-3/25 was ordered to assume command of BLT-2/25. The attack jumped off at K-hour although considerable difficulty had been encountered in completing proper re-supply and re-organization of front line units on time. Slow advances were made by BLT-1/25 and by BLT-2/25 against very heavy small arms, automatic weapons, mortar, artillery and rocket fire. Tanks of Co "A", 4th Tank Bn supported the attack of BLT-1/25 and BLT-2/25 but were of little assistance due to the rough terrain and the fact that every time a tank reached a firing position it was brought under heavy mortar and artillery fire. During the day heavy mortar and artillery barrages were placed along the front lines of BLT-1/25 near AIRFIELD No. 1 and on the beaches. This fire on the beaches made both the supply and evacuation problems extremely difficult and LVT's were used almost exclusively for bringing in supplies.

At 1600, an air strike consisting of 50 cal strafing, rockets and bombs was placed on troops of BLT-1/24 on top of the quarry in TA 183-W. This air strike was delivered without a preliminary run and was placed on the front lines in spite of the fact that yellow front line marking panels were displayed prior to and during the attack, in such positions as to be clearly visible. The troops and panels were visible from RCT-25 CP and from positions on the beach. BLT-1/24 suffered 5 killed and 6 wounded from this attack.

By 1800, gains of 200 to 300 yards had been made by BLT-1/25 and BLT-2/25. The left flank of BLT-1/25 was unable to move throughout the day due to the heavy fire received from the left front in the zone of action of RCT-23. At 1800, orders were issued for all units to consolidate, dig in, and establish firm contact between units.

D plus 2, 21 February, 1945.

Units in line from left to right, BLT-1/25, BLT-2/25, BLT-1/24 were in much better defensive positions during the night of 20-21 February. During the night the enemy attempted to infiltrate through our line in two and three man groups and continually em-

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played knee mortar fire on the front lines. At 0445, BLT-2/25 repulsed an attack by an estimated 100 Japanese. A large amount of air burst WP, in conjunction with sporadic mortar and artillery fire, was placed on the rear area starting two fires in the beach ammunition dumps on Beach BLUE 1.

Div Op Or No. 2-45 was received during the night for continuation of the attack at K-hour (0810) to seize objective O-2. The plan of attack for RCT-25 with Co "A" and "B", 4th Tank Bn and BLT-1/24 attached was the same as for the preceding day. The attack jumped off at K-hour against heavy small arms fire from numerous pillboxes and under heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire. The attack of BLT-1/25 and BLT-2/25 was supported by tanks of Co "A", 4th Tank Bn. Co "B", 4th Tank Bn delivered destructive fires on located pillboxes on the cliff line to the front of BLT-1/24. At 1000 the Commanding Officer of BLT-1/25, Lt. Col. H. U. MUSTAIN, was killed in action by enemy mortar or artillery fire in TA 182Y while checking front line positions. Major Fenton J. Mee, the Bn-3, performing duty as Bn-X (since D-day) immediately assumed command of BLT-1/25. Slow progress was made in the center by BLT-2/25 and on the left by BLT-1/25 except on its extreme left flank where continued fire from the zone of RCT-23 and the inability of that unit to move to its front prevented the advance of the left elements of BLT-1/25. At 1430 BLT-3/25 was committed between BLT-1/25 and BLT-2/25. This was necessary due to a gap being created between 1/25 and 2/25. One Co of BLT-3/25 and one Co of BLT-1/24 were held as RCT Res. At 1700 units were ordered to consolidate positions for the night and contact was established along the front except on the left flank of the RCT where a gap existed which was covered by fire and observation.

D plus 3, 22 February, 1945.

Accurate enemy mortar and artillery fire for short but intense periods was received throughout the night. Enemy patrols constantly harassed the front lines and attempted to infiltrate through the line. The enemy patrols were repulsed, though some casualties were suffered as a result of their activity.

Div Op Or No. 3-45 was received during the night and called for the continuation of the attack at K-hour (0835) to seize O-2. RCT-21 was to pass through RCT-23 on the left flank at K-hour.

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The plan of RCT-25 with 1/24 and Co "A" & "B", 4th Tank Bn attached was for the initial effort to be made on the left. BLT-1/25 on the left, was ordered to attack straight to the north to the RCT left boundary where it would hold its position and be pinched out as RCT-21 advanced across its front. BLT-3/25 in the left center was then to make contact with RCT-21. When this was completed a coordinated attack of the whole front line would begin to seize O-1. Due to the delay of RCT-21 on the left in effecting the relief of RCT-23 the attack did not jump off until 1215. Initially the attack progressed well against moderate resistance and gains of up to 200 yards were made on the extreme left. However, RCT-21 suddenly fell back to its original position leaving the left of RCT-25 completely exposed. Since RCT-25 had only a small reserve it was necessary for BLT-1/25 to drop back to its original position to prevent a very large gap. BLT-3/25 made only minor local improvements in positions during the day, however fired two rocket barrages on the hill in TA 183-C-D to soften the position. This barrage drove a large number of enemy out of their emplacements who were immediately taken under fire by well placed MG's. It was estimated that 200 of the enemy were killed in this manner. BLT-2/25 in the right center was counter-attacked at 1120 by an estimated 100 enemy following a very heavy enemy mortar barrage. The attack was repulsed, however, a large number of casualties were received from the enemy mortar fire. BLT-1/24 on the right, made only local improvements in its positions. At 1000 a hard cold rain began to fall and continued throughout the day. At 1530, the Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. J. M. Chambers and the Air Ln Officer of BLT-3/25 were wounded by enemy MG fire while in the BLT OP. Captain James G. Headley, formerly C.O. of Co "L", but serving as Bn-X, was ordered to assume command of BLT-3/25. Units were ordered to consolidate positions at 1630, however, a gap on the left existed and, although the Res Co of BLT-1/25 was employed, was not filled completely. At 1830, a large group of enemy was observed forming up in front of BLT-2/25 and moving toward our front lines. This attempted counter-attack was broken up and repulsed by BLT-2/25.

D plus 4, 23 February, 1945.

During the night of 22-23 February, the enemy attempted to infiltrate into our lines. These attempts were repulsed with an estimated 150 enemy killed. The infiltration attempts were

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accompanied by heavy artillery and mortar fire.

RCT-25 was relieved by RCT-24 commencing at 0600 in accordance with Div Op Or No. 4-45. The relief of BLT-1/25 and BLT-3/25 was completed prior to 0730, but the relief of BLT-3/25 was not completed until 0900. BLT-1/24 and Co "A" & "B", 4th Tank Bn were detached and BLT-2/25 was attached to RCT-24 for use as Res BLT. RCT-25, less BLT-2/25, assembled in Div Res in TA 165-E-J, 166-A-F. All units spent the day in reorganizing and rehabilitation with unit Commanding Officers making a reconnaissance of the Div front and selecting routes of approach to the various front line BLT areas.

D plus 5, 24 February, 1945.

A few rounds of enemy mortar and artillery fire fell in the RCT area during the night causing no casualties. RCT-25, less BLT-2/25, remained in Div Res throughout the day and continued reorganization and rehabilitation. Further reconnaissance of the Div front line was made by all units. At 1600, BLT-1/25 was attached to RCT-24 in accordance with orders from Div. One Co of BLT-1/25 was in turn attached to BLT-3/24 for use as a Res Co during the night.

D plus 6, 25 February, 1945.

BLT-1/25 reverted to RCT-25 at 0930. RCT-25, less BLT-2/25, remained in Div Res and reconnaissance of zone of RCT-24 was made by unit commanders and staff. At 1700, a verbal warning order was received stating that RCT-25 would pass through RCT-24 on 26 February, and plans were made accordingly.

D plus 7, 26 February, 1945.

RCT-25 started relieving RCT-24 in its zone at 0530 in accordance with Div Op Or No. 7-45. BLT-1/25 relieved BLT-3/24 on the left, completing its relief by 0650; BLT-2/25 relieved BLT-2/24 in the center, completing its relief by 0820. BLT-2/25 had been attached to RCT-24 on 25 February, and had its companies attached to the BLT's of RCT-24. One of these companies had in turn been placed in the line by BLT-3/24. The delay in early release of BLT-2/25 and its subsequent delay in moving into the line prevented the jump off at K-hour. BLT-2/25 was attached to

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RCT-25 and remained in RCT Res. Tanks of Co "A", 4th Tank Bn attached to RCT-25 were assigned the mission of supporting BLT-1/25 and BLT-3/25. The attack jumped off at 0820 following the artillery and NGF preparations. On the left the front lines moved out well for 150 yards against small arms fire, but were suddenly pinned down by extremely heavy MG fire from concealed emplacements thought to be in the vicinity of "Turkey Knob" (SW cor of TA 184-F), which proved to be a strong center of resistance. Enemy mortars and rockets were also brought to bear on the front lines of BLT-1/25. Tanks brought up to locate and knock out MG fire, were unable to do so and their presence drew even more intense mortar and rocket fire. Air spot and counter battery fires were requested to locate and knock out the mortar and rocket positions but they were unable to locate the enemy firing positions.

BLT-2/25 in the center was able to make gains of only 75 to 150 yards. Heavy casualties were suffered in this advance over very rugged terrain, from heavy small arms and well placed MG and mortar fire. BLT-3/25 on the right made a slow but steady advance against heavy MG and rifle fire from well constructed positions utilizing tanks to neutralize these emplacements. By 1630, BLT-3/25 had seized the cliff line to the east of the Boat Landing (TA 167-B, 184-P-U) for an overall advance of nearly 500 yards. On the left BLT-1/25 was forced to withdraw from its untenable position on the low ground below the cliff line in TA 183-J under cover of a smoke screen which was also utilized to evacuate the numerous casualties. The Res Co of BLT-1/25 had been committed on its left and at 1530 BLT-3/24 was ordered to attach one Co to BLT-1/25. On the right BLT-3/25 requested an additional Co since its lines had become extended in tying in with BLT-2/25 to its left rear. At 1630, BLT-3/24 was ordered to attach one Co to BLT-3/25. At 1700, all units were ordered to consolidate positions, to make firm contact with adjacent units and to dig in for the night.

D plus 8, 27 February, 1945.

Extensive infiltration preceded by very heavy though intermittent mortar barrages were made by the enemy during the night. In the area in front of BLT-1/25, 103 enemy dead were counted following the night's activities. The attack of RCT-25 with BLT-3/24 attached, jumped off at 0800 in accordance with Div Op Or No. 8-45. BLT-2/25 in the center and BLT-3/25 on the right were

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to continue the attack straight to the front; BLT-1/25 on the left was to by-pass the strongly held area to its immediate front by moving troops to the left through the zone of RCT-23 (which was reported to have advanced on its right to a position forward of the cliff line) and then to attack south east from the RCT boundary toward BLT-2/25. BLT-1/25 moved two Co's behind the right of RCT-23 and left two Co's in its original position. It was found that the right elements of RCT-23 (BLT-3/23) had not progressed sufficiently to allow BLT-1/25 to start its move to the south-east, and this plan could not be carried into effect at K-hour. At 1500 BLT-1/25 decided not to wait on the advance of BLT-3/23 and passed one Co through the right elements of BLT-3/23 in their zone of action and attempted to make the envelopment. This attack was supported by tanks and followed a rocket barrage. An advance of 150 yards was made across an open area but the advance was halted prior to reaching the cover on the far side. Very heavy casualties were received from intense MG, heavy mortar and anti-tank fire. Two of the three tanks supporting this attack were put out of action by enemy fire and the third was damaged. At 1715 it was seen that the commanding ground could not be reached and that the position was untenable due to the fact that there was no cover and that both flanks were exposed and orders were issued for this flanking unit of BLT-1/25 to withdraw back through the line of BLT-3/23 and return to its position of the preceding night. In the center and on the right BLT-2/25 and BLT-3/25 were able to make gains of from 200 to 300 yards when they were ordered at 1600 to halt their advance on favorable ground. At 1730 orders were issued for all units to consolidate positions and dig in for the night.

D plus 9, 28 February 1945.

Activities during the night of 27-28 February consisted of attempted infiltrations and light mortar fire along the whole front. The attack jumped off at K-hour (0815) in accordance with Div Op Or No. 9-45 to seize O-2 with the main effort being made on the left, Co "I", the remaining Co. of BLT-3/24, was attached to BLT-1/25 for use as a reserve Co for the flanking elements. BLT-1/25 on the left attacked in a column of companies through the right flank of RCT-23 in a southeasterly direction to pinch off the strongpoint below "Turkey Knob" (SW corner TA 134-F). The leading Co moved across the open ground and into the edge of the wood north of "Turkey Knob" for an advance of 150 yards. As the

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troops reached this point the enemy laid down a very heavy mortar and rocket barrage, plus intense MG fire from the high ground 100 yards to the front and from the left flank. The left flank of BLT-1 was exposed since BLT-2/23 on the left had not moved abreast and fire from the commanding ground in the zone of BLT-2/25 decimated the front line of BLT-1/25. At 1030 two more Co's were ordered in the line extending the right flank toward "Turkey Knob". At 1215 Co "B", which had remained on the low ground to the south of "Turkey Knob" started an attack toward the high ground east of "Turkey Knob". By 1500 this Co had made an advance of 200 yards and had reached the base of the cliff line of which "Turkey Knob" was a part. After this Co started up the high ground the enemy, well dug in and established on this high ground, began throwing grenades and mines on the advancing troops. MG's emplaced further east on this ground also enfiladed Co "B". Co "B" suffered very heavy casualties and at 1530 was forced to withdraw. When the juncture with Co "B" could not be made it was seen that the position of the flanking forces was untenable due to the fact that both flanks were exposed, the commanding ground had not been seized, and very heavy casualties had been suffered, therefore orders were issued for BLT-1/25 to withdraw to the closest favorable ground.

In the center, BLT-2/25 attempted to extend its left flank to support the attack of Co "B" and to push forward and seize the commanding ground to its immediate front. Very little progress was made due to extremely heavy fire and very rugged terrain. Tanks and half-tracks could not be brought into position to support the attack of BLT-2/25 and in order to reduce the pillbox that was holding up the advance a 75mm pack howitzer was requested and sent up to the front lines. The howitzer was assembled and fired about 40 rounds but the direct result of this fire was not apparent. However, the front lines were able to move forward 75 yards further to a position from which the pillbox was destroyed on the following day. On the right flank BLT-3/25 had by 1000 moved out 100 yards where its advance was halted in order not to break contact with BLT-2/25 on its left. At 1800 units were ordered to consolidate positions for the night.

D plus 10, 1 March 1945.

At 2200, 28 February and again at 0230, 1 March, the enemy made large scale attempts to penetrate the lines of BLT-3/25. These attacks were repulsed by the accurate placing of artillery and mortar fire on the enemy group killing an estimated 150 of the enemy. In the zone of BLT-1/25 command at 2200 the enemy

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placed heavy mortar and rocket fire on our front lines and continued to do so throughout the remainder of the night.

The attack was continued at K-hour (0830) in accordance with Div Op Or No. 10-45. BLT-3/24 was relieved by BLT-3/23 which was attached to this RCT at 0930. BLT-1/25 on the left was ordered to make the main effort; BLT-2/25 and BLT-3/25 in the center and on the right respectively were to hold their positions until the bulge in our lines could be straightened out. BLT-1/25 jumped off at K-hour and was able to push forward approximately 50 yards further than on the preceding day and to extend its right flank to within 50 yards of "Turkey Knob". The unit on the left did not move from positions held the past two days, and the left flank of BLT-1/25 was again exposed to heavy fire from the commanding ground on the left flank. At 1200, Co "B" on the low ground again attempted to make a juncture with the flanking units on the high ground but was again repulsed in its attacks on the strongly fortified cliff line and at 1700 fell back to their original position. Extremely heavy mortar and rocket fire was again placed on the front lines of the flanking unit of BLT-1/25, which combined with the very heavy MG fire from perfectly camouflaged and strongly emplaced positions on the ridge to the front and on the high ground to the left flank, caused very heavy casualties. At 1700 it was seen that the position of the flanking units was untenable for the night since the high ground to the front could not be seized nor the juncture made with Co "B" and orders were issued for the withdrawal to a position held on the previous night. As units started to withdraw very heavy mortar and rocket fire was brought to bear on the front lines and it was necessary to lay a smoke screen to cover the withdrawal and evacuate the wounded.

BLT-2/25 and BLT-3/25 made only minor improvements in positions with BLT-2/25 making an advance on its left of 100 yards. The Div. Recon. Co. was attached to this RCT from 0900 to 1700 for rear area mopping up operations. Positions were consolidated at 1800 and firm contact established between all units.

D plus 11, 2 March 1945.

The night of 1-2 March was relatively quiet with only moderate infiltration attempts and light sporadic mortar and artillery fire. RCT-25 (BLT-3/23 attached) continued the attack

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commencing at 0630. BLT-1/25 on the left attempted to infiltrate and seize the high ground to the north of "Turkey Knob" by jumping off at K minus 90 (K-hour 0800) without the normal preparatory fire in the hope that the enemy would be caught off guard. For the first 15 minutes this was successful but at approximately 0650 the enemy opened up with mortar and rocket barrages and intense MG and sniper fire. By 1430 troops on either side of the gap were within 65 yards of each other, however at 1445 the enemy opened up with a murderous mortar and rocket barrage and with all available small arms and Co "B" on the right of the gap was forced to pull back having suffered over 30 casualties.

In the center BLT-2/25 was ordered to extend its left flank to assist the advance of Co "B" on its left and one Co of BLT-3/23 (RCT Res) was attached for that purpose. The left flank attempted to move out with Co "B" at 0800 but was unable to make any appreciable progress. In the center of BLT-2/25, a frontal advance of nearly 200 yards was made. BLT-3/25 on the right flank commencing at 1630, made an advance along the coast of approximately 300 yards against no opposition. BLT-3/23 remained in RCT Res and continued to mop up the resistance to the west of "Turkey Knob" that had been partially by-passed. The Co that had been attached to BLT-2/25 was not committed during the day and was returned to BLT-3/23 at 1700. At 1700 positions were ordered consolidated for the night and BLT-1/25 was again forced to fall back from its untenable position to make contact with the unit on its left which had not moved throughout the day. Positions were consolidated and firm contact was made along the line prior to darkness.

D plus 12, 3 March 1945.

In accordance with Div Op Or No. 12-45, RCT-23 relieved RCT-25 in its zone of action commencing at 0500. BLT-2/25 and BLT-3/25 remained in the line and were attached to RCT-23. BLT-1/23 relieved BLT-1/25 (less Co "B", which remained in position on the south of the gap); BLT-3/23 reverted to control of RCT-23; RCT-25 (less BLT-2/25 and BLT-3/25) closed in Div Res in TA 182-W at 0830. Co "B" remained under control of BLT-1/25 but was ordered by Div to remain in position on the south of the gap until such time as RCT-23 could effect its release. This was not accomplished until the following day. BLT-1/25 commenced reorganization and rehabilitation.

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D plus 13, 4 March 1945.

RCT-25 (less BLT-2/25 and BLT-3/25) remained in Div Res. Co "B" was relieved from the line at 0730 by RCT-23 and reported to the assembly area of BLT-1/25 at 0930. Co "A", 4th Engr Bn continued to build and improve roads and blow caves in the rear of BLT-2/25 and BLT-3/25. BLT-1/25 continued reorganization, rehabilitation and rest.

D plus 14, 5 March 1945.

In accordance with Div Op Or No. 14-45, RCT-25 commenced relieving RCT-23 in its zone at 0530. BLT-2/25 and BLT-3/25 reverted to control of RCT-25 and remained in position. BLT-1/25 relieved BLT-1/23 in its former zone and had effected the relief of the assault companies by 0600 and the total relief by 0740. BLT-2/25 and BLT-3/25 were each ordered to reorganize their lines and create a Res Co. A Prov Bn was organized composed of the Div Recon Co (attached to RCT-25 at 0700) and Co "L" of BLT-3/25 and placed under the command of Major Asbill (Bn-X of BLT-1/25.) This Prov Bn relieved BLT-3/23 in the area to the rear of the pocket and between BLT-1/25 on the left and BLT-2/25 in the center. The relief of BLT-3/23 commenced at 0800 and was completed at 1030. Readjustment of the lines of BLT-2/25 and BLT-3/25 was completed by 1200. Co "F", BLT-2/25, was designated as RCT Res and placed behind BLT-2/25 and BLT-3/25. The day was spent in reorganizing the lines, digging in strong defensive positions, and mopping up operations in the pocket by the Prov Bn using two flamethrowers and four medium tanks. Extensive use was made of the flamethrower tanks in burning out sniper infested areas. Firm contact was established between all units.

D plus 15, 6 March 1945.

The night of 5-6 March was quiet. Div Op Or No. 15-45 ordered RCT-25 (Div Recon Co attached) to continue mopping up operations on the partially by-passed pocket, to hold its position on its right and to conform to the advance of RCT-24 on its left. K-hour was set at 0800 with 4th Mar Div to continue attack at K plus 60. At 0900 BLT-1/25 started to extend its right flank and by 1600 had pushed to the east side of "Turkey Knob" (S 184-F). On the left of BLT-1/25 no advance was made since RCT-24 on the left did not move its right flank. The Prov Bn continued mopping up operations on the pocket and in the gap between BLT-1 and BLT-2, using flamethrower tanks, medium tanks, and 75 mm halftracks. BLT-2/25 and BLT-3/25 remained in position throughout the day improving their positions.

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There was a considerable increase in the volume of enemy mortar and rocket fire in the left sector over the previous day. This fire was particularly heavy during the K plus 45 to K plus 81 artillery preparation. The resistance in the zone of BLT-1/25, although less than that previously encountered, was still heavy, especially to the east of "Turkey Knob". At 1700 units were ordered to consolidate and dig in for the night. Firm contact was established prior to darkness.

D plus 16, 7 March 1945.

During the night of 6-7 March the enemy attempted to infiltrate along the whole front. In the zone of BLT-1/25 over 50 enemy were killed, but not until some of them had crept all the way into the line. BLT-3/25 reported seeing groups of enemy moving toward the ocean from inland areas and was able to break up their formations by use of artillery and mortar fire, inflicting numerous casualties on the enemy, thus preventing a likely counter attack against the RCT right flank.

RCT-25 (Div Recon Co attached) was ordered by Div Op Or No. 16-45 to conform to the advance of RCT-24 on the left and to hold its position in the center and on the right. BLT-1/25 on the left made no movement during the day due to the dictates of the terrain on the left and since RCT-24 on the left did not move. Mopping up operations were continued on the pocket in TA 183-C, 184-K by the Prov Bn utilizing flamethrower tanks supported by medium tanks. BLT-1/25 also utilized flamethrower and medium tanks in the right of its zone to reduce emplacements and drive out the enemy ahead of its right flank. In the zone of BLT-1/25 the enemy intermittently placed intense mortar barrages on the front lines. BLT-1/25 also received small arms and MG fire from the high ground to its left flank.

D plus 17, 8 March 1945.

During the early part of the night of 7-8 March a very heavy rocket and mortar barrage fell in the lines of BLT-1 killing 10 and wounding seven more. The remainder of the night was marked only by light mortar fire and a few infiltration attempts.

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Div Op Or No. 17-45 ordered a continuation of the attack with the same scheme of maneuver as for the preceding day. K-hour was set at 0750 and the 4th Mar Div attack was set at K minus 90 (0620). No advance was made in the zone of RCT-25 (Div Recon Co attached) since RCT-24 did not move its right flank. BLT-1/25 employed flamethrower and medium tanks on its right flank forward of "Turkey Knob" to destroy any emplacements that could be located. The Prov Bn continued burning off the area within the gap in the same fashion as on the previous day. At 1445, an extremely heavy mortar barrage was placed on the left of BLT-1/25 zone causing a number of casualties and making it necessary for the left Co to be relieved. BLT-1/25 throughout the day received MG and very accurate sniper fire particularly from the high ground on its left flank.

D plus 18, 9 March, 1945.

At 2000, on the night of 8-9 March the Prov Bn reported small patrols of the enemy working along its front and at 0500 several groups of the enemy attempted to infiltrate through the lines of the Prov Bn. The enemy groups worked across the whole front of the Prov Bn and several of the enemy succeeded in reaching the left flank in TA 183-I and placed or threw mines on the 37mm prime movers in that area. No damage was done and none of the enemy succeeded in penetrating the lines. At daylight, 36 enemy dead were counted by the Prov Bn. Minor infiltration was attempted in the zones of the other BLT's and sporadic mortar fire fell on the front lines during the night.

Div Op Or No. 18-45 ordered a continuation of the attack with K-hour at 0700. BLT-2/24 was attached to RCT-25 (Div Recon Co attached) at 0500 and at 0600 relieved BLT-3/25 in its zone of action and BLT-3/25 was detached from RCT-25 and reverted to Div Res. Co "F", BLT-2/25 (RCT Res) relieved Co "L", BLT-3/25, which had been assigned to the Prov Bn. BLT-1/25 on the left made no movement until 1400 when BLT-1/24 on its left was able to move forward 50 yards; the left of BLT-1/25 moved forward accordingly. Throughout the day flamethrower and medium tanks were used on the right of BLT-1/25's zone and in the gap by the Prov Bn. During the day a warning order was received from Div giving the boundaries and scheme of maneuver for the following day and appropriate plans were made and orders issued to BLT's. At 1545, the Prov Bn

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was disbanded and BLT-2/25 was assigned its mission. Co "F", BLT-2/25 and Div Recon Co were attached to BLT-2/25. "Turkey Knob", which had been used as an artillery and mortar registration point by the Japanese, was ordered by the RCT Comdr to be blown down and during the day Co "A", 4th Engr Bn succeeded in carrying out this mission.

D plus 19, 10 March, 1945.

The night of 9-10 March was relatively quiet. In accordance with Div Op Or No. 19-45, BLT-3/25 relieved BLT-1/24 in its zone commencing at 0500 and completed the relief at 0600. RCT-25 (BLT-2/24 and 4th Recon Co attached) jumped off at K-hour (0800) with BLT-3/25 on the left, BLT-1/25 and BLT-2/25 in the center, and BLT-2/24 on the right. The plan of attack was for BLT-3/25 and BLT-1/25 to attack to the SE toward the ocean. As BLT-3/25 moved abreast of BLT-2/25, BLT-1/25 would be pinched out and BLT-2/25 would then swing its left flank and tie in with the right flank of BLT-3/25 and the attack continue toward the ocean. The Recon Co and "F" Co, BLT-2/25 were to mop up the area of the pocket and the gap. BLT-1/25 and BLT-3/25 jumped off at K-hour and made fairly rapid advances against moderate to heavy opposition. BLT-3/25 was able to move faster than BLT-1/25 on its right and in order not to slow the attack BLT-3/25 was ordered to break contact with BLT-1/25 if necessary. By 1100, an advance of 500 yards was reported by BLT-3/25. BLT-1/25 made contact on its right with BLT-2/25 at 0845 thus closing the gap and eliminating the pocket. BLT-3/25 continued its advance an additional 200 yards where its right flank made contact with the center Co of BLT-2/25 which had swung out to meet it. BLT-2/25 had jumped off in the attack at 0800 on its extreme left and was able to mop up the pocket of resistance by 1300. As BLT-2/25 pushed its center company forward to meet BLT-3/25 an area was by-passed in TA 184-I-N. At 1600, BLT-3/25 and BLT-2/25 occupied the controlling ground in the vicinity and were consequently ordered to dig in for the night in that position. The by-passed area in TA 184-I-N was completely surrounded by units of BLT-1/25 and BLT-2/25. At 1200, as BLT-2/25 moved its center Co, Co "A" of BLT-1/25 was pinched out. At this time Co "A" was attached to BLT-3/25 for use as a Res Co since BLT-3/25 had been forced to employ the majority of its Res Co on its left flank to maintain contact with

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RCT-23 on the left. The Div Recon Co was placed in a position in the vicinity of "Turkey Knob" for the night in order to prevent any enemy from infiltrating into the emplacements in that vicinity.

During the day a total gain of 700 yards was made by RCT-25 and the pocket of resistance in TA 183-O and 184-K were completely eliminated.

D plus 20, 11 March, 1945.

During the night 10-11 March the greatest activity was within the pocket of resistance in TA 184-I-N where groups of the encircled enemy tried to break out throughout the night. At K minus 75 (0745) RCT-25 (BLT-2/24 and Div Recon Co attached) continued the attack towards the sea with the units in line from left to right as follows: BLT-3/25, BLT-2/25, BLT-2/24 with BLT-3/25 on the left making the main effort. The RCT was 15 minutes late in jumping off due to the reorganization necessitated by enemy activity during the night. BLT-3/25 met extremely heavy opposition on its left and was unable to move its left any appreciable distance. On the right of BLT-3/25 some progress was made and the left of BLT-2/25 was able to move out in conjunction with the right of BLT-3/25 for an advance of approximately 200 yards. Heavy mortar and rocket fire was placed on the front lines of BLT-3/25 and BLT-2/25 throughout the day causing heavy casualties.

At 0800, BLT-2/25 supported by BLT-1/25 commenced operations to eliminate the pocket in TA 184-I-N and this was completed by 1100. BLT-1/25 was then assigned the mission of mopping up the areas taken on the preceding day. At 1200, BLT-2/25 was ordered to move its two unemployed companies ("J" and "F" Co) to the left of the RCT's zone, prepared to employ them in that area. At 1300, Co "F" was placed in the line between BLT-3/25 and RCT-23 to fill a gap which had been created by the excessive casualties in BLT-3/25 and because the right unit of RCT-23 on BLT-3/25's left did not move abreast. At 1530, BLT-1/25 reported its area of the previous day completely mopped up and it was ordered to take up a secondary position astride the beach road behind BLT-2/24. At 1730, units were ordered to consolidate on ground then held, establish firm contact along the line, and to dig in for the night. BLT-1/25 was ordered to provide security for the beach area and Co "B", 2d Arm Amph Bn was attached to BLT-1/25 for that purpose.

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D plus 21, 12 March, 1945.

Activity during the night was concentrated on the right front of BLT-3/25 where groups of the enemy attempted to break through the line. These were repulsed by hand grenades. (The area of resistance remaining to be taken was by this time so compressed that the use of artillery, NGF, rockets and air support was denied and only by using the greatest care could mortars be used. The terrain in this area was the roughest and most chopped up terrain encountered so far in the operation. It consisted of a series of ridges running generally perpendicularly to the sea. These ridges were in turn cut in numerous places by steep draws running parallel to the ocean. Between these main ridges were draws whose sides were nearly vertical and these draws were in turn broken at intervals by cross ridges. Control was extremely difficult due to the fact that visual contact could be maintained only between very small units and due to the fact that it was impossible to orient the map to the ground).

Div Op Or No. 21-45 was received during the night and called for a continuation of the attack by RCT-25 (BLT-2/24 and Div Recon Co attached) at K plus 60 (0800). At 0700, it was planned that a POW, captured in this area on the previous night, would attempt to induce the surrender of the remaining enemy in the area. The attack was delayed until 0900 for this purpose. Failure of the public address system to function prevented the POW from talking to the remaining enemy.

In order to relieve the left unit of BLT-3/25 which was particularly depleted and bring BLT-2/25 into one zone, the following was done prior to K-hour: BLT-1/25 relieved Co "G" of BLT-2/25; BLT-2/25 relieved the left elements of BLT-3/25 with Co's "E" and "G". Co "A" which had been attached to BLT-3/25 was attached to BLT-2/25 for use as a Res Co, not to be committed without approval from RCT-25. Units in the line from left to right at K hour were: Co "F", Co "E", Co "G", Co "I", Co "B" and BLT-2/24. BLT-2/25 was the only unit facing the ocean. BLT-3/25, BLT-1/25 and BLT-2/24 were faced to the east with their front perpendicular to the ocean. BLT-2/25 was ordered to make the main effort and its attack was to be supported by the three remaining BLT's.

The attack of BLT-2/25 jumped off at K plus 120 (0900) and was

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met by very heavy MG, sniper and mortar fire. The attack of BLT-2/25 was to be supported by tank fire north into the draws inland from the beach road in an attempt to knock out the mortar positions. To accomplish this BLT-2/24 was ordered to push forward along the beach road and to clear the beach road of mines for passage of tanks. This was accomplished by 1200, but at 1300, BLT-2/24 was ordered to withdraw to its previous positions since its presence along the beach road prevented the use of supporting fires by BLT-2/25. The tanks fired napalm and 75mm fire up some of the draws but were unable to reach all of the draws in the area. Gains by BLT-2/25 were very slight and by 1700 an advance of only 100 yards had been made; BLT-2/25 suffered very heavy casualties in gaining this ground. On the left flank RCT-23 pulled its flank away from BLT-2/25 at 1800, leaving a gap of approximately 150 yards which existed throughout the night. At 1130, Co "C" was moved to a position behind BLT-2/25. At 1600, one platoon of Co "C" reinforced with MG's was moved to the beach area behind BLT-2/24 and with Co "B", 2d Arm Amph Bn provided beach defense.

During the day BLT-1/25 and BLT-3/25 continuously fired bazookas, AT grenades, 60mm mortars and hand grenades with grenade adapters into the area to their front in attempts to knock out the mortar and rocket positions which were firing on BLT-2/25. However, this fire did not reduce to any great extent the enemy mortar fire. Tanks were used by BLT-2/25 in support of its attack but due to the limitation of the terrain and closeness of own troops, were only able to fire on a few targets. At 1800, units were ordered to consolidate for the night on the ground then held, and contact was made along the whole line except on the left flank where a gap of 150 yards existed between RCT-23 and RCT-25.

D plus 22, 13 March, 1945.

Activities during the night were limited to a few infiltration attempts and some light mortar fire. The attack by RCT-25 (BLT-2/24 and Div Recon Co attached) was continued at 0700 in accordance with Div Op Or No. 22-45 with BLT-2/25 making the main effort. Resistance was still very strong and consisted chiefly of mortar fire and intense MG fire from well camouflaged pill-boxes. BLT-2/25 was able to make slow progress on both its right and its left for gains of 50-75 yards, but its center was unable to move. At 1130, Co "L" was detached from BLT-2/25 and attached

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to BLT-2/25 and was immediately placed in the center of the line relieving Co "E", however, further progress was made in the afternoon. BLT-1/25 and BLT-3/25 continued to place all types of fire to their front while trying to locate and knock out the mortars firing on BLT-2/25. A flamethrower tank was used throughout the day to support the attack of BLT-2/25, firing up the draws that it was able to reach from the beach road. During the day small groups of the enemy were frequently seen moving from position to position and a large number of them were destroyed; the resistance, however, still remained very heavy. Both light and heavy mortar fire continually fell on the lines of BLT-2/25 throughout the day causing heavy casualties. Co "C" was moved from its reserve position behind BLT-2/25 to a secondary line behind BLT-2/24 at 1600. When the flamethrower tank made its final run of the day and fired up one of the draws inland from the beach road, it caught a large number of enemy in the open. Of this group of enemy at least 75 were killed by the flame and MG fire from the tank, and by fire of BLT-1/25 when they ran out of the draw.

D plus 23, 14 March, 1945.

During the night of 13-14 March, 1945, activity by the enemy constricted in the zone of RCT-25 consisted principally of knee mortar and hand grenade fire and some infiltration attempts in the zone of BLT-3/25. The infiltration was beaten off by hand grenades and no enemy was able to penetrate our lines.

At 0500, adjustments were made in the line to put relatively fresh troops in the attack. Co "C" relieved Co "I", Co "I" and Co "K" relieved Co "G", and Co "E" relieved Co "L". From left to right the units on the line were then: BLT-2/25 with Co "E" and Co "F", with Co "G" and Co "A" (attached) in reserve; BLT-3/25 with Co "K" and Co "I", with Co "L" in reserve; BLT-1/25 (less Co "A") with Co "C" and Co "B"; BLT-2/24 with Co "G" and Co "F". This relief was completed by K-hour (0630) and the attack of RCT-25 (BLT-2/24 and Div Recon Co attached) jumped off with BLT-2/25 and BLT-3/25 making the main effort. The RCT Commander supervised the shifting of troops from the BLT-1/25 CP and then moved up to direct the attack from the BLT-3/25 Forward CP. The advance was slow against very stiff opposition and by 1500, the center of the line had only been able to gain but 50-75 yards. BLT-2/25 suffered particularly heavy casualties from both small arms and

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mortar fire. At 1500, BLT-2/24, the only fresh and strong force left, was ordered to pull out of its position astride the beach road and to relieve the left elements of BLT-2/25. This relief was ordered to take place by 1630 and the attack continued at 1700 but, due to the heavy fire on the front lines from the front and from a position to the left rear, behind the lines in the area of RCT-23, the relief was not totally completed until after dark. A Prov Co composed of R/W Co personnel and a group from Reg H&S Co, and the 81mm Mortar Platoon of BLT-1/25 was organized and ordered to take up the defensive position astride the beach road that had been vacated by BLT-2/24. The Div Recon Co was ordered to take up positions on a secondary defense line behind the Prov Co and to protect the beach against any enemy attempting to make a counter landing on the RCT right flank. Co "A" of BLT-1/25 was detached from BLT-2/25 and attached to BLT-2/24 for use as a Res Co. (Flamethrower tanks were used throughout the day in burning draws inland from the beach road). At 1700, when it was seen that the relief of BLT-2/25 by BLT-2/24 would not be completed prior to dark, all units were ordered to dig in and consolidate positions for the night. All units reported being completely tied in at 2300 when contact was finally made with RCT-23 on the left.

D plus 24. 15 March, 1945.

The enemy, probably realizing its hopeless situation and constricted by continued pressure, attempted to come through the lines of BLT-1/25 and BLT-3/25 during the night in greater force than on previous nights. At 2200, approximately 25 Japs tried to walk in a column through the lines of BLT-3/25; they were killed. BLT's reported extensive infiltration attempts and hand grenades and small arms skirmishes took place throughout the night. No naval gunfire illumination was provided during the night.

The attack of RCT-25 (BLT-2/24 and Div Recon Co attached) jumped off at K minus 60 (0630) with BLT-2/24 making the main effort. All BLT's were ordered to maintain contact but at 1100, when BLT-2/24 had been unable to move its right flank, orders were issued for BLT-2/25 and BLT-3/25 to attack the beach road regardless of contact. BLT-3/25 moved out rapidly and by 1430 reached the beach road making an advance of over 200 yards. As BLT-3/25 moved forward, its right flank moved across the front of BLT-2/25 and,

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when BLT-3/25 reached the beach road, BLT-1/25 had been completely pinched out. BLT-2/25 made slower progress than BLT-3/25 but pushed its right flank to the beach road at 1600. As BLT-2/25 moved forward Co "A" (attached to BLT-2/24) was committed on the right flank of BLT-2/24. Co "A" and Co "F", the left company of BLT-2/24, were then both to attack on either flank of Co "G", the right company of BLT-2/24, and by-pass the strong point in front of Co "G". This was started at 1400, but the move was not successful and a juncture was not made between Co "A" and Co "F". At 1600, Co "B" of BLT-1/25 was ordered attached to BLT-2/24 for use as a reserve, since BLT-2/24's reserve had been committed. BLT-1/25 (less Co's "A" and "B") was ordered into a reserve position in TA 184-H at 1630. At 1800, units were ordered to dig in for the night.

D plus 25, 16 March, 1945.

There was little activity during the night, but RCT-23 on the left reported that groups of the enemy attempted to infiltrate through its lines.

At K minus 105 (0630) RCT-25 (BLT-2/24 and Div Recon Co attached) jumped off in the attack with BLT-2/24 making the main effort. Initial progress was slow but the advance gained momentum rapidly and at 1030, BLT-2/25 reached the beach road in its zone. At 1100, BLT-2/24 reached the beach road and all organized resistance had ceased at 1030.

At 0800, BLT-3/25 was ordered to remove the minefield it had laid several days previously when in a holding position in TA 184-S-X, 167-D. At 1130, BLT's were assigned zones of responsibility in the RCT area for mopping up operations. A sweep was made by BLT-1/25, BLT-2/25 and BLT-3/25 to the westward; BLT-2/24 mopped up its former zone of action; the Prov Co (R/W and H&S Co's) made a sweep to the north between the beach road and the beach to a point beyond the RCT boundary. All enemy dead were located and buried, all caves and other shelters for the enemy to hid in that could be located were blown shut, all Marine dead were picked up, all supplies, ammunition, water and weapons, both friendly and enemy, were either salvaged or destroyed. Assembly areas were assigned to the BLT's and by 1800, all BLT's reported that mopping

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up operations had been completed and that they were in their assembly areas. BLT-3/25 reported that the friendly mine field had been removed. The Div Recon Co was released to parent control at 1600. BLT-1/25 took up positions in the vicinity of "Turkey Knob", BLT-2/25 at TA 183-R-S-T, BLT-3/25 took a position astride the beach road at TA 184-U, 167-A with outposts on the beach, and BLT-2/24 a position at 184-T-Y, 167-E.

Tanks stood by in the morning prepared to support the attack until 1200 and were released at that time when organized resistance had ceased. At 1500, however, it was necessary to call back one flamethrower and one medium tank to neutralize one cave in the zone of BLT-3/25. This cave had previously been taken, but when the engineers attempted to blow it closed, they were taken under fire. The cave was finally blown shut at 1800 after a road had been bulldozed to within 50 yards of the cave and the tank had fired napalm into the mouth of the cave.

Based upon the numbers of enemy dead found in the pocket of resistance that had faced this RCT for the previous six days, it was estimated that there were from 800 to 1,000 Japs in well fortified positions in the area. This estimate did not include those enemy which were sealed in caves.

D plus 25. 17 March. 1945.

There was no enemy activity reported during the night of 15-16 March.

At 0800, BLT-2/24 was detached and reverted to control of RCT-24. At 1530, loading of personnel started when BLT-1/25 and BLT-2/25 embarked on an LST on Beach BLUE 1 for transfer to APA-178, the USS LANDER. RCT Hq and BLT-3/25 embarked on an LST on Beach BLUE 1 at 1530 and were transferred to APA-172, the USS GRIMES. At 1900, all troops of RCT-25 were on board their designated APA's.

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SECTION V

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Personnel:

(a) The present T/O does not provide for initial losses that are suffered by every unit that lands against a defended beach. Furthermore, the T/O does not follow in its changes the development of new type weapons and it is not until these new weapons have been issued and used in combat that the T/O is changed, based on the past employment and recommendations concerning the use of these weapons. This organization had AT rocket launchers and flame throwers issued for use in combat and has been required to train and use demolitions personnel in combat without a corresponding increase in enlisted strength. The addition of these new weapons and changes in their employment necessitates the reorganization of the rifle company and the taking away of men from their T/O duty in order to man these weapons and perform demo duty. In every operation this RCT has been forced to leave a rear echelon taken from the T/O strength, which further reduces the combat effectiveness. In view of the above mentioned problems, it is recommended that each organization be brought to a 10% over-strength figure prior to departure from a base camp for an operation and that T/O allowances follow more closely the increased requirements for enlisted personnel.

(b) When replacements for combat organizations are sent to that organization, the replacements should be sent as an organized unit. If 800 replacements are required by an RCT it should receive an infantry battalion that has been trained as an infantry battalion and that is completely equipped. It must be remembered that when replacements are required, the weapons, transportation, radios, etc., will also be required in most instances. When these replacements are assigned they should be sent as intact units with the size of the unit determined by the size of the unit to be replaced. We would then have small groups of men who have been trained together, rather than isolated individuals scattered along the front line. When three or four men who have never seen each other previously are sent to a rifle squad, the original men in the squad have to spend a great deal of time finding out the capabilities of these men and the new men necessarily require several days to become adjusted to completely strange surroundings and to work with men they have never seen before.

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2. Training:

It is felt that in training, more emphasis should be placed on the simulation of battle conditions. Infantry should have an opportunity in training to actually use live naval gunfire and air support with live bombs in tactical problems. Artillery safety regulations and limitations on training areas have so far prevented the employment of artillery to fire close fires in support of an actual advance by troops in an attack problem. In training, emphasis should be placed upon preparation for the next objective. To train for fighting against small highly fortified objectives would be a mistake if the operation were to be a large objective that would often require long advances and sweeping maneuvers. In the past this organization has nearly completed its training before being informed as to the general type of fighting that would be expected in the next operation.

3. Organization and weapons:

(a) The T/O should be changed frequently as the tactical requirements for organizations are changed. If a unit is to be required to adopt a certain organization, that change should be supported by a more rapid change in the T/O.

(b) It is recommended that the T/O be changed to include a scout-sniper platoon in the Headquarters Company of the Infantry Battalion. This scout-sniper platoon has a great many uses in mopping up; as a flank patrol; as a scouting unit; as security for rear area installations at night and as a reserve for the BLT when three companies have been committed.

For organization of this platoon, see BLT-1/25 and BLT-3/25 reports.

(c) It is recommended that the T/A and T/O be changed to include six (6) 81mm mortars in the 81mm platoon in the infantry battalion. The 81mm mortar has proved in the past two operations to be one of the most useful weapons in the hands of the BLT Comdr.

(d) It is strongly recommended that a 155mm mortar platoon be formed in the Regimental Weapons Co with six (6) 155mm mortars and with full tracked prime movers and supply carriers. The experience gained on the past operation indicates that a large mortar type weapon that can place a heavy shell in defiladed areas should be adopted, and further, that only full tracked vehicles can be relied upon to negotiate sandy beaches

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and rough terrain that is under fire to such an extent that Pioneers and Engineers cannot construct roads.

(e) It is recommended that the 37mm AT gun be replaced with the 57mm AT gun. The 37mm AT gun is not large enough to effectively stop with a single round the better Japanese tanks, nor to breach any but the weakest enemy fortifications. Canister ammunition should be provided for the 57mm AT gun. If the silhouette of the 57mm AT gun could be reduced it would be an improvement on the weapon.

(f) It is recommended that the Gun, Machine, Caliber .30 Browning M1919A6, flexible, w/bipod replace the Gun, Machine, Caliber .30 Browning M1919A4 flexible. The mount tripod machine gun Cal..30 M2 should also be issued and should be carried in Co. or Bn. headquarters supply train for issue when setting up defensive lines.

(g) It is strongly recommended that an expendable magazine for the BAR be developed. This magazine could be loaded with ammunition and packed for issue during an operation in the same manner as MG ammunition. The method of issue of the present magazine has frequently resulted in a shortage of magazined ammunition for the BAR when needed most.

(h) The AT grenade launchers M-7 and M-8 should be issued in such quantity that every carbine and M-1 rifle in the rifle company can be equipped with the launcher.

(i) The short bayonet should be substituted for the long bayonet. Personnel carrying the short bayonet need not be issued the combat knife.

(j) The automatic pistol, Cal .45, should replace the carbine for issue to flamethrower operators, bazooka operators, gunners and assistant gunners in machine gun squads, and SCR 300 operators. Thompson sub-machine guns should be issued to telephone linemen on the basis of one per two men.

(k) A rocket of approximately 90mm to be fired from a launcher similar to the AT rocket launcher should be developed. There should be two types of rounds; a fragmentation round and an AT round.

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4. Intelligence:

(a) The terrain control of maps should be greatly improved to portray ground forms as they actually exist.

(b) Enemy information should not be placed on the operations map but should be confined to special intelligence maps and overlays.

(c) There should be more good gridded photos and photo maps of 1:5,000 scale for issue down to and including platoon leaders. Photos covering the ground to the front in the direction of the next attack, of 1:5,000 scale, gridded, and from recent sorties should be issued frequently.

(d) See S-2 report for other recommendations.

5. Aviation:

(a) In the preliminary bombings of fortified objectives bombs of 1000 lbs. or greater; should be used as smaller bombs have no effect on fortified installations.

(b) The preliminary strikes should be concentrated on the defensive ground that the enemy can best fortify and on known targets. These areas should be assigned by the landing force after a careful analysis of the defensive capabilities of the ground.

(c) In order to attain greater accuracy and save dummy runs the 3LT Air Liaison Parties should be permitted to coach in strikes on the SAD net.

(d) A new fuse should be developed for the napalm bomb to lessen the number of duds.

(e) Strafing, rocket, and light bombing attacks were generally ineffective on the IWO JIMA operation.

6. Naval Gunfire:

(a) SFCP's should brief assigned ships prior to and after rehearsal.

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(b) More VOF planes should be assigned to Division and observers should receive more training in adjusting fire, in recognizing ground panels, and in ground tactics.

7. Tanks:

(a) A tank with a high velocity 90mm gun is recommended.

(b) In the initial landing the flail and dozer tanks should land early with a reconnaissance party and prepare routes inland before the other tanks are landed.

8. Rockets:

(a) Develop a light weight single round launcher for the 7.2" rocket for use on the front line in reducing fortified installations.

(b) At least two tanks per tank company should land equipped with the 20 round 7.2" rocket launcher. All tanks should have fittings so that the 20 round launcher could be installed, providing that these fittings do not hamper greatly the normal operation of the tank.

(c) Increase the range of the 7.2" rocket, if possible, without too great an increase in weight.

9. Engineers:

(a) The number of engineers assigned to an RCT should be increased. At present the engineers have two combat functions and cannot perform both of them at the same time. The construction and road maintenance functions should be separated from the demolition and mine removal functions. There are numerous occasions when the infantry cannot be spared from its primary mission of fighting to perform mine removal and demolition missions.

10. Transportation:

It is recommended: (a) that a "Wessel" Platoon with 20 Cargo Carriers M29C be organized in the Infantry Regiment H&S Company, (b) that the T/A and T/O be changed to provide (2) two one ton 4x4 trucks in the 81mm mortar platoons of the infantry battalion.

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11. Supply:

It is recommended that the preloaded ammunition on LST's be loaded so that any particular type of ammunition is readily available. A loading plan showing the disposition of the cargo should be made and supplied to the LST Comdr and the unloading details. Further, when the preload is put on the LST, enough room must be provided for the loading of LVT's, and the winch which is used to pull inoperative LVT's up the ramp must not be blocked.

12. Communications:

(a) The SCR 300 should have a wider frequency band in order to permit greater use of this excellent set. It is recommended that the SCR 300/2S 300 (with a broader frequency range than present SCR 300) be procured.

(b) A better signal supply system should be developed for the initial stages of the landing. It is recommended that a signal dump be set up on an LST so that signal supplies may be readily available to units ashore.

13. General:

(a) There should be greater flexibility in the planning phase to allow minor changes to be made by the lower units. The orders of higher echelon are necessarily issued well in advance and prior to the RCT and BLT orders and cannot foresee all of the minor requirements of the smaller units. For example, because the orders of one ship were not up to date it was necessary for one BLT to submit a minor change, affecting that BLT only, to higher Marine Corps echelon. This incidental change had to be passed down through the Navy Chain of command before a decision could be reached.

(b) The attack of a highly fortified position requires long and careful planning, coordination, and preparation if the position is to be breached successfully without excessive casualties. The extent of the enemy position and the location of the individual emplacements must first be determined and then all available fire power must be coordinated to attain maximum effectiveness in neutralizing the enemy. Air support

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of the actual infantry attack.

(c) All units should report their front lines as they exist and should not make definite reports of position when their location cannot be definitely tied down to the map and to the ground.

(d) Artillery should be displaced to positions from which the most effective line of fire in respect to the location of the enemy positions and the ground forms can be obtained.

(e) Units should be assigned frontages commensurate with their front-line strength and with respect to the type of terrain. Frequently RCT-25 and the 3LT's were forced to employ all of their units to cover the assigned frontage.

(f) The word of the man on the ground must be believed and given consideration by the higher echelons until it has been disproven. Confidence must be placed in the lower commander and it must be assumed that he can estimate his own requirements and situation correctly.

(g) Jump-off hours for continuation of the attack must, generally, give the front-line troops time to eat, resupply, and make daylight reconnaissances prior to the attack.

(h) In the rehearsals for the landing all ships, supporting arms, troops, and especially the LVT units should participate. The rehearsal should be conducted as nearly similar to the actual landing as is possible. Provision should be made for the correction of discrepancies in the planning that are discovered in the rehearsal.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL J. R. LANIGAN

C. J. O'DONNELL,  
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,  
Executive Officer

O-F-F-I-S-I-A-L:

J. H. JONES,  
Major, USMC,  
S-6

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RCJ.25-4TH MAR DIV.

W. HEFIELD

15 APRIL 1945

APPENDIX A, TO SECTION 4 OF RCJ.25 OPERATIONS REPORT

MAP: SPECIAL AIR & GROUND TARGETS, IWO JIMA,

DATED 12 NOV, 1944, SCALE: 1:20,000

PROGRESS OF THE ATTACK OVERLAY

BY ORDER OF COLONEL J. R. LAMIGAN

C. J. O'DONNELL

LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U.S. MARINE CORPS

EXECUTIVE OFFICER


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J. H. Jones

J. H. JONES

MAJOR U.S.M.C.

3-3





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APPENDIX "I" TO RCT-25 OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA  
VOLCANO ISLANDS

ADMINISTRATION

Enclosures: (A) Report of personnel.  
(B) Report of casualties.

1. PERSONNEL:

See enclosure (A).

The replacement plan of the operation could have been vastly improved by placing the replacement draft attached to this regiment under the control of the regimental commander. It is apparent that the initial mission of unloading would not be impaired by premature commitment of the replacement personnel, because it is the responsibility of the regimental commander to unload his ships. This would enable the regiment to assign replacements to the units with whom they had trained, and assign units of replacements, not single individuals who cannot operate as a team. It is further recommended that, particularly in the case of officers, an effort be made to provide infantry personnel for an infantry regiment.

2. CASUALTIES:

See enclosure (b).

3. MORALE:

Morale was excellent at the time of the initial landing, but lagged slightly during the latter days of the operation, largely because of excessive casualties and inadequate replacements.

4. CIVIL AFFAIRS:

No report.

5. RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES:

(a) The fact that the Catholic Chaplain of this regiment

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was wounded and evacuated on 19 February, 1945, necessarily somewhat curtailed the religious activities which it was possible to make available to the officers and men of this regiment. However, the Protestant Chaplain was available to all units of the regiment periodically, and assisted daily at the Division cemetery.

6. POST EXCHANGE:

Adequate post exchange supplies were available for gratuitous issue at all times as part of the ration.

7. POSTAL:

Postal service was fair throughout the operation. However, it could have been considerably improved by immediate use of embarkation rosters by postal personnel for the purpose of sorting mail. Attached units frequently received no mail, although their embarkation rosters had been submitted at the same time as those of major units. Further improvement in postal service could be made by fully executing the initial plan of sending mail clerks by air to each port of call, enroute both to and from the target. Also, under the present system of allocating replacements without written orders by name, a hardship is worked upon replacements, who do not receive mail in their new organizations until rosters of personnel joined have been submitted, necessarily a slow process under field conditions. Further, service could be rendered by requiring Division and higher echelons to hold casualty mail, rather than send it all to regiments, where a relatively small number of postal clerks are available.

8. MILITARY POLICE:

During the operation, one platoon of military police was sufficient for the use of the regimental combat team. However, it is felt that at least two platoons would be necessary in an operation in which the regimental area was greater in depth, and in which there was a civil affairs problem.

*G. K. Dunn*  
G. K. DUNN,  
Major, USMCR  
S-1

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	H&S Co	R/W Co	1st Bn	2d Bn	3d Bn	TOTAL						
	O	E	O	E	O	E						
Stren 19 Feb 45.	29	216	91195	36	869	36	7876	37	879	147	3035	
Repl. joined	-	6	-	1	6	453	9	257	11	249	26	966
TOTAL	29	222	9196	42	1322	45	1133	48	1128	173	4001	
Transferred	1	24	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	24	
Remainder	28	198	9196	42	1322	45	1133	48	1128	172	3977	
TOT Casualties	10	45	6	53	26	1030	25	872	39	798	106	2798
Remainder	18	153	3	143	16	292	20	261	9	330	66	1179
W & NE	6	9	2	15	2	58	2	50	5	56	17	188
TOTAL	24	162	5158	18	350	22	311	14	386	83	1367	
Cas ret to duty once only	1	-	1	12	2	76	-	67	2	59	6	214
TOTAL	25	162	6170	20	426	22	378	16	445	89	1581	
Cas ret to duty twice	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	4
TOTAL	25	162	6171	20	426	22	378	16	448	89	1585	
Stren 16 Mar 45	24	167	5167	21	439	22	386	15	446	87	1605	

ENCLOSURE (A)

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ORGANIZATION: 25th Marines PERIOD COVERED FROM: 19 Feb 45.

TO: 16 Mar 45.

C-A-S-U-A-L-T-I-E-S

	KILLED		WOUNDED EVAC		SICK EVAC		WOUNDED NON EVAC		MISSING		TOTAL CAS.	
	O	E	O	E	O	E	O	E	O	E	O	E
H&S Co	1	8	3	19	-	8	6	9	-	1	10	45
R/W Co	1	4	3	23	-	10	2	15	-	1	6	53
1st Bn	9	195	14	590	1	182	2	58	-	5	26	1030
2d Bn	7	207	14	486	2	128	2	50	-	1	25	872
3d Bn	10	190	23	493	1	52	5	56	-	7	39	798
TOTAL	28	604	57	1611	4	380	17	188	-	15	106	2798

ENCLOSURE (B)

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APPENDIX II TO HOP-25 OPERATION REPORT IWO JIMA, VOLCANO ISLANDS.

INTELLIGENCE

1. MAPS, PHOTOGRAPHS AND SUPPLEMENTARY INTELLIGENCE.

(a) Maps: The maps furnished by the D-2 Section were, for the most part, adequate, as to quantity. During the campaign it was noticed, however, that the operation maps were topographically inaccurate and failed to show draws, ravines and other terrain features as they existed on the ground. We understand the reason for these inaccuracies, but the fact remains that an inaccurate map is confusing and misleading to all who use it.

The most useable scale was the 1/10,000; the 1/20,000 had limited use and the 1/5,000 is of use only for instructional purposes in orienting troops while enroute; it is too large to handle in combat.

The 1/10,000 maps indicating defensive installations of the enemy were inaccurate, incomplete and confusing to read. It is recommended that all enemy installations, whether known or supposed, be omitted entirely from the operation map. Such installations may be cumulately shown on situation overlays.

(b) Photographs: The photographic coverage of IWO JIMA was excellent as regards quantity and quality of photos. We had enough to supply every unit down to platoon leaders and platoon sergeants. It is to be remembered, however, that a photograph of the scale of 1/10,000 is of very limited use to a BLT Commander and next to worthless for a Company Commander. Also photographic interpretation of 1/10,000 photos is necessarily guess work to a large degree. It is therefore, strongly recommended that in addition to the 1/10,000 photos, sorties be flown with a 24 inch lens at 10,000 feet giving a 1/5,000 photo. Low 50 foot obliques are mandatory, both before and during the operation. We are aware of the risk involved in doing this, but it will mean a great saving of lives on D-day and following. Low altitude photos should be taken from day to day of the area to be attacked on the following day. These should be furnished the BLT Commanders and Company Commanders with the attack order.

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Photographs furnished by Corps after D-day were worse than useless. They were blurred, poorly developed and taken at such extreme altitudes as to show nothing whatever. We were finally forced to send up the Division VMO-4 with a public relations sergeant who took obliques with his small hand camera. These photos proved to be of great value.

The photomaps furnished by Division can be divided into two groups; the controlled and uncontrolled. The controlled photomaps were useful and furnished in sufficient quantity. The uncontrolled mosaics and photomaps, however, are of no value whatsoever. It is recommended that they be discontinued.

The "blowups" of the beaches were excellent. It is recommended that "blowups" be made of photos taken each day of the RCT zone of action for the following day and furnished the BLT commanders along with the attack order.

(c) Hydrographic information: The hydrographic information furnished was for the most part accurate and complete. The swell and the waves breaking on the beach was, however, heavier than was expected and the gradient from the waters edge to the second terrace was so steep and the sand was so loose that vehicles could not be landed. Prime movers bogged down hopelessly in the loose sand and, at least on Beach BLUE I, not a single jeep got ashore during the first day. As is well known, even tracked vehicles had difficulty on Beach BLUE 1 and 2.

## 2. INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONING:

(a) Collection of information: The collection of information by the RCT-25 intelligence team was made extremely difficult during the first three to five days of the campaign, due to the fact that the enemy had comparatively few documents or items of intelligence interest in the area covered during this period. He knew where we would make our landing and destroyed, or took with him as he retreated, most items of importance. Once we gained the high ground overlooking the beach, however, we began to find a limited number of maps, orders and other documents. All members of the RCT and BLT intelligence teams as well as the various front line companies were untiring in their search for information and documents of intelligence value. That relatively few really important documents were found was not due to lack of aggressive searching on our part, but rather that the enemy destroyed or carried such documents with him as he retreated.

(b) Evaluation and Dissemination of Information: All units cooperated in the dissemination of information. The Division Intelligence Section was especially prompt in giving regiment an evaluation of information received from other units.

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(c) Communication: The communications on this operation were excellent. This is attributable at least in part, to the fact that the intelligence sections of the Division operated on a radio net assigned to them. This plan, tried out for the first time on this operation, was preeminently successful. It is recommended, however, that the radios designated for this work in the RCT's be assigned to the intelligence sections as part of the Table of Basic Allowance of Equipment. This would foster a feeling of responsibility for this equipment in the intelligence sections and would be under their control at all times and should be included in their training program.

(d) Liaison: Liaison between the intelligence units was adequate. The daily visits to the Regimental Intelligence Sections by members of Division Intelligence Staff encouraged cooperation. The close contact of D-2 was outstanding and his contacts included numerous visits to the front lines.

(e) Training and use of attached personnel: The interpreters, public relation men and combat photographers attached to this RCT were all well trained in their duties, cooperative and aggressive in pursuit of their duties. It is, however, recommended that enlisted interpreters be given more schooling, especially in the spoken language of the enemy.

### 3. PRISONERS

Immediately upon the capture of prisoners by the forward elements (or in some cases by the personnel of the R-2 section) they were rushed back to the RCT CP for preliminary interrogation by the language officers. Only those questions were asked which had bearing upon the immediate tactical situation. As soon as this preliminary interrogation was completed the prisoners were rushed to the Division Language Section.

### 4. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND MATERIAL

Considering the unexpected loss of trained intelligence personnel during the first few days of the operation, the recovery of enemy documents and material functioned very smoothly. Transportation was, at times, a problem but all units cooperated to the utmost to expedite the flow of intelligence material. The usual system of scouts working directly from the RCT and cooperating with the BLT intelligence teams was followed. These teams recovered most of the material; a small amount was sent in by the independent units, e.i. the Engineers, Military Police, etc.

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## 5. PROPAGANDA

No direct results of the pre-invasion propaganda were observed by RCT-25. In fact most of the prisoners captured claimed not to have seen it at all.

The loudspeaker was used both from an LCI just off-shore and from just behind the front lines. One prisoner captured claimed to have heard our broadcast, but, considered as a whole, both attempts must be considered as being of questionable value. The first time we attempted to set it up on land the set would not function and at all times when it was used it drew small arms and mortar fire. One casualty was received in these attempts.

It must be concluded that the value of the public address system is limited to the latter phases of a campaign, when the enemy has become disorganized and separated from his leaders. The average Japanese soldier is amenable to our propaganda, both written and oral, only after he is removed from the influence of his officers. Koreans, both army personnel and others are not to be confused with the average Japanese soldier.

It is recommended that each RCT Intelligence Section be furnished with a portable speaker. It was necessary to borrow such equipment from Division causing a delay which could have been avoided. Moreover the large public address system is less easy to conceal and thus draws enemy fire more readily than the small set which can be carried from place to place and used from covered positions.

## 6. COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE

(a) Enemy counter-intelligence: A distinct difference was noted on this campaign as compared to previous operations in the emphasis by the enemy on security of documents. For the first time we met proof that the enemy is becoming security conscious. Several prisoners mentioned that, to their knowledge, the enemy had destroyed maps, orders and other valuable documents when threatened by our approach. These statements are amply confirmed by the scarcity of valuable documents found during the operation.

(b) Our own counter-intelligence: No instance was reported to RCT-25 of maps or documents being compromised in RCT-25 Zone of Action. Greater emphasis should be placed on individual camouflage technique. Many lives were lost on this operation because the individual failed to make use of proper foxhole and CP security. Men should be taught that movement attracts attention and draws fire. They should avoid carrying papers, maps, etc. in the open while in the vicinity of the command posts.

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PUBLIC RELATIONS

Two public relations sergeants in RCT 25 intelligence sections were well trained and did their work promptly and under adverse conditions. There was a noticeable improvement in the expediting of press releases.

8. THE ENEMY.

(a) Organization: It was obvious from the first that the enemy had correctly assumed that we would make our landing on either the southeastern or southwestern beaches and had planned his defense accordingly. There is some evidence to indicate that he expected either a diversionary or supplementary landing on the northern shore. He had planned his defense with care and forethought. His guns were sighted to sweep the beaches with infilade fire and the large mortars and rockets so placed as to be untouched by our preparatory naval bombardment. In general, the organization and deployment of his troops was excellent. He knew that once blue troops landed he could not hold the island. He determined to exact as high a toll as possible and in this he succeeded.

(b) Tactics: The enemy obviously took cover in his extensive system of caves and holes during our preparatory bombardment, emerging after our fire had lifted to resist our landing with mortars, rockets, artillery and small arms. Extensive mine fields had been sown on the beach and the approaches inland. As these slowed up or stopped the progress of our vehicles he opened up on them with all arms. Prepared trenches had evidently been registered in on with rockets, mortars, and artillery prior to the landing.

The enemy showed no inclination to close with our advancing troops during the early stages, depending rather upon his artillery, mortars and rockets to keep us at a distance and to harass our supply lines. He did not counterattack to "drive us back into the sea", as is his usual doctrine. There were, in fact, no counter attacks other than by small isolated units, and no wild banzai charges; he was cold, systematic and analytical in exacting the highest possible toll for our advance. He had planned his positions well, utilizing the rugged terrain to reinforce his positions and channelize our attack. By far the greater number of his emplacements were so constructed as to be invisible from the air and not to show up on photographs. Even from the ground they could not be spotted until one was actually on top of them.

The one major defect in the Japanese defense of IWO JIMA was his failure to wire the beaches. Had these been properly wired, our landing would have been even more costly than it was.

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(c) Equipment: The enemy had excellent equipment on IWO JIMA, his artillery, mortars and rockets were especially worthy of comment. Most of the coast defense guns had been knocked out by our pre-invasion bombardment as had some of his dual purpose guns and artillery but he still had plenty left. Tanks were reported by other units, but were not encountered in RCT-25 Zone of Action. (Supplementary report on weapons and defense plan to follow.)

Ammunition of all types was plentiful and we found no evidence that the enemy suffered severely (except for stragglers) for food or water. Either rifles were less plentifully supplied troops, or the enemy recovered them from their dead and wounded as they withdrew. At any rate a fewer number of rifles were found by RCT-25 in its zone of action than has been the case on previous operations.

As was mentioned before, the enemy seems to have become "security conscious". He destroyed or took with him documents and maps as he retired.

#### 9. RECOMMENDATIONS.

(a) The "SCR 300" radio furnished the RCT intelligence team for intelligence purposes should be a part of its organic equipment and should be in addition to the number allotted the RCT communications officer.

(b) It is absolutely imperative that the intelligence team take a jeep on an operation. Even on a small island, transportation becomes a problem.

(c) Officer interpreters should be made to feel that they are a part of the intelligence team and when not occupied with questioning of prisoners or translations of documents should enter wholeheartedly into the spirit of intelligence work.

(d) It is strongly recommended that some small tent or shelter, a black-out tent for example, be furnished the regiment so that certain vital work can be carried out at night without endangering the security of the command post.

(e) Information on the enemy emplacements should not be placed on the operations map; it can be placed on separate maps or overlays and disseminated to the various units.

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(1) It cannot be over-emphasized that photos of the scale of 1:10,000 do not, repeat not, show enough detail to be of tactical value to the small-unit leader and interpretation of such photos is limited to the more obvious installations. Emphasis should be placed on the value of low level verticals and obliques, and such photos should be made of areas to be attacked at least one (1) or two (2) days prior to a unit operating in that area.

10. GENERAL COMMENTS

In general the functioning of intelligence on this operation was good. Higher echelons must, however, take greater pains to correctly interpret photos. Maps must also be more accurate, especially as regards topographical details. Photos must be furnished at a scale of at least 1:5,000, with target squares and points, etc. marked on photos before delivery to assault units.

*C. D. Gray*  
C. D. GRAY,  
Major, USMCR  
S-2

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APPENDIX III TO RCT-25 OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA,  
VOLCANO ISLANDS

OPERATIONS

A. Infantry:

It is felt that the organization of the BLT's, H&S Co, and R/W Co at the time of landing on IWO JIMA was satisfactory with the following exceptions:

1. The Tables of Organization make no provision, in many cases, for the weapons carried and duty assigned, i.e., flame-throwers, AT rocket launchers and demolitions are issued and must be manned, yet, to do so, breaks down the organization of the rifle company. As has happened with every new type weapon issued for use by infantry, there has been no corresponding change in the T/O and unit commanders have had to take men from other assigned duties to man the new weapons.

2. The T/O does not include any allowance for initial casualties which are to be expected every time an organization engages in combat. When RCT-25 landed on D-day on IWO JIMA, it was a smooth running machine, however, after 50 to 70% losses in the rifle, MG, and 60mm mortar platoons, the functioning of these units lacked their former efficiency and power. This is especially true since the majority of the losses included the leaders and most aggressive personnel, the ones who are always out in front.

Heavy casualties were met by moving up junior NCO's and officers from subordinate positions, the transfer of personnel from other units in the regiment, and the filling in by replacements. As long as there were experienced leaders and specialists the efficiency was not greatly reduced, however, when these men became casualties and inexperienced and untrained personnel assumed duties beyond their capabilities, the efficiency and fighting ability dropped to a greater extent than would be indicated by the strength of the unit alone. It must be remembered that the "Effective Strength" figures do not show the tactical effectiveness of any particular unit because of the nature of combat,

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losses are greater in the assault or front line troops than in the administrative personnel which comprise a large percentage of any given unit. All other things being equal, the effective strength of the rifle platoons will determine the combat effectiveness of the higher unit. For this reason it is recommended that each unit be trained and sent out at least 10% overstrength. Also, replacements should be trained as regular combat units and not as just a mass of rifle men. Then, as casualties occur, replacements with the necessary training, weapons, and equipment can be sent as complete units to replace the casualties. Unless the situation is critical, the replacements should not be absorbed while the organization is in the front lines.

Replacements given RCT-25 on IWO JIMA, other than the 30th Replacement Draft, which was attached to RCT-25 initially, were untrained and often unsuitable for the type of duties they were required to perform. Such personnel as construction engineers, clerks, truck drivers, etc., formed the bulk of the later replacements sent to RCT-25 for use in the front lines as riflemen, BAR men, machinegunners, flamethrower operators, demolition men, etc., and completely nullified the basic principles of personnel classification. Replacements of this type were nearly as much of a burden as an asset, since they did not even know such basic things as the difference between a mortar shell and an AT rocket projectile; that the safety pin of the hand grenade must be removed before throwing the grenade, and how to load and fire a machinegun. Not only did the placing of such personnel in the front lines make the experienced men nervous and jittery, but it also necessitated valuable time being spent by the experienced men in constant supervision of the replacements.

The fighting on IWO JIMA was unusual in that the defenses were such that, in a great number of instances, the infantry was forced to take exceedingly strong and well fortified positions, without the benefit of a preparation by supporting fires that were capable of neutralizing the enemy's defenses. This was true in two particular areas encountered by RCT-25: The area generally around "Turkey Knob" (TA 184-F), in TA's 183-E-J-O, 184-A-F-K and the area in TA 184-O-T, 185-F-K-P. In these areas the defenses were so strong that the emplacements could only be destroyed or neutralized by a direct hit with a large caliber weapon. Yet, the emplacements could not be destroyed until the troops were too

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close to allow the use of large caliber NGF, heavy bombing attacks or other supporting weapons and the terrain was such that tanks could not often maneuver into a firing position. The solutions of seizing such areas are two: (1) Withdraw troops from the immediate vicinity and subject the area to a complete saturation bombing with the very heaviest bombs and a heavy bombardment by NGF using only major caliber projectiles fired from many angles, and (2) storm the area with large numbers of troops disposed in depth with the prior realization that exceedingly heavy losses will be experienced. Neither solution assures success since, in the first, the enemy may return to the area after the bombing ceases and, in the latter, man power alone may not be sufficient to take the position. The heavy losses suffered in the second plan limits the number of objectives that can be taken in this manner. There is one other alternative other than a combination of the above methods, and that is to completely surround the area by maneuver and then attack from all sides or contain the area. This may not succeed if the position is fortified for all-around defense or if the positions covers the total front, thus requiring a breakthrough prior to a flanking maneuver. In the two such areas taken by RCT-25 they were neutralized only after a long period of constant attack without heavy supporting weapons and causing large numbers of casualties to the attacking forces. It is questioned, therefore, whether under such conditions the best plan would not be to withdraw from the position and promulgate a carefully coordinated and planned scheme of attack after a thorough study of the enemy's defenses and utilizing all available supporting weapons rather than sacrifice large numbers of men in an effort to meet a time schedule.

As the operation progressed it was necessary to assign units smaller frontages than would normally be covered by a company or battalion. This was necessary when the units were reduced in strength from heavy casualties, the terrain became more and more rugged and chopped up, and the lack of trained and rested men to do the job. This reduction of frontages often required the placing of the reserve platoons, companies, and the Res BLT on the line. As this occurred the need for a mopping up unit became more and more apparent. Two of the BLT's (BLT-1/25 and BLT-3/25) each had one platoon in the Hq Co organized for this purpose and found them very useful until they had to be used as replacements, or were rendered ineffective by casualties. The Div Recon Co was

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attached to RCT-25 for a period and was extremely useful in mopping up the rear areas for by-passed, and infiltrated enemy. It is recommended that the T/O be changed to provide for a "Scout-Sniper" or similar unit in the Bn Hq Co or that a "Scout-Sniper" Co be organized in the Regt. This unit, in addition to mopping up operations, can be employed as a flank patrol, as security for rear area demolitions and construction teams, as a scouting force, as a reserve when three companies are committed, and as protection and security for the command post and the 81mm mortar platoon at night.

### 3. Infantry Weapons

During the operation the infantry weapons were generally found to be efficient and suitable. However, based on the Marshalls, Marianas and IWO JIMA operations the following recommendations are made:

(a) The present light machinegun has too high a silhouette and is a crew served weapon. When one of the crew is a casualty, either the tripod, gun, or ammunition is lost. A single load light machinegun should replace the present gun. The M1919A6 LMG w/bipod would be excellent. The tripod M2 should be retained so that the LMG M1919A6 can be used on FPL's in defensive positions.

(b) A weapon with a greater penetrating power than the AT rocket should replace the present AT rocket, if such is available or can be produced. This should remain a weapon that can be carried and fired by one man, and should have a launcher similar to the present AT rocket launcher. The new type collapsible launcher with the waterproofed ignition is a great improvement over the older model; it is the projectile and caliber that should be changed.

(c) The BAR gave good service, however an expendable preloaded magazine that can be packed and issued in the same manner as MG ammunition is a NECESSITY. A man who fights a hard battle all day in the rain over sandy country does not have time to stop and clean magazine, nor does he have time to reload magazines in the middle of a battle.

(d) The present flamethrower with the cartridge type ignitor worked very well. The range should be increased if possible.

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(d) The M1 rifle is still the best rifle. The carbine is satisfactory and is increasing in popularity; the new type with the adjustable sight would be preferable.

(f) The 81mm mortar again proved to be the best supporting weapon in the hands of the BLT Comdr. The unit of fire should be changed to provide a much greater amount of the light shell. A selective delayed and super-quick fuze should be developed for the medium shell. A number of smoke shells were found to have improper propelling charges and the number that fell short forced the BLT Comdrs to prohibit the use of this shell. Throughout the operation there was never enough 81mm mortar ammunition and the quantity of 81mm mortar ammunition carried on the operation should have been trebled; on Saipan, Tinian, and on Iwo Jima, there has been a shortage of this indispensable ammunition. Some terrain prevents the use of artillery and there have been numerous instances when the ONLY weapons available for preparation and defensive fires were the 60mm and 81mm mortars. It is of PRIMARY importance that SUFFICIENT 81mm mortar ammunition be carried on an operation because there are always times when it is the only weapon that will do the job; frequently at Iwo Jima, RCT-25 was confronted with terrain that could not be reached by artillery, or NGF. Many draws and crevasses had such steep sides and were so deep that artillery could not reach the bottom of the draws from position from which they were firing. Furthermore, 81mm mortars can be adjusted much closer to the front lines than artillery and such was often done when the enemy advanced close to the front lines to escape artillery fire.

(g) The bayonet has yet to be used often enough to justify its being carried. If it must be carried substitute the short bayonet which can also replace the combat knife.

(h) Flamethrower operators, bazooka operators, SCR 300 operators, 60mm mortar gunners, and gunners for the LMG should all be armed with the pistol rather than the carbine.

(i) A grenade launcher should be issued to every man in the rifle companies armed with either the carbine or rifle, since the designated grenadiers may become casualties and no launchers be readily available. At one time one rifle company fired a large number of AT grenades into an area from which they had been repulsed; the next day no resistance was offered and a very large number of enemy dead found in the draw. The AT grenade is a good long range hand grenade.

(j) There is a definite need for a heavy mortar that can reach defiladed areas with a large projectile. It is strongly recommended that a mortar company be established in the Regimental

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Weapons Co of the Infantry Regiment: This company should have at least six 155mm mortars with full tracked prime movers and supply vehicles. There should be both HE and smoke ammunition and the HE shell should have a selective delay or super-quick fuze. This company should be trained and controlled by the regiment.

While it is realized that in rough terrain, such as was encountered on IWO JIMA, and with a map that does not truly show the terrain, that the exact location of front lines cannot often be determined, the optimistic reporting of advances of units and their location should be minimized and discouraged until definite information is available. An exact location of the front lines should not be required from lower echelons regardless of whether the troops in the ground know where they are or not. When an unsupported estimate of front line positions is made, it should be made pessimistically and should be confirmed as correct or incorrect at the earliest moment. The reporting of front lines on the map well ahead of their actual location on the ground prevents the full use of supporting weapons by adjacent units and makes planning ineffective when it must be based on faulty troop locations.

#### 4. Regimental Weapons Company

Units of the Regimental Weapons Co were attached to the BLT's as follows: The assault BLT's each had attached one platoon of 37mm AT guns and two 75mm halftracks, the reserve BLT had attached one platoon of 37mm AT guns and one 75mm half-track. The Co Hq remained in the RCT Support Group. All of the guns were landed on D-day and none got off the beach due to the heavy sand and lack of egress routes from the beach.

During the operation very little use was made of either the 37mm AT guns or the 75mm AT halftracks; the terrain usually would not allow either to be brought to a firing position on targets ahead of the front lines. The 37mm AT gun was used only at night and then in front line positions firing cannister. The 37mm AT gun would not penetrate any but the weakest fortifications and when brought into position to fire was too vulnerable to enemy MG and small arms fire. The 75mm half-track was not mobile enough and could not perform any mission that could not be performed by a medium tank and yet was much more vulnerable to enemy fire of nearly all types, including small arms and 50mm "knee" mortars.

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Since organic arms could not be used, the R/W Co's personnel were frequently used as bazooka teams, MG platoons, and as riflemen. On one occasion the R/W Co Hq Section, together with personnel from H&S Co, was used in the front lines in a holding sector to relieve another unit for employment in the assault.

Recommendations for the R/W Co are:

- (a) Replace the 37mm AT gun with the 57mm AT gun which should be provided with cannister ammunition and should, if possible, be altered so as to have a lower silhouette. It should also be capable of being broken down into smaller loads to move over rough ground.

## **B. Aviation.**

### **1. Preliminary Planning:**

Training of Air-Liaison Parties for this operation consisted of maneuvers with units to which they were attached, including a rehearsal. It is believed that training was adequate. It is suggested that Air-Liaison Parties be attached to their units when these units begin their preliminary training and planning, rather than just prior to embarkation, for purpose of familiarizing the unit commanders and the Air-Liaison personnel with the efficient functioning of their units together. The rehearsal was adequate from a procedure standpoint, but it is felt that supply situation permitting, live plane armament should be used in training problems and rehearsals to accustom ground troops to close air support. This training should be with the air units that will support the next operation.

### **2. Effectiveness of Pre-D Day Air Strikes.**

Due to the fact that too much attention was given to air strips and not enough to defensive or possible defensive positions in the early air bombardment, it is felt that the pre-D day air strikes did not accomplish appreciable destruction of enemy emplacements. This appeared to be due primarily to (1) Well-fortified and dug-in enemy positions, (2) deeply ravined terrain on parts of Iwo Jima, which offered defilade positions and excellent natural camouflage to the enemy, making air observation difficult, and (3) it is felt that a much greater quantity of larger (1,000 lb. and up) bombs should have been used, paying particular

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attention to high ground and the ravined terrain which was tactically favorable to the enemy's defenses.

### 3. D-Day, Pre-H-hour Air Strikes.

Again, these strikes did not appear to affect the enemy's defenses materially. Napalm was ineffective, because less than 30% of the napalm bombs dropped exploded. Extremely heavy mortar fire and artillery fire was received just after H-hour on the beaches and inland, which appeared to be coming from the high ground, and the ravines in the northern sector of the objective. It is felt that these strikes should have likewise been concentrated on these areas. The beach strafing of the H-5 strike was not effective because of the well-fortified positions. It is felt that the strafing attacks on enemy positions in this operation were of little value in neutralizing the enemy.

### 4. Function of Air-Liaison Parties of RCT-25.

Air Liaison Parties operated under standard Air Liaison Procedure throughout this operation. BLT parties initiated strike request direct to CASCU except at night when pre-K hour strike requests for the following morning were cleared through higher echelon and also, at times during the latter stages of the operation when the small number of planes available dictated that only priority targets approved by higher echelon be run. It is felt that after D plus 3, sufficient numbers of planes were not available for call strikes. This was evidenced by the time lag between time of request, and the time the initial run was made, which in a number of cases required forty five to sixty minutes.

Target marking by ground units was generally good, but it is felt that colored smokes if available be used in future operations to mark targets, as Air Coordinator had considerable trouble distinguishing our marker W.P. from that of the enemy, and that of artillery and mortar barrages in adjacent areas. Front line marking panels were displayed clearly, yet there were a number of cases where our own troops were strafed and bombed, indicating that support pilots did not have sufficient training and briefing in target-front line recognition.

OY-1 planes, used in the latter stages of the operation, did an excellent job in observing enemy positions and then directing our own artillery and mortar in counter-battery fire. In

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In addition, their mere presence in the air served, somewhat, to keep enemy mortars and artillery underground. If it were possible to provide these planes armor protection it is felt their usefulness would be greatly increased. Considerable damage was done to them by enemy small arms fire.

Dummy runs did away with the element of surprise, and allowed the enemy ample time to withdraw his weapons into their deep caves. While a necessary safety precaution in this operation, a lot of the effectiveness of the air strikes was lost because of too many dummy runs being made. More thorough training of support pilots in target-front line recognition, and especially direct communication between observer on the ground and the strike leader, would do much to eliminate the necessity for so many dummy runs.

Air Liaison Parties of the Assault BLT's were landed immediately following the third wave with the BLT CO's forward CP's. Personnel in Air Liaison Parties are adequate. In general, Air Liaison parties performed their duties satisfactorily, however, it is felt that all members of party should be qualified radio operators, wire and telephone operations being incidental to the functioning of Air Liaison Parties.

#### 5. Communications:

Prior to the time radio jeeps were landed, two-way radio transmission was confined to the SAR net. The SAR net was monitored with an RBZ. Radio jeeps were either damaged or did not land for several days, causing some delay in securing observation missions, but otherwise, communications were adequate. Little or no benefit was derived from the Div Recon net until the latter stages of the operation, when this net was used by the OY-1's to observe and direct our own artillery and mortars. It is felt that since this net is so heavily trafficked, a separate frequency should be assigned to the OY-1 planes for their specific use.

It is also felt that direct communications between air strike group and Air Liaison party would materially increase effectiveness of strikes, by faster target location, and faster correction of mistakes. Safety of our front line troops would thus be increased by the ability of the Air Liaison Party to immediately call off the strike if it appeared to be going in our lines, and to redirect the strike on the proper

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6. Recommendations:

(a) In attacking fortified positions larger bombs and rockets be used on both preparatory and called strikes. Bombs to have delayed action fused for deeper penetration.

(b) Many more planes should be available to assure adequate close-support missions when needed. It is felt that the use of Marine Corps pilots, or pilots who have had infantry training, would be much better for close support work.

(c) BLT Comdrs must be allowed final voice in determining safety of front line troops for a called strike.

(d) All Air Liaison Parties should have more training in capabilities of support planes, and safety limits of the various types of plane armament.

(e) Dive-bombing should be used instead of glide-bombing, to assure greater accuracy. Planes must come lower than they generally did in this operation to be really effective against the type targets encountered.

(f) While it is recognized that priority of targets was assigned with the help of Landing Force Officers, it is felt that an experienced Infantry Officer should either actually accompany the strike leaders, or should help brief support pilots by pointing out on a map of the objective, specific target locations, which are the most probable locations for important enemy defensive installations. This could apply to strategic bombing missions but should most certainly apply to pre-H-hour strikes, and to D minus 3 to D minus 1 strikes.

D. Naval Gunfire.

1. Prior training:

During the training period on MAUI several CPX's were held within the regiment. These CPX's were satisfactory in the development of smooth functioning of the NGF teams.

Drills with ships in the Hawaiian area were neither satis-

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factory nor adequate. Many of the ships did not have time to become well trained in SFC procedure due to the small number of drills held. Actual firing was conducted on KAHOOULAWA but ships used were not the ships which were to be assigned to the respective NGF teams for the actual operation. In the case of LCI mortar and rocket craft, a new communications procedure was introduced to SFC parties one week before leaving the Hawaiian Area. A total of two drills were held with the LCI craft; procedure with both parties was unsatisfactory, yet no further drills were held prior to the operation.

## 2. Forward Area:

Not until the forward area was reached were drills held with the fire support ships assigned to the SFCP's and then only one drill was held with these ships. During the forward area rehearsal the BLT's simulated call fires with their initially assigned ships. It should be stressed at this point that this was the first time SFCP's had worked with their particular ships and no opportunity was given for SFCP's to brief the assigned ships.

## 3. Operational Plans:

Preparation fires on beach defenses was considered adequate by all BLT SFCP's, though all agreed that the right flank needed more attention. Since fire from the right flank was from entrenched positions, which required well adjusted call fires, it was impossible to neutralize all positions as SFCP's were not yet ashore.

Many targets of opportunity along the coast were knocked out by the firing ships but targets of a concealed nature were difficult to destroy until ships increased range and air spot was used. After D-day this firing at an increased range was hazardous due to the position of the transport area and it was necessary to use 1200 FS powder in order to prevent premature air bursts over transports.

Observed counter-battery fire was very effective. After D-day only one destroyer was hit by a concealed artillery piece or mortar. Night harassing fires carried out by BLT's were mostly unobserved. Unobserved harassing fires were coordinated with BLT

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Comdrs and an adequate safety limit established. Night illumination was very satisfactory; only in a few cases did duplication or misplacement occur. When the supply of star shells became critical the BLT's were limited to 75 rounds a night except in case of emergency. In every case where an emergency did arise adequate illumination was received.

Interdiction fire was carried out in connection with night harassing fire. Most daylight interdiction fire was by plane spot.

The use of VOF planes for spotting by SFCP's was not entirely satisfactory. Spotters did not know limits of fire control equipment in applying spots on shore targets and some spotters and ships did not seem to understand the meaning of infantry front line panels or green star cluster (Friendly fire falling in own lines). In two instances spotter planes failed to report green star clusters to firing ships or higher echelon ashore. It is estimated that 15 call fire missions were carried out by the RCT-25 NGF Team. BLT-2/25 NGF Team estimated 70 call fire missions but BLT-1/25 and BLT-3/25 NGF Teams were unable to give an estimate of call fires.

#### 4. Composition of SFCP's:

SFCP's were adequate in number initially. Due to casualties BLT-3/25 was far below effective operating strength. There was an inadequate replacement of trained communication personnel and officer casualties were one more than the number carried by Div as replacements. All Div replacements were used by RCT-25.

#### 5. Effectiveness of SFC equipment:

Communication equipment supplied to SFC parties were adequate; the RCT team was oversupplied with wire, remote controls, and 536's.

Adequate replacement of damaged primary communication was not available from JASCO or Div Signal Co until D plus 6 and SFCP's owed their continued operation to cooperative RCT and BLT Comm sections.

New generators for TBX(8) and SCR 284 were supplied to SFCP's prior to rehearsals in Hawaiian area. These generators were

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not used enough to bring out their faults and despite heat treatments prior to departure they were a constant source of trouble during the operation.

SCR 300's were used for the first time and were highly satisfactory.

TCS jeeps were landed too early and were lost.

6. Coordination:

Coordination with adjacent units was always well controlled. Most targets supplied to NGF from air and artillery were too close to our own lines. Chain of command between various echelons of NGF control was more effective than any previous operation.

7. Recommendations:

(a) In the rehearsal stage live NGF should be used in support of advancing troops in a tactical problem.

(b) A special effort should be made to have SFCP's brief firing ships prior to the operation.

(c) Div should carry an adequate resupply of trained communications personnel.

(d) There should be sufficient preparation fire to insure the destruction of priority targets.

(e) Division should report to the lower echelons Division preparations in zones of action of lower echelons.

(f) Greater use could be made of infantry weapons in getting a ship on the target, i.e. smoke projectiles, etc.

(g) Unobserved fires should be given a wide safety range.

(h) Division should be assigned more VOF planes and spotting frequencies and these spotters should receive more training in their duties prior to the operation.

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E. Engineers:

1. From September until December, 1944, Co "A", 4th Engr Bn spent the greater part of its training period on demolitions and on mines and booby traps, both American and Japanese types. At the end of that period, practically every man in the company was able to prepare and detonate demolition charges, lay and take up our own and enemy type minefields, and to disarm Japanese mines and booby traps. This training cannot be overemphasized, for the majority of combat engineer work is either demolitions or mine and booby trap removal. In addition, Hq Platoon continued training operators for its heavy equipment, construction foremen, carpenters and electricians for their specialties during the same period.

2. On 27 December, 1944, Co "A", 4th Engr Bn was attached to RCT-25 as its combat engineers. Platoons within the company were attached as follows: Hq Plat and 2d Plat directly under RCT control; 1st Plat to BLT-1/25, 3d Plat to BLT-3/25. Organized thusly, the Co took part in all amphibious maneuvers prior to landing on IWO JIMA.

The different elements of this company were landed on D-day as indicated below:

Hq Plat forward echelon, with a bulldozer, landed at H-hour plus 40 minutes with the mission of putting in pioneer beach egress roads to aid tanks and other transportation over the beach and its terraces.

1st Plat, divided into four squads, two of which landed in the 3d wave, the other two in the 6th wave. Their mission was the location and removal of mines and booby traps and beach demolitions.

2d Plat, landed about 1600 with all its personnel as combat engineer reserve.

3d Plat, divided into three squads, one of which landed in the 5th wave, other two in the 6A wave; all three with the mission of locating and removal of mines and booby traps and beach demolitions.

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3. The morning of D plus 1, the situation was as follows:

Hq Plat was unable to carry out its mission due to the intense mortar and artillery shelling which temporarily disabled the dozer.

1st Plat had successfully completed its missions.

2d Plat had not yet been committed.

3d Plat had successfully completed its missions.

4. By 1400, D plus 1, the three platoons were attached directly to and operating with their respective BLT's. Hq Plat remained under RCT control.

5. From D plus 1 until the island was secured the platoons were assigned missions by their BLT's and the RCT in the case of Hq Plat, as follows:

(a) Location, disarming and removing of enemy mine fields and booby traps. (All avenues of approach were heavily mined and had to be searched for mines and and booby traps before they could be used by vehicles).

Location of mine fields, individual mines and booby traps was accomplished in two ways. The most successful was the searching of the top and the probing of the earth with a bayonet. Mine detectors were tried but found for the most part inefficient because of the new type enemy plastic mines. In the majority of cases it is felt that the location of the mine fields and booby traps was highly successful. Disarming the mines and booby traps was a comparatively simple though dangerous task. It was made simple because the men were thoroughly versed in every type mine or booby trap encountered and had been provided with the proper tools to facilitate the disarming of the mines. No new procedure was used on this operation as previous training proved satisfactory.

Removal of enemy mine fields was usually by troops other than engineer after all mines had been disarmed and inspected for booby traps.

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(c) Mopping up missions with demolitions in both forward and rear areas.

These missions were the greater part of the combat engineers work in this operation. It is estimated that approximately 400 caves, tunnels, and other fortifications were neutralized or blown shut. In many cases this was done under heavy sniper fire; it was found that shaped charges were effective in this type of work when larger charges were not necessary.

(c) The improvement of existing roads and the construction of many new roads in both forward and rear areas. Hq Platoon was responsible for road construction and put in beach egress roads to the front line BLT's. These roads were maintained and new ones built as the lines moved forward. In most cases these roads were of pioneer construction and passable for jeeps and one-ton trucks only, and then were primarily for the transportation of supplies and evacuation of casualties from front line BLT's.

(d) Water Supply.

Water supply was initially by five gallon cans carried by the RCT. There was attached to the Engr Co for transportation, a water supply squad from the Engr Bn Hq. This squad landed on D plus 6 and immediately reverted to Engr Bn control.

6. The four platoons of Co "A", 4th Engr Bn completed successfully all missions assigned to them during the operation; however, it is felt that many small demolition assignments performed by the engineers while mopping up rear areas should have been taken care of by infantry trained in basic demolitions thereby relieving the engineers for more important demolition projects. This, however, was not possible since, due to the excessive losses in the infantry units, the demolitions personnel in the infantry had either become casualties or could not be spared from front line duties.

F. Artillery:

RCT-25 was directly supported by the 1st Bn, 14th Marines with 75mm pack howitzers. This Bn landed on Beach BLUE 1 on D-day and had started firing call fires at 1100. Excellent support was

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given within the capabilities of the 75mm pack howitzer and call fires were delivered very quickly and accurately. The 75mm pack howitzer did not, however, fulfill the needs for an attack on a fortified position since it was just not big enough to breach the enemy's installations. For night defensive fires it was excellent since the concentrations could be brought in close to the front lines without fear of short rounds due to dispersion. The supply of ammunition sometimes was low and some missions could not be fired as heavily as was desired.

The coordination of artillery with NGF was accomplished automatically by close cooperation between BLT and RCT Artillery and NGF liaison officers. Experience brought out that it was almost impossible to knock out enemy artillery, rocket, and mortar fire with our counter-battery fire, so a system of automatically placing harassing fires on all located enemy rocket, artillery and mortar positions when the enemy opened up was devised. This system was found to be the best solution for reducing the volume of the enemy fire.

The amount of 155mm fire available was not sufficient for the highly fortified positions encountered. This was often the only weapon available that had the power to breach the fortified installations and there should have been more 155mm artillery support available. On several occasions the 155mm Corps Artillery refused to fire because their map showed the desired concentration too close to the front lines. If the BLT Comdr on the ground is willing to take the calculated risk of short rounds in order to knock out fire that is causing him casualties, the artillery should be willing to grant the BLT Comdr's requests, especially since the BLT Comdr is on the ground and the Arty FDC has only a map.

When deeply crevassed terrain is encountered artillery cannot deliver fire on reverse slopes and at the bottom of steep-sided narrow draws when its direction of fire is across the corridors. Such an area confronted RCT-25 in the latter part of the operation and the artillery was requested to move to a position where its line of fire would parallel the crevasses, so that fire could be placed on the bottom of the crevasses; the request was refused. This request was made after a personal reconnaissance by the RCT Comdr and the BLT Comdrs. It is believed that had this movement of the artillery taken place to fire down corridors where

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the impact would strike both sides of the deep crevasses and also the bottom of the crevasses, where many caves and cave entrances were later located, this RCT would have been able to secure its zone of action in TA's 184 and 185 with less casualties and in a shorter time.

With the exception of the above comments the artillery support was as efficient as possible and generally its effectiveness was limited only by a lack of supply and lack of a large enough weapon for the neutralization of the highly fortified positions encountered. The efficiency of the 1st Bn, 14th Marines cannot be praised too highly and their cooperation and willingness was outstanding. On one occasion a 75mm pack howitzer was taken to the front lines, assembled, and used as an assault gun. The results of this were not spectacular but the willingness to try was noteworthy.

#### G. Rockets.

The 1st Section, 1st Prov Rocket Det was attached to RCT-25 for the IWO JIMA operation. Initially they were of little use and their first mission was not until D plus 3 days. The beach conditions and lack of roads inland were the reasons for their not being used initially. The 4.5" barrage rocket was found to be an effective weapon against enemy in open entrenchments but did not have the power to neutralize or destroy enemy in strong emplacements. The fire control system, chiefly communications, needs improvement.

It is strongly recommended that a light weight single round launcher for the 7.2" rocket be developed for use on call by the BLT's as a weapon to breach strongly fortified positions when other large weapons cannot be brought to bear. The range of the 7.2" rocket should be increased. It is also recommended that at least two medium tanks in the tank company be fitted for attachment of the 20 round 7.2" rocket launcher and that the tank units receive training in the employment of this rocket.

It is recommended that the 4.5" barrage rocket sections be maintained since they do provide a good shock weapon for use against an enemy that is not in a strongly fortified position.

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The IWO JIMA operation did not favor the use of tanks. The majority of the time their use was extremely limited due to the ruggedness of the terrain and the enemy anti-tank measures, (chiefly mines and tank obstacles.) The medium tank was used almost exclusively as an assault gun in destroying enemy pillboxes and blockhouses. The 75mm gun is not a large enough gun nor does it have a high enough velocity to breach heavy concrete emplacements such as were encountered on IWO JIMA. The replacing of the 75mm gun with a high velocity 90mm gun is strongly recommended.

The flamethrower tank gave good service when it could get into position but it can be considerably improved. It should have a much larger fuel capacity and should have a fuel trailer so that it will not be required to leave the front frequently to go back and refuel. The flamethrower tank broke down frequently due to weak fuel lines and this should be remedied. The rated range was never attained; the distance that flame can be thrown should be doubled. The dozer tank is not powerful enough to do any but the simplest dozing jobs yet was the only dozer available for work under fire. The dozer tank could not push rocks or do much more than move loose earth.

When tanks were brought to the front lines they nearly always drew heavy rocket and mortar fire and as a result front line troops could not maintain close communication with the tanks. Furthermore, when tanks opened fire on located enemy emplacements the enemy would frequently lay smoke to blind the tanks and nullify the tanks' fire. When tanks operated in support of infantry they either were covered by fire by the infantry or covered each other to prevent closein attacks by the enemy.

On future operations it is recommended that the bull-dozer and flail tanks land well ahead of the rest of the tanks and the other tanks be ordered to the beach only when cleared egress routes from the beach are available. When tanks are landed without prior work on the beach they get bogged down easily, can perform no mission, and draw enemy fire on themselves.

#### I. Chemical Warfare.

1. Schools were held by the regimental gas officer for

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all personnel in the regiment. The school covered all phases of the gas mask and instructions in the fundamentals of Chemical Warfare was given. The mask of each man was inspected at this time for proper fit.

2. Under the supervision of the regimental gas officer a gas obstacle course was constructed which encompassed the use of gas under combat conditions as nearly as possible. All officer and enlisted personnel were put through this course, which included a gas chamber.

3. A special school attended by one NCO from each platoon and one officer from each Bn. was held by the regimental gas officer. This school gave instruction in all phases of Chemical warfare. Field Manual 21-40 was covered and demonstrations were given as extensively as availability of materials would allow. The men thus schooled held further training for all men of their units under the guidance and supervision of the regimental and Bn. Chemical officers.

#### ON WAY TO TARGET.

1. Every man was given refresher instruction on the gas mask and the waterproofing of same. One day prior to D-day all masks were again inspected to see that all fit properly and were waterproofed satisfactorily.

2. Fundamentals of Chemical warfare were again discussed.

#### COUNTER CHEMICAL WARFARE PRECAUTIONS.

1. Each company gas Sgt. carried the Kit Chemical Agent Detector M-9.

2. Each gas mask case contained 1 tube, ointment, bal; 1 tube, ointment, protective (S461 or M1) and at least one protective cover.

3. The regimental and Bn quartermasters carried one complete suit of impregnated clothing for all personnel of the regiment. The regimental quartermaster also carried 50% resupply of Agent Decontamination (RH195) and Solvent Decontamination Agent (RH 195).

4. Each officer and man was issued 1 kit, water proofing.

5. Every vehicle carried the apparatus Decontamination Hand M2 (1/2 qt. capacity) complete with one charge of decontamination agent.

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J. War Dogs.

RCT-25 had attached for the attack on IWO JIMA the 7th Marine War Dog Platoon (less 2d and 3d sections), consisting of 12 dogs - six messenger and six scout-sentry. The messenger dogs were utilized for runs between Div Hq and the RCT Hq and were found to be efficient. The delivery of messages was generally as rapid as by auto-messengers and faster when the route was under arty and mortar fire. On two occasions the dogs were stopped by friendly personnel and fed and the dogs returned without delivering the message. Other than these two incidents they were very efficient. The scout-sentry dogs were chiefly used on sentry missions at night on the front lines and in the BLT CP's. During daylight they were of little use since the front lines were in constant close contact with the enemy the greater part of the time, and since the dogs would not go down into dark caves. The scout-sentry dogs were sent to the BLT's each night and returned to their assembly area for rest during the day.

It is recommended that the present War Dog platoons be maintained. The messenger dogs are efficient and they release transportation that would otherwise be held for emergency messages. The IWO JIMA operation did not provide much opportunity for efficient use of scout dogs by this RCT; but, in future operations where the front lines are not always in contact with the enemy it is felt that they will be valuable for patrolling and advance guard actions.

J. H. JONES,  
Major, USMC,  
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HEADQUARTERS,  
TWENTY FIFTH MARINES, FOURTH MARINE DIVISION,  
c/o FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

17 April, 1945.

APPENDIX IV TO RCT-25 OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA, VOLCANO ISLANDS.  
"S-U-P-P-L-Y"

1. OUTLINE:

(a) The following broad outline will be followed in the discussion of "Supply":

<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Subject</u>
2	GENERAL
3	SUPPLY
4	TRANSPORTATION
5	TRANSPORT QUARTERMASTER
6	ORDNANCE
7	MEDICAL
8	BURIAL
9	SUMMARY OF MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS

2. GENERAL:

(a) "Supply" as a general though mis-used term covering a multitude of functions from requisitioning and issuing actual supplies and equipment, through responsibility for and supervision of waterborne and land-operated vehicles, maintenance, ordnance, transport loading and unloading, medical activity and evacuation, to the responsibility for burials, may be broadly classified in two phases: (1) planning and (2) execution. In combat supply the first ends, and the second starts when the combat unit loading aboard transports begins.

(1) Planning may be further broken down into two phases: basic and secondary.

a. Basic planning is that planning done by the highest echelon directly charged with the responsibility of directing the particular operation.

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b. Secondary planning is the detailed planning done by all participating echelons lower in the chain of command. The lower the echelon, the more detailed the planning.

(2) Execution is simply the carrying into effect of planning.

(b) Generally speaking, the failures of supply at Iwo Jima were in basic planning rather than in secondary planning or in execution. As obvious examples of this failure, the following points are enumerated:

- (1) Preloading of Infantry LST's: - On the whole, the so-called "Preload No. 1" is considered adequate for general infantry use. However, the loading of individual LST's has been such as to prohibit maximum efficiency in unloading. Supplies were found to have been loaded with no regard for combat requirements and in such fashion as to preclude immediate access to particular items immediately required. In many cases it was necessary to move or transfer supplies not desired into small boats in order to get at those demanded by the situation. It is recommended that a definite system of combat loading for LST's be promulgated to all interested parties and that all items be so placed as to be accessible at any given time.
- (2) Shortage of mortar ammunition: - Terrain characteristics must be seriously considered prior to allocating amounts and types of ammunition. Iwo Jima, being primarily loose volcanic ash, obviously containing many draws and depressions and having few wooden, man-made, above-ground installations, should have indicated the relative uselessness of 81MM mortar shells, HE, M56, W/fuze P.D. M53 and should have indicated the greater need for Shells, HE, M43A1, W/fuze P.D. M52. Further, the arbitrary allocation of two units of fire of mortar ammunition over the number of units of small arms fire for operations such as this

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APPENDIX IV TO RCT-25 OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA, (CONTINUED).

indicates a tendency to undervalue intelligence reports on terrain and geological conditions. A unit of fire is an arbitrary estimate of a day's ammunition requirement under average conditions and should be varied to the circumstances and characteristics of the specific operation. A recommended "rule-of-thumb" for an operation upon the type of land common to young volcanic formations is that mortar ammunition be allocated on the basis of two units to one over small arms ammunition. The use of great amounts of mortar ammunition can be justified when it is pointed out that terrain requires it; that the mortar is the largest organic weapon with which the Battalion Commander can bring immediate massed fire upon a target of opportunity; and with which faster, easier, safer and cheaper reconnaissance by fire can be accomplished. The 60MM mortar fills the same needs for the Company Commander who has the added problem of intermediate illumination.

- (3) Control procedure for LST's at night: - The unknown and uncertain qualities of an amphibious landing make execution of any plan of supply difficult in the first few days. The organization for control is complicated as far as the combat team is concerned by the procedure necessary to obtain actual access to an LST during the hours of darkness. Control of at least one LST for emergency supply should be relinquished by the higher echelon so that it may take station as near the Beach Control Vessel as possible and remain under the RCT Logistics Officer during the first night. Supply must be carried on regardless of enemy land activity or anticipated enemy air activity. Primarily the success of the beach head and, secondarily, the loss of life through supply failure are more important than the possible loss of an LST.

3. SUPPLY:

(a) Mounting out supplies were adequate for the operation with the following exceptions:

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APPENDIX IV TO RCT-25 OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA, (CONTINUED).

(1) Class I:

Landing type rations "C" and "K" were not provided in logical quantities. "K" rations, which can be carried easily by troops on the line, were not available in the quantity needed. "C" rations, primarily useable in static situations, were available in excessive quantities. In some cases these rations were dated "1942". The new type "C" rations should be allocated immediately to combat troops. "B" rations were excessive.

(2) Class II:

Certain items of this class were carried that were in no way necessary to the operation. In fact, items such as field ranges and accessories (excluding fire units) and tentage (excluding paulins and tent flies) created unnecessary labor for the shore party and the regiment in unloading and moving them across the beach.

(3) Class V:

Critical shortages of ammunition developed in the same items as at Saipan and Tinian: 81MM Mortar (light), 60MM Mortar Illuminating, and shaped charges (demolitions). (Further comment on ammunition will be found under "Ordnance").

(b) Resupply of all classes of supply was adequate except in the items noted as inadequate above.

(c) Palletized cargo crossing RCT-25's beach was voluntarily held to a minimum due to difficulty in handling and was of such small quantity as to preclude comment. No "Wilson" drums were used.

(d) Shore Party:

- (1) Under the conditions existing on Iwo Jima, RCT-25's shore party accomplished its mission as satisfactorily as could have been expected. The heavy enemy fire and the adverse beach and surf conditions nullified considerable prior planning and necessitated reliance on initiative and deci-

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APPENDIX IV TO RCT-25 OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA, (CONTINUED).  
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sions made "on the spot". During the period that RCT-25 was in control of the shore party, supply was direct from ship-to-frontlines. Such beach dumps as were established initially were not revetted and were destroyed by enemy fire. Revetting was not accomplished initially because of lack of equipment and the murderous enemy fire on the beaches. Traffic control was nil due to lack of roads and amounts of traffic.

- (2) Ship-to-shore cargo control: - No boat left any ship with supplies until given a cargo ticket and dispatched by the unloading officer aboard ship. The boat then reported to the RCT-25 Logistics Officer at the Beach Control Vessel. The cargo boats remained in the vicinity of the control vessel until dispatched ashore by the Logistics Officer. The Shore Party Commander had direct radio communication by SCR-300 with the Logistics Officer who, in turn, had radio communication with each ship's unloading officer. "Force" unloading (that is, allowing the commanding officer of a ship to institute unloading simply because there were small boats available) was specifically forbidden. Only that cargo specifically requested by the RCT Logistics Officer came off of any ship until general unloading began. This assured logical utilization of available boats and prevented a recurrence of the customary confusion involved when a ship's captain (who is interested only in unloading) suddenly fills all available boats with rations or some similar, useless cargo and then has no transportation available for hauling ammunition or other priority supplies. The RCT Logistics Officer directly and completely controlled all unloading and the routing of cargo to the beach based on request from the Shore Party. Unloaded small boats returned directly to their parent ship. Parent ships periodically reported boat availability to the

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RCT-25 OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA, (CONTINUED).

Logistics Officer. By the loading diagrams and the boat availability the Logistics Officer knew immediately where he could get the most of a given supply at a given time. Iwo Jima proved that this system is excellent when all ships have been carefully coached and the spirit of co-operation exists.

- (3) Salvage: - Extensive salvage collection was carried on throughout the RCT-25 and adjacent areas (including beach areas). All salvage in condition for re-use was immediately re-issued. This was especially true in the case of automatic weapons and flame throwers. Items that could be easily repaired were retained in the RCT dump, repaired and returned to use as required. Items that could not be repaired were turned over to the higher echelon repair facilities or salvage dump as appropriate.
- (4) Supply communication was sufficient and efficient. Primary means of communication were telephone and runner. Radio facilities were immediately available in the event of line failure. Runners from each BLT dump were stationed at the RCT dump and were available as messengers or as guides for the delivery of supplies.

#### 4. TRANSPORTATION:

(a) This RCT had sufficient transportation because of the fact that the RCT zone of action remained in a limited area. No displacement of RCT dumps and other installations was necessary from the original positions in the beach area. Again however, the type of terrain was of vital importance. During the first five (5) days of the operation, wheeled vehicles played little or no part in supply. Only tracked vehicles could navigate the volcanic ash and the terraces immediately inland of the water's edge. This was accomplished by LVT's and Carriers, M-29. After the first five (5) days wheeled vehicles were satisfactory. This RCT lost approximately forty (40%) percent of its Trucks, 1/4 ton, 4x4, cargo, during the first few days, but loans from higher echelon and other units helped off-set the loss.

(b) Carrier, M-29 (Weasel): - In terrain such as was encountered at Iwo Jima, the value of the weasel is minimal.

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supply cannot be over-emphasized. Its ability to navigate on sand and rough terrain, either alone or pulling a 1/4-ton trailer, was invaluable. Further, the wide tracks and, consequently, the dispersion of weight evidently made it less vulnerable to land mines. It is recommended that the T/O be revised to allow the infantry regiment a platoon consisting of twenty (20) Carriers, M-29, to be used as supply vehicles, as ambulances, as prime movers for weapons, for wire-laying, etc.

(c) Spare parts and maintenance facilities: - No spare parts were available for the Weasel. Spare parts were inadequate for other types of vehicles as well. Maintenance facilities, supplemented by "cannibalization" were barely adequate. Sufficient tools have never been allowed an infantry regiment for adequate field maintenance. A trip to the higher echelon is not the answer to prompt repairs when, during the assault phase, that unit is not ashore or later when the distances are great and the need is immediate. It is recommended that each mechanic in the motor maintenance section of an infantry regiment be equipped with a kit, tool, mechanic's motor and chassis repair, and that a master repair kit become part of the organic equipment. There is also a great need for an Acetylene welding outfit.

(d) It is recommended that the T/O be changed to allow the 81MM mortar platoon in each infantry battalion two (2) 1-ton trucks.

#### 5. TRANSPORT QUARTERMASTER:

(a) All ships embarked upon by this unit were loaded according to schedule and within the time allocated by 4th MarDiv. No difficulties were encountered that couldn't be adjusted with little effort. An inadequate number of docks is the major problem of embarkation at Maui. The following suggestions are made to alleviate certain problems of loading:

- (1) Machine gun mounts, especially those on 6x6 trucks, must be constructed so that they do not add to the height of the vehicle at loading time.
- (2) Vehicles should contain no preload that extends the dimensions or adds greatly to the over-all weight. If such is done the size

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APPENDIX IV RCT-25 OPERATIONS REPORT ON IWO JIMA, (CONTINUED).

of holds and the lift capacity of the booms must be kept in mind and UP&T Tables should carry the increases.

- (3) Possibly because the Army has been successful in landing on unopposed beaches, thereby allowing the early beaching of LST's and like craft, the Marine Corps seems to have developed a mania for palletizing supplies. Pallets cannot be used until the shore party is functioning with the necessary equipment. Otherwise the pallets have to be broken down, resulting in a loss of time and manpower. It is suggested that palletizing be reduced considerably for operations such as Iwo Jima.
- (4) The use of 5-gallon expeditionary cans for gasoline is an error. These cans lose their air tightness after being used once. Further use creates a fire hazard. The additional gasoline carried on each vehicle is deemed adequate to nullify the extensive use of 5-gallon expeditionary cans. Vehicles can be re-fueled from 55-gallon drums.

(b) Difficulties of unloading ships at the target were mostly those caused by nature, that is, the beach condition and the surf. These were partially off-set by the use of larger landing craft and amphibious tractors. Another difficulty in the initial phase of unloading was the control procedure which prevented the RCT from having at least one LST immediately available near the Beach Control Vessel for emergency supply during the first half of D-night. In addition, while the "Preload No. 1" is generally adequate for infantry re-supply, it is felt that at least one (1) and probably two (2) LST's assigned an RCT should be loaded, not with "Preload No. 1", but with more of the high priority items, such as 81MM and 60MM mortar ammunition, belted MG ammunition, grenades, etc., which are in greater demand during the first one or two days. This LST should then remain in the vicinity of the RCT Beach Control Vessel under direct control of the RCT Logistics Officer for supply throughout the night of D-day and thereafter if necessary. By use of this LST (and its LVT's) the Logistics Officer would have immediate access to supplies and the means of transporting them directly to the front lines. In the case of Iwo Jima it was impossible to land adequate supplies during daylight hours of

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APPENDIX TO RCT-25 OPERATIONS REPORT ON IWO JIMA, (CONTINUED).

D-day to carry units through the night. That this hadn't been accomplished was known prior to darkness, but, despite immediate request that an LST be moved in to the vicinity of the Beach Control Vessel, a period of approximately six (6) hours elapsed before it was accomplished. Further, it is noted in passing that, under conditions such as existed on Iwo Jima, a shore party is at best an information bureau for landing units during the first twenty-four (24) hours. Therefore, excepting the small amounts maintained in the floating dump, supply must be from ship-to-troops via the most expedient means.

(c) Equipment for unloading ships was standard for the class CV2 hull. Unloading could have been speeded up in no way except by having an "easier" operation.

#### 6. ORDNANCE:

##### (a) Weapons:

- (1) The assault landing on Iwo Jima was made with the following weapons (25th Marines organic):

1658 Carbines, cal. .30 M1.  
1424 Rifles, U.S. cal. .30 M1.  
243 Rifles, automatic, U.S. cal. .30 Browning.  
90 Pistols, automatic, U.S. cal. .45  
54 Guns, machine, cal. .30 Browning, M1917A1.  
75 Guns, machine, cal. .30 Browning, M1919A4.  
10 Guns, machine, cal. .50 Browning, HB, M2.  
39 Mortars, 60MM.  
12 Mortars, 81MM.  
5 Guns, 75MM, SP, M1897A4.  
12 Guns, AT, 37MM, M3A1  
43 Launchers, Rocket, AT, 2.36" M9A1  
60 Shotguns, 12 gauge  
81 Flame throwers, portable, M2-2.

- (2) During the operation the following weapons were issued RCT-25 by Division for replacement weapons:

15 Carbines, cal. .30 M1.  
7 Rifles, U.S. cal. .30 M1.  
20 Rifles, automatic, U.S. cal. .30 Browning.  
6 Guns, machine, cal. .30 Browning, M1917A1.  
12 Guns, machine, cal. .30 Browning, M1919A4.

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25 OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA, (CONTINUED).

3 Mortars, 60MM  
2 Mortars, 81MM  
3 Guns, AT, 37MM, M3A1  
12 Launchers, Rocket, AT, M9A1  
2 Flamethrowers, portable M2-2

(3) The following weapons were received in the hands of replacement troops:

213 Carbines, U.S. cal. .30 M1  
897 Rifles, U.S. cal. .30 M1

(4) The weapons listed below were salvaged and put to use by the 25th Marines:

78 Carbines, U.S. cal. .30 M1  
202 Rifles, U. S. cal. .30 M1  
20 Rifles, Automatic, U.S. cal. .30 Browning  
1 Gun, machine, cal. .30 Browning M1917A1  
12 Guns, machine, cal. .30 Browning M1919A4  
1 Mortar, 60MM  
1 Launcher, Rocket, 2.36" M9A1

(5) The following weapons were lost in combat:

850 Carbines, U.S. cal. .30 M1  
1557 Rifles, U.S. cal. .30M1  
164 Rifles, automatic, U.S. cal. .30 Browning  
77 Pistols, automatic, U.S. cal. .45  
19 Guns, machine, cal. .30 Browning M1917A1  
Gun, machine, cal. .30 Browning M1919A4  
(All recovered by salvage operations)  
4 Guns, machine, cal. .50 Browning, HB, M2  
7 Mortars, 60MM, complete  
3 Mortars, 81MM, complete  
3 Guns, 37MM, M3A1  
27 Launchers, Rocket, AT, 2.36", M9A1  
48 Shotguns, 12 gauge  
46 Flame throwers, portable, M2-2

(6) Malfunctions:

a. The only known malfunction occurred on D + 10.

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APPENDIX IV TO RCT-25 OPERATIONS REPORT ON IWO JIMA, (CONTINUED).

b. This malfunction consisted of a premature explosion of an M43A1 shell in the tube of an 81MM mortar. All men at the gun position were killed or wounded and evacuated. As a result, accurate information as to the condition of the gun prior to firing was unobtainable.

c. The mortar platoon leader stated that all hands were instructed to test the safety pin of each shell before firing.

(7) Spare parts and accessories were adequate with the exception of firing pins for 60MM and 81MM mortars. The allowance of these parts was exhausted on D+12. It is recommended that the allowance of these parts be doubled.

(8) It is recommended that the following types of weapons be adopted and the following changes be made:

a. It is recommended that the T/A and T/O be changed to include six (6) 81MM mortars in the 81MM mortar platoon in the infantry battalion. The 81MM mortar has proved in the past two operations to be the most useful weapon in the hands of the BLT Commander.

b. It is strongly recommended that a 155MM mortar platoon be formed in the Infantry Regimental Weapons Company with six (6) 155MM mortars and with full tracked prime movers and supply carriers. The experience gained on the past operation indicates that a large mortar type weapon that can place a heavy shell in defiladed areas should be adopted, and, further, that only full tracked vehicles can be relied upon to negotiate sandy beaches and rough terrain that is under fire to such an extent that Pioneers and Engineers cannot construct roads.

c. It is recommended that the 37MM AT gun be replaced with the 57MM AT gun. 37MM

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APPENDIX IV TO RCT-25 OPERATIONS REPORT ON IWO JIMA, (CONTINUED).

ammunition has neither the size nor velocity to effectively disable the newer Japanese tanks. Neither can it pierce any but the weakest of enemy fortifications. Cannister ammunition should be provided for the 57MM AT gun. The gun itself could be improved by reducing its silhouette.

- d. In the infantry battalions it is recommended that the Browning LMG, model 1919A4 be replaced by the 1919A6 model so that it may be carried and fired by one man. The tripod and elevating mechanism and the pintle should be retained and carried in the battalion supply train and taken up to the front lines when setting up a defensive position. Frequently the LMG tripod was lost when the man carrying the tripod became a casualty and the gun could then be only fired from the hip, thus reducing its effectiveness.
- e. It is strongly recommended that an expendable BAR magazine be developed and factory loaded for combat issue. The use of the present magazine requires the BAR man to waste valuable time and effort reloading empty magazines.
- f. The short bayonet should be substituted for the long bayonet. Personnel carrying the short bayonet need not be issued the combat knife.
- g. The pistol, automatic, cal. .45 should replace the carbine for issue to flame thrower operators, bazooka operators, gunners and assistant gunners in machine gun squads, and SCR-300 operators. The Thompson sub-machine guns should be

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issued to telephone linesmen on the basis of one per two men.

- h. A rocket of approximately 90MM to be fired from a launcher similar to the AT rocket launcher should be developed. There should be two types of rounds, a fragmentation round and an AT shaped charge round.
- i. Issue one (1) Mount, tripod, M2, per M1917 machine gun in addition to the M1917A1 tripod mount.
- j. Increase the allowance of M7 and M8 AT grenade launchers to one (1) per Rifle, M1 or Carbine in the rifle company.
- k. Increase the allowance of M1919A4 machine guns for Regimental Weapons Company from eleven (11) to thirty (30).
- l. At present, there is no weapon in the Marine Division capable of destroying well-constructed pill-boxes of the type used by the enemy on Iwo Jima. Development of a self-propelled, large caliber, high velocity weapon that is capable of penetrating at least seven (7) feet of concrete is recommended. These weapons should be an organic part of each infantry regiment. The 90MM Tank Destroyer, T-26, might be used as a basis for the development of this weapon.

(b) Combat vehicles:

- (1) Five (5) Guns, 75MM, S.P. (Half-tracks) M3, were employed during the operation.
- (2) Only limited use could be made of half-track vehicles because of the sandy beaches and the rugged terrain.
- (3) Numerous maintenance difficulties were encountered, mainly because the supply of spare parts did not include radiators, wheels and axles. Several of the half-tracks were temporarily put out of action by horn mines. In all cases the wheels, radiators, and axles were the only parts damaged seriously.

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(c) Ammunition:

(1) Ammunition expenditures are listed below:

426,400 CARTRIDGE, carbine, cal. .30 M1.  
 6,000 CARTRIDGE, grenade, carbine, M6.  
 625,813 CARTRIDGE, A.P., cal. .30, (5-rd Clips).  
 613,446 CARTRIDGE, A.P., cal. .30, (8-rd Clips).  
 60,000 CARTRIDGE, tracer, cal. .30, M1.  
 64,000 CARTRIDGE, tracer, cal. .30, (5-rd Clips).  
 30,000 CARTRIDGE, tracer, cal. .30, (8-rd Clips).  
 2,528,050 CARTRIDGE, cal. .30, Belted, (all ratios).  
 28,850 CARTRIDGE, Ball, cal. .45.  
 19,500 CARTRIDGE, cal. .50, Linked, (all ratios).  
 47,407 SHELL, HE, M49A2 w/fuze PD, M52, 60MM Mortar.  
 5,579 SHELL, Illuminating, M83 w/fuze time Fixed,  
 M65, 60MM Mortar.  
 775 SHELL, smoke, W.P., T-6, 60MM Mortar.  
 368 SHELL, smoke, HC, BE, T-8, 60MM Mortar.  
 15,086 SHELL, HE, M43A1, w/fuze P.D. M52, 81MM Mortar.  
 8,106 SHELL, HE, M56, w/fuze, P.D. M53, 81MM Mortar.  
 1,320 SHELL, Smoke, W.P. M57, w/fuze, P.D., M52 81MM Mortar  
 840 CANNISTER, M2, 37MM Gun  
 1,120 SHELL, Fixed, HE, M63, w/fuze, B.D. M58, 37MM Gun.  
 1,510 SHOT, Fixed, AP, M74, w/tracer, 37MM Gun.  
 2,560 SHELL, HE, M48, (SC) w/fuze P.D. M48 75MM Gun.  
 1,840 SHOT, APC, M61, w/fuze, B.D. M66A1, 75MM Gun.  
 32,685 GRENADE, hand, frag, MK11A1, w/fuze M10A3  
 3,881 GRENADE, hand, smoke, AP, M15.  
 277 GRENADE, hand, smoke, colored, assorted.  
 154 GRENADE, hand, Inc, Thermite, M14.  
 94 GRENADE, hand, Inc, Fragible.  
 3,388 ADAPTER, gre-proj, M1  
 1,881 GRENADE, hand, Ill, MK1  
 4,065 GRENADE, AT, M9A1.  
 50 GRENADE, Rifle, fragmentation  
 4,611 ROCKET, AT, 2.36", M6A1.  
 200 ROCKET, Smoke, W.P., 2.36".  
 2,200 ROCKET, 4.5", B.R., w/fuze MK137.  
 490 SIGNAL, ground (f/gren launchers).  
 90 SIGNAL, smoke, (f/gren launchers).  
 640 FLARES, trip.  
 100 LIGHTS, signal, Very.  
 382 MINE, A-Per., M-2  
 40 TORPEDOE, Bangalore.  
 50 EXPLOSIVE, 40-lb shape-charges, T-2.

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Ammunition supply in RCT-25 was direct from beach dumps to BLT dumps. The most significant problem encountered was the protection of high explosives from enemy mortar, rocket and artillery fire. The enemy mine fields and deep sands made defiladed areas largely inaccessible by truck. The revetting of dumps by bulldozer proved very successful when finally possible. None of the ammunition in revetted dumps was destroyed by enemy fire.

- (3) The containers used in the packaging of ammunition were, in general, adequate. The exceptions are noted below:
- a. The steel containers in which 60MM Mortar ammunition is packed are not waterproof. Packing the individual rounds in waterproof fiber containers before packing in the steel containers would remedy this situation.
  - b. It is recommended that all types of blasting caps be packed in waterproof containers as follows:
    - 1. Non-electric caps; 100 rounds per can, 5 cans per waterproof package.
    - 2. Electric caps; 50 rounds per waterproof package.
- (4) The CINCPAC U/F table:
- a. The CinCPAC U/F table in use during the Iwo Jima operation was dated 21Mar44. It is felt that the new U/F table, dated 13Dec44, incorporates the changes most needed in the earlier one.
- (5) The types of ammunition were generally adequate. The following changes are recommended:
- a. Equip the M56 high explosive shell for 81MM Mortar with a selective fuze that may be set for a delay action or a super quick action. The M53 fuze in use is generally effective. However, in soft ground much of the fragmentation effect is lost because the shell buries itself in the ground before exploding.

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The super quick fuze should remedy this situation.

- b. The type of shotgun shells now in use is of doubtful value in the field. Inevitably ammunition is exposed to moisture. Under such conditions the paper cartridge cases swell to such an extent they will not fit the chamber of the shotgun. The use of brass cartridge cases for all shotgun ammunition used in forward areas would do much toward making the shotgun a valuable asset to line companies.

(d) Miscellaneous ordnance equipment:

- (1) The M2-2 portable flame thrower was a great improvement over the M1A1 used previously. However, no spare parts were made available for the Iwo Jima operation. As a result considerable difficulty was encountered in keeping the M2-2 flame throwers in working order. The "rear safety grip" is made of a light, brittle metal, and as a result is easily broken. It is recommended that the rear safety grip be made of a more durable metal.

(e) Salvage of enemy equipment, due to the tactical situation, was impracticable.

7. MEDICAL:

(a) Embarkation:

- (1) Personnel: - In the battalions the company corpsmen were embarked with their respective companies aboard the IST's. The main body of the battalion aid station and the regimental aid station and the battalion and regimental surgeons were embarked upon their respective APA's. The embarkation of medical personnel was satisfactory during this operation. It is recommended that, in future

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OPERATIONS REPORT OF IWO JIMA, (CONTINUED).

operations, the practice be continued in which non-organic surgeons are furnished for duty aboard LST's so that organic surgeons may remain with their respective command groups.

- (2) Material: - The preparation of pre-loaded sea bags or canvas bags designed for back carry by one (1) man proved to be satisfactory. The canvas bags such as are found around units 5A, 5B, 11A or 11B, proved to be the more satisfactory. Preloaded hospital jeeps are recommended but cannot be depended upon to reach the aid station before D + 2 or D + 3 days. Back-up supplies were carried by quartermasters, who established a small medical dump which was drawn on as necessary.

(b) Aboard ship:

- (1) Sickness: - Nothing unusual occurred. No outbreaks of contagious or infectious diseases occurred. Sick Call was occupied with the usual complaints - minor skin infections, mild upper respiratory infections, fungus infections of the feet, and the usual number of functional complaints. There were approximately a dozen cases of pediculosis pubis and scabies aboard one (1) ship. This undoubtedly was acquired from the ship's troop holds. One (1) appendectomy was done aboard ship.
- (2) Sanitary conditions: -
- a. Heads: - Daily inspections of the ships were made by the ship's first lieutenant, the troop executive officer, troop medical officer, ship's medical officer, and police officer. An officer representative was present in each troop hold to receive comments on the spaces for which he was responsible. This plan worked out to the satisfaction of both ship and troops. Heads were in satisfactory condition.
  - b. Living quarters: - Crowded but satisfactory under the circumstances.
  - c. Messes: - Satisfactory in nutrition and palatability.

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- d. Galleys: - Minor improvements only could be suggested for ship's galleys.
  - e. Troop cooks and messmen, used to augment ship's galley personnel, should be furnished clean, white clothing daily by the ships because their own clothing is limited and laundry facilities are not readily available.
- (3) Special precautions: -
- a. Inoculations: - While aboard ship troops not previously inoculated were given a booster inoculation for tetanus. While arrangements can be made aboard ship to do this with as little confusion as possible, it is difficult to accomplish because of the lack of space, because of the numerous separate units aboard, and because the health records of the men are not available for reference or recording of the shots.
  - b. Impregnation of clothing: - This, too, is best done in camp rather than aboard ship. Sufficient additional clothing should be provided to allow each man to lay aside his impregnated suit until D-day. Several cases of skin irritation were noted, presumably caused by the dimethylphthalate. These were especially noticed after the clothing of the men had become rain soaked during the first week ashore. The advisability of impregnation for the Iwo Jima Operation is questionable. No insects other than flies were observed on the island. Some sort of unknown insect bites were noticed on several men despite the fact that clothing was impregnated. No disease resulted from said bites.

(c) Debarkation:

- (1) Personnel: - Again it is pointed out that medical personnel can serve no useful purpose on the beach if landed too early. While it is recognized that there is danger of "putting all the eggs in one basket", the aid station men and their equipment should not be divided into more than three (3) equal groups. This is necessary for

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purposes of organization and control of the corpsmen after landing on the beach.

- (2) Material: - All material necessary for the functioning of the battalion aid stations must be carried ashore by the corpsmen in the aid station. No dependence should be placed on preloaded jeeps landing or being available or upon back-up supplies in quarter-master dumps. While these supplies may be counted on for use later, their availability is too uncertain during the first three (3) or four (4) days of the battle. Medical equipment should be divided into six (6) or eight (8) sea bags or canvas carrying bags, which should not weigh over thirty-five (35) pounds. Emphasis should be placed on equipment that is light and takes up little space. Thus, the Thomas splints (Unit #8) should be replaced entirely by the moulded ply-wood leg splints and basswood arm splints. Also plasma should be replaced by serum albumin. Units #11 to #20 should not be brought along on any landing but should be left in the base camp rear echelon gear. The first critical shortage of medical gear was stretchers. Stretchers should be carried ashore by every man able to carry a stretcher and on every jeep and vehicle landing in the assault waves. If the stretcher carried by any man proves to be a burdensome load after landing, it could be dropped on the beach where it could be picked up for use later. Each platoon corpsman could carry a stretcher and at least four (4) could be placed on each radio jeep, bulldozer, etc.
- (3) Losses of personnel and material: - By dividing the aid station corpsmen into three (3) groups and dividing the aid station equipment into six (6) or eight (8) parts it is not likely that any casualties of corpsmen or equipment that do occur will be too seriously weaken the group as a whole or impair its efficient function.

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(d) Ashore - Assault phase:

(1) Medical installations:

- a. Where set up: - Little choice was given on Iwo Jima to the battalion or regimental surgeons in choosing an aid station location. For the first three (3) days, they merely picked a deep shell hole in the sand on the beach and went to work despite the exposure. Later, as the troops advanced, a more suitable location could be selected.
- b. Location with regard to roads or trails: - Until the aid station could be taken off the beach no roads or trails were near them. Later all aid stations were within 10 yards of a passable road that could accommodate all vehicles.
- c. Cover was impossible on the beach, but later locations had the advantage of cover in gun positions and blockhouses and beneath cliffs.
- d. Great emphasis was placed on dispersion at all times due to the intense mortar, rocket, and artillery fire. This was necessary because of the exposed positions and the lack of cover. Two men foxholes were used and at least eight (8) or ten (10) yards were required between holes.
- e. Other medical installations: - The location of adjacent aid stations was known by each medical officer and as far as possible a duplication of efforts was prevented by not being too close together. However, when only one natural location existed in the vicinity, rather than locate two aid stations close together, the two were combined, thus complementing each other as to personnel, equipment, and transportation.

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- f. Proximity to critical points: - The aid stations were kept as far forward as possible consistent with efficient functioning. Where practicable, the aid stations were located in close proximity to the CP's in order to keep abreast of the tactical situation and for mutual protection at night.
- g. Natural line of drift of walking wounded: - As far as possible aid stations were located with this point in mind. However, the nature of the terrain on Iwo Jima was so rugged that ideal locations were not available. There were few natural lines of drift for walking wounded as the road net was very limited in the RCT zone of action and the terrain was exceptionally rough.

(2) Protective measures taken:

- a. Local security: - Whenever possible the aid stations were located in proximity to the CP's and the local security of the aid station was made an integral part of CP security. In addition, the aid stations were organized with all around security with corpsmen dug in in teams of two, one of which was always alert.
- b. Cover: - Aid stations were located in covered gun positions, blockhouses, caves, etc., whenever possible.
- c. Concealment was not practiced to any great extent except to cover bandages and equipment that might be visible at night. Vehicles were provided with camouflage nets which were of little value on Iwo Jima.

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- d. Black-out precautions: - From dusk until daylight rigid black-out precautions were carried out. When a light was needed, a shaded flashlight under a blanket or poncho was used. It is recommended that a small 4'x4'x4' black-out tent be provided each aid station for purpose of treating patients at night. Training of corpsmen and aid station groups in operating at night should be carried out.

(3) Hospitalization:

- a. Functioning: - Until D + 12, casualties were evacuated to LST(H)'s, APA's and AH's. On that date the division hospital was set up and received casualties, especially at night. The hospital functioned efficiently, although the number of casualties cleared through the hospital were but a small fraction of the total number. It is recommended that the Division Hospital be landed earlier and be maintained in operation until all division units have been withdrawn from the line. Furthermore, portable operating rooms and surgical teams could be used nearer the front lines, even as far forward as the battalion aid stations, if a situation such as was encountered on Iwo Jima after D + 15 exists.

(4) Evacuation:

- a. Ashore: - Evacuation of casualties for the first three (3) days of the operation was a major problem because of the terrain and enemy mortar, rocket, and artillery fire. No ambulance jeeps were functioning ashore and no other definite transportation was available for assignment solely to evacuation. Evacuation of the wounded from the aid stations to the beach evacuation stations was a "catch-as-catch-can"

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proposition. All LVT's, DUWK's, Weasels, etc., that could be stopped were loaded with casualties. After D + 3 ambulance jeeps were available and evacuation proceeded in a satisfactory manner, according to plan.

- b. Shore-to-Ship: - Shore-to-ship evacuation has always been unsatisfactory from the standpoint of the wounded men. In every operation there are cases of men being left in small boats for several hours prior to being sent aboard ship. In other cases large numbers of casualties are routed to one ship, thus making it impossible for the ship to process them expeditiously. This is a problem of the higher echelon and it is recommended that the control established aboard the LST (H) be tied in with the receiving ships in such a manner as to assure the immediate and effective evacuation of wounded.

(5) Casualties treated: - RCT-25 (three battalion aid stations and regimental aid station):

a. Number:

.....  
Sick and Evacuated..... 357  
Wounded and Evacuated..... 1260  
Killed in Action..... 632  
Returned to Duty..... 224

- b. Type: - The majority of cases were caused by shrapnel from mortars and artillery and were the most mutilating wounds yet encountered. A smaller percentage of wounds--perhaps twenty-five (25%) percent - were gun shot wounds, and less than one (1%) percent were bayonet wounds. Concussion cases were about five (5%) percent and resulted from explosion of large rockets and mortars. Combat fatigue cases in the later days of the operation were of frequent occurrence and became progressively more numerous as the operation proceeded.

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The ratio of walking wounded to stretcher cases was about 1:1 (one to one).

(6) Sanitation:

- a. Heads: - Temporary heads were dug and utilized in most cases. The use of D.D.T. hand sprayers around heads and food dumps was practiced. Head seats were provided and used. Airplane spray of D.D.T. was especially effective and should be continued in every future operation.
- b. Food: - Emergency rations were used for the most part. Heating of canned food by individuals and small groups was extensively practiced and no harmful effects resulted, probably because of the low mean temperature on Iwo Jima, and the effect of the airplane spraying of D.D.T. in keeping down flies.
- c. Water: - Water was provided in five (5) gallon cans and larger drums. No water was used which was found on the island and no rain water was caught. It is recommended that all water cans and drums be cleaned, steamed, and their interiors lacquered after each operation to improve the potability of the water. Much water furnished was discolored, full of sediment, and tested of gas and oil or  $H_2S$  (hydrogen sulfide). It is further recommended that a purifier be developed that will neutralize the taste of paint, rust, and dirt so common to water carried in five (5) gallon expeditionary containers, and that water loading points be designated nearer the target to prevent water being canned for long periods of time. (For example, water to be used on the Iwo Jima operation might have been loaded at Saipan rather than at Maui.)

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(7) Dental Service: - Provided by regimental dental officer equipped with Unit #2. Cases were negligible and equipment adequate for assault work.

(8) Medical personnel:

a. Adequate: - Losses and replacements were as follows:

Total on Board 2-18-45.....	131
Evacuated.....	50
MIA.....	2
KIA.....	13
Remaining.....	66
Replacements.....	74
Evacuated.....	31
KIA.....	6
MIA.....	2

Replacements were obtained from the medical companies and the 30th Replacement Draft. One medical officer was killed in action and one was wounded in action. Two medical officer replacements were obtained from the 30th Replacement Draft.

b. State of training: - The training of corpsmen of the regiment was adequate, but that of replacement corpsmen was not adequate in the majority of cases. Their inadequacy was not so much due to lack of skill but rather in their ability to "take it". They were lacking in dependability, initiative, individual drive and spirit. It is recommended that the medical company corpsmen receive training as platoon corpsmen in infantry battalions as an integral part of their training so that when they are ordered to a battalion in combat they will not feel "lost".

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(9) Field Medical equipment:

- a. Proportion of allowance carried: -100%
- b. Pilferage and losses: - None.
- c. Adequate supplies were provided.
- d. Suitability of present type: - Adequate
- e. Improvements: - It is recommended that battalion and regimental medical supplies be streamlined with the ultimate objective of reducing their volume and weight. The following suggestions are made with this in mind: (1) A 90% reduction in the amount of blood plasma to be replaced by serum albumin, which is as effective as plasma in the treatment of most shock cases. The light weight and smaller bulk of serum albumin would allow each corpsman to carry one or two units without being overburdened. (2) The unit #8 is too heavy and bulky and could be adequately replaced by lighter weight moulded plywood splints and bass-wood arm splints. (3) A lighter stretcher must be provided. Under combat conditions it is difficult enough to carry a wounded man and an additional thirty pounds of stretcher is an unnecessary burden. (4) Units #1, 2, 3, and 4, should be redesigned to allow greater availability of contents, particularly at night. A possible aid in solving this problem might be the use of a phosphorescent agent in distinctively marking the individual items in these units.

f. Re-supply: - Adequate.

(10) Medical supplies:

- a. Amount carried: - 100%

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- b. Pilferage and losses: - None
- c. Adequate supplies were provided.
- d. Re-supply from medical companies: Satisfactory.
- e. Adequacy of block shipments: - 100%

(11) Motor vehicles and rolling stock:

- a. Number and type carried: - Two (2) ambulance jeeps per battalion and two (2) in the regimental aid station.
- b. Losses:- One
- c. How utilized and maintained: - One jeep in each battalion was used to transport wounded from collecting sections to the battalion aid station and the other from aid station to beach evacuation station or to the division hospital. The two jeeps at the regimental aid station were used to transport casualties occurring in the vicinity of the regimental aid station to the beach and hospital. Also, they were on call for use by battalions if needed to augment their jeeps or to replace a jeep needing repair. Minor repairs were done by the drivers - major repairs done by the motor transport section of the regiment.
- d. Adequacy: - After D + 3 ambulance jeeps provided adequate transportation.

(12) Malaria and epidemic control equipment and supplies:

- a. Amount carried - - six (6) hand sprayers and two (2) dusters.
- b. How used - - to impregnate clothing with D.D.T. and dimethylphtalete be-

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fore landing and to spray heads and food preparation areas during the operation.

(e) Ashore after the completion of assault phase: - No comment, because the regiment re-embarked aboard ship upon completion of operation. It is recommended that the division hospital remain in function until all troops are relieved from the line to obviate difficulties encountered the last days on shore in the evacuation of casualties.

8. BURIAL:

(a) Allied Dead: - Navy and Marine Corps dead were collected by battalions and placed near a road to be picked up by trucks from the Division Cemetery. Except for the first three days, when collection of dead was impossible because of the tactical situation, and except for isolated cases that were undiscovered until later, the disposal of friendly dead was satisfactory.

(b) Enemy dead: - Enemy dead were buried by the most expedient means and in the most opportune locations to prevent fly breeding.

9. SUMMARY OF MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS:

(a) Supply:

- (1) That the new type "C" rations be made immediately available for use by assault troops and that the old type be disposed of by rear elements.

(b) Transportation:

- (1) That the T/O be revised to allow the infantry regiment a platoon consisting of twenty (20) CARRIER, M-29, (WEASEL), to be used as prime movers for weapons, for supply vehicles, for ambulances, for wire-laying, etc.
- (2) That each mechanic of an infantry regiment be equipped with a KIT, tool, mechanic's, motor and chassis repair, complete.
- (3) That a KIT, master, repair, become part of the infantry regiment's organic equipment.
- (4) That the infantry regiment be issued an acetylene welding outfit.

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- (5) That the T/O be changed to allow two (2) TRUCK, 1-ton, 4x4, cargo, per infantry battalion 81MM Mortar platoon.
- (6) That all spare parts be doubled for the infantry regiment.

(c) Transport Quartermaster:

- (1) That machine gun mounts, especially those used on TRUCKS, 6x6, cargo, be so constructed that they will not increase the height of the vehicle at loading time.
- (2) That palletizing be greatly reduced for small, land mass operations.
- (3) That 5-gallon expeditionary cans, except those on vehicles, not be used for gasoline.
- (4) That a definite system of combat loading for LST's be promulgated to all interested parties and that all items be so placed as to be accessible at any given time.
- (5) That at least one (1) LST per infantry regiment be loaded completely with high priority cargo such as mortar ammunition, belted machine gun ammunition, hand grenades, etc., which are in greater demand during the first night, and that this LST be designated to remain at the Beach Control Vessel under direct control of the RCT Logistics Officer during the first night.

(d) Ordnance:

- (1) That the T/A and T/O be changed to include six (6) 81MM mortars in the mortar platoon in the infantry battalion.
- (2) That a 155MM mortar platoon be formed in the Infantry Regimental Weapons Company with six (6) 155MM mortars and with full tracked prime movers and supply carriers.
- (3) That the 37MM AT gun be replaced with the 57MM AT gun.

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- (4) That the Browning LMG model 1919A4 in the infantry battalion be replaced by the 1919A6 model.
- (5) That an expendable BAR magazine be developed and factory loaded for issue during an operation.
- (6) That the short bayonet be substituted for the long bayonet.
- (7) That the automatic pistol replace the carbine for issue to flame thrower operators, bazooka operators, gunners and assistant gunners in the machine gun squads, and SCR-300 operators. Also that the Thompson sub-machine gun be issued to telephone linesmen on the basis of one per two men.
- (8) That a rocket of approximately 90MM to be fired from a launcher similar to the AT rocket launcher be developed.
- (9) That one (1) MOUNT, tripod, M2, be issued for each M1917A1 machine gun in addition to the M1917 tripod mount.
- (10) That the allowance of M7 and M8 AT grenade launchers be increased to one (1) per Rifle, M1 or Carbine in the Rifle Company.
- (11) That the allowance of M1919A4 machine guns be increased in the Infantry Regimental Weapons Company from eleven (11) to thirty (30).
- (12) That a satisfactory water-proof container for 60MM Mortar ammunition be developed.
- (13) That all types of blasting caps be packed in water-proof containers as follows:
  - a. Non~~electric~~electric caps, 100-rounds per can, five (5) per water-proof package.

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b. Electric caps, 50 rounds per water-proof package.

- (14) That the SHELL, 81MM, WE, M53, be equipped with a selective fuze which may be set for either a delayed action or a super-quick action.
- (15) That shotgun shells be cased in brass rather than cardboard for combat use.
- (16) That the "rear safety grip" of the M2-2 flame thrower be made of a more durable metal.
- (17) That a self-propelled, large caliber, high velocity weapon that is capable of penetrating at least seven (7) feet of concrete be developed for organic use in the infantry regiment.

(e) Medical:

- (1) That surgeons be furnished by higher echelons for duty aboard LST's so that organic surgeons may remain with their respective command groups.
- (2) That ships be prepared to furnish clean clothing daily to cooks and messmen.
- (3) That all combat medical equipment and supplies be carefully surveyed with the intentions of making them lighter and more easily handled. (For example: The Thomas splint (Unit #8) should be replaced by the moulded ply-wood leg splints. Plasma should be replaced by Serum Albumin. Stretchers should be developed which are lighter than the present models).
- (4) That the infantry regiment be issued one (1) 4'x4'x4' blackout tent for each aid station.
- (5) That the control established aboard the LST(W) for evacuation be tied in with the receiving ships in such a manner as to assure the immediate and effective evacuation of wounded.

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- (6) That all water cans and drums be cleaned, steamed, and their interiors lacquered after each operation to improve the potability of water. (This must be done by all units as containers carried by one unit will not necessarily be used by it.)
- (7) That a water purifier be developed that will neutralize the taste of paint, rust, lacquer, and dirt so common to water carried in 5-gallon cans.
- (8) That water loading points be designated nearer the target to prevent water being canned for long periods of time.
- (9) That medical company corpsmen and replacement corpsmen be given a thorough training program with infantry units so that they will be familiar with infantry organizations in combat.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL J. R. LANIGAN:

C. J. O'DONNELL,  
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,  
Executive Officer.

O-F-F-I-C-I-A-L:

*A. E. Buck, Jr.*  
A. E. BUCK, JR.,  
Major, USMCR,  
S-4.

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APPENDIX V. TO RCT-25 OPERATION REPORT OF TWO JIMA OPERATION

COMMUNICATIONS.

1. PREPARATION AND PLANNING

(a) Preparation: Specialized training of Communication Personnel for the operation consisted of field exercises in which command posts were established and operated in locations which offered no cover or concealment, and class work which stressed maintenance of frequency modulated radio equipment, and radio operation through enemy jamming.

In field exercises, command post locations were picked which offered no cover or concealment. Digging in, camouflage, and radio operation by remote control were stressed.

In class work school was held by the senior maintenance NCO within the RCT for all regimental maintenance men. There were schools at Division and higher echelons which stressed maintenance of frequency modulated radios. Classes were also held by Division for all radio operators within the RCT in radio operating through enemy jamming.

(b) Planning: Plans for communications during the ship-to-shore movement were as follows:

The RCT Comdr, aboard the PC control boat, would have contact with the BLT Comdrs by SCR 610 and 300 radios. The primary channel would be the SCR 300; but the BLT's were to check into the 610 Division voice command net for contact with RCT or Division, in case of failure of the SCR 300. RCT Hq, aboard the PC, would guard the TBX regimental command net; BLT's were to check in when established ashore, or might check in afloat, in case of failure of other radios.

Contact with the RCT SF Comdr would be through the Regimental 300 command net.

Contact with Division would be maintained through the following nets:

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The Regimental 300 command net (Division would guard); the 610 Division voice command net; and the Division logistic control net (TCS).

Contact between the RCT TQM, aboard the PC, and the BLT TQM's, aboard the transports of the TransDiv, would be through the Navy Transport Division ship-to-shore administrative net, with the PC boat as net control.

The Boat Control Officer, aboard the PC would provide communication with wave guides.

The CO of RCT LVT's and LVT(A)'s would be aboard and would provide communication with his vehicles.

The RCT NGF Officer would operate his radios from the deck of the PC, and provide communications.

The RCT Air Liaison Officer would be boated with his radios in operation and stay alongside the PC for contact with Air Support.

An operator on the PC near the CO, would monitor with an RBZ and keep a log on the Support Air Observation Net.

The Regimental TCS jeeps would be boated and initially rendezvous near the PC to serve as spare radios in an emergency. Later they were to go ashore, one with the forward and one with the rear echelon of the RCT command post.

The Intelligence Officer would be furnished an SCR 300 to operate on the D-2 net.

The RCT TQM would be furnished an SCR 300 and operator to remain on the PC after the Regimental CP had moved ashore.

The RCT QM would be furnished a 610 and later a TCS for contact between BLT's, RCT and RCT Dump in case of wire failure.

The RCT Communication Platoon would be divided into two echelons, each equipped to operate as a command post afloat or ashore, one echelon to accompany the CO, the other to accompany the Executive Officer. Each echelon and equipment were to be further divided into three boat groups.

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Communications ashore would be standard. Wire would be installed by the forward echelon to the BLT's and shore party. Lance and two by four poles would come ashore as soon as the RCT TQM could send them, and lines would be overheaded wherever there was danger of them being broken by vehicles. Eight miles of W-130 and five miles of W-110 were to be taken ashore. Every jeep and trailer would carry extra batteries and wire.

## 2. MOVEMENT TO OBJECTIVE

At the port of embarkation all radio equipment was tested and treated for protection against moisture and fungus. All expendable items were brought up to strength. Crystals for TBX and TCS radios were furnished. Since the TransDiv ships were not in visual contact, an SCR 300 net was established to handle administrative traffic while in port.

Enroute to the objective, personnel were briefed on the operation in detail, with photographs, maps and lectures. Emphasis was placed on learning call signs, frequencies, authentication, and all parts of the communication plan. There was CW practice by our operators standing watch on ships radios. All jeep storage batteries were re-charged enroute to the objective.

## 3. SHIP-TO-SHORE MOVEMENT

During the ship-to-shore movement communications functioned as planned. There were no radio failures, and no equipment was damaged by salt water. The only deviation in plan came in not landing RCT radio jeeps with either echelon. Both TCS jeeps were left at the PC boat, one guarding the SAO net, the other, the Division CW command net. One 610 was left aboard the PC boat for relay to Division from shore, as necessary.

All RCT Hq personnel and equipment were landed without loss. The forward echelon had established all radio nets and had installed wire lines to BLT's and the RCT shore party when the CO arrived ashore.

## 4. NARRATIVE OF OPERATION

Communications throughout the operation functioned gen-

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erally as planned; and once installed there were few deviations from normal communications; the limited area of action of our RCT did not create problems of distance or rapid movement of CP's. Radio jeeps were not necessary, however, and only one on air observation was used. The 610 and 800 provided the main and adequate channels of radio communication. Wire was overhauled and telephone was the main channel of communication as units became established ashore. The 610 and 103 did not prove necessary for the RCT QM because wire communication was adequate.

### COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 1. Comments:

No telegraph communication was used to higher or lower echelons. Runner communication was handicapped by high number of casualties. BLT's were not always able to furnish runners at RCT Hq.

The deal code was used with higher echelons but was not as rapid or satisfactory as the Indian talkers. The shackle code was the only code used with and by lower echelons.

The basic system of radio nets was satisfactory. There was interference on 30R-300 channels 16 and 32. No methods other than radio were used to spot targets to NGF.

Casualties for the entire operation (including attached JASCO units and replacements) were 4 officers, 22 radio operators, 50 wiremen, and 4 message center men.

Although non-communications personnel were not satisfactory as company radio operators in one BLT; they were very satisfactory in another. In the BLT in which they were satisfactory, they had been especially well trained and taught to be proud of their responsibility and importance to their company. One non-communications operator successfully took command of his company and directed it for approximately one hour during the assault on D-day.

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2. Recommendations:

Signal supply was not adequate during the first three days of the operation. Since RCT Hq is not equipped with men or equipment for supply, Division Signal Supply should be furnished LVT's to send radios, batteries, telephones and wire ashore as they are needed. There are always equipment losses through enemy fire, and for the first three days, BLT's, RCT's and attached units continue communications only by exchanging equipment wherever possible. No sufficient supply of equipment is furnished or can be brought ashore by BLT's or RCT's; and it is during the first three days that communication is most vital. There must be some prepared plan for sending replacement equipment and supplies ashore.

Radio equipped Weasels should be substituted for all radio jeeps in BLT's and RCT. Weasels should take the place of wire jeeps in BLT's. There should be one Weasel and one jeep in the RCT Wire section.

Units to be attached to BLT's should have their own 300 radios.

There was interference on 536 company radio nets. If possible, each company within the Division should have a different frequency.

Mortar platoons need a 300 channel. BLT-1 used the same channel as assigned NGF for D-day successfully. It is recommended that that channel be a permanent assignment for an operation and that it be used by both NGF and mortars.

The Regimental Weapons Company requests three (3) 536 radios for each 37mm platoon, to furnish contact between platoon leader and gun positions. Such a plan was tried and used successfully with BLT-1.

Replacements were made very soon. They would have been of more help if they had been more familiar with BLT work. It is therefore advisable that possible replacements train occasionally with or be familiar with work in a BLT or RCT.

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There have been too few promotions in communication personnel. Corporals acting sergeant section chiefs and PFC's acting corporals through SAIPAN, TINIAN and IWO JIMA have not been promoted. Replacements are often rated, and according to the system of promoting up to strength and not above T/O, many qualified men who have proven themselves excellent leaders in combat will not be promoted.

2-7 MCKEAN  
V. F. MC KEAN,  
Captain, USMCR,  
RCT Communications Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS, FIRST BATTALION,  
TWENTY FIFTH MARINES, FOURTH MARINE DIVISION,  
FLEET MARINE FORCE, 670 FLEET POST OFFICE,  
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

19 April, 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.  
To: The Commanding Officer, 25th Marines  
Subject: Operation Report.  
Reference: (a) Division SOP 1-45, Operations Report.

1. The attached Operation Report is submitted  
herewith, in accordance with instructions contained in reference (a).

F. J. MEE

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HEADQUARTERS, FIRST BATTALION,  
TWENTY FIFTH MARINES, FOURTH MARINE DIVISION,  
FLEET MARINE FORCE, c/o FLEET POST OFFICE,  
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

BLT #1, RET #25 OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA, VOLCANO ISLANDS.

BASIC REPORT

SECTION I - PLANNING AND PREPARATION

The Task organization of Landing Team #1, Combat Team #25, was constituted as follows:

- 1stBn, 25th Marines.
- 1stPl, R/Wpns Company.
- 1st & 2d Sections, 75mm Pl., R/Wpns Company.
- 1st & 3rd Pls, Co "A", 4th Tank Battalion.
- 1stPl, Co "A", 4th Engr. Battalion.
- 1stPl, Co "A", 4th Motor Transport Battalion.
- Det. Coll. Sec., Co "A", 4thMedBn.
- Co "B", 4thPnrBn.
- Det., 1stJASCO.
- Det., Co "A", 30thReplDrft.
- Det., Eighth Field Depot.
- Ln. & FO Parties, 1stBn, 14thMar.

With the exception of the Detachment Collection Section, Co. "A", 4thMedBn., and the Detachment of the Eighth Field Depot, the Landing Team had numerous exercises, both CPX'S, and Field Problems as a complete unit. The Divisional Directives, for Training were all followed and field problems were stressed. In the latter part of November, 1944, the Landing Team had Amphibious Training aboard the U.S.S. MALLETT, (APA-156). Landings were made at MAALAEA BAY as a separate Landing Team, and as a component part of Combat Team #25. This training was essentially for the benefit of replacements who had joined the organization after the SAIPAN-TINIAN operations.

Firing problems stressing the use of the Infantry-Tank-Artillery teams, were had and worked very successful. Unfortunately the terrain available was not suitable for the problem as tanks could only be used in the latter stages of the problem, Artillery could not be fired less than eight hundred (800) yards in front of the front lines and Naval Gun Fire was completely simulated. There was no place on the Island of MAUI, where a realistic problem for a Landing Team, could be held.

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BLT #1/25, OPERATION REPORT, SECTION I, Cont'd.

The TO, and the TA, of an Infantry Battalion was followed with the following exceptions:

- (a) Scout and Sniper Platoon, one (1) officer, and twenty-six (26) men, operating as an integral part of Headquarters Company. This unit was organized for mopping up rear areas that may have been by-passed, to handle supplies in the event this was necessary, to fill gaps in front line positions as a Battalion reserve. In former operations, the Landing Team usually was forced to attack with three (3) companies abreast, and there was not Battalion reserve to handle any emergency that might occur.
- (b) Six (6) 81mm mortars were used, and fired as a battery. This was done to aid front line units in the event artillery fire could not be used. The volume of fire of this battery was very effective. It was difficult to handle the six (6) mortars without increasing the personnel of the platoon. This could not be done because of the shortage of men in the Battalion.
- (c) Two (2) jeeps and two (2) jeep trailers were traded for two (2) one ton trucks, and two (2) one ton trailers, to handle supplies. Supply would be a problem because of the increased number of mortars, consequently, this trade was made.

(A). Planning for the operation in Battalions commenced some four (4) months prior to "D" day. Maps and photographs were distributed to Battalion Commanders, and their staffs through this time.

The Corps, Division, Regimental schemes of maneuver were disclosed. Battalions made up original operations plans and orders based on the above.

Throughout this period, several Corps, Divisional, and Regimental CFXs, were held, both in Battalion Offices, and in the Field. All these exercises were based on the Corps Plan of maneuver. Maps and photographs of the objective were used for these exercises.

The early release of the plans, maps, and photographs permitted the Battalions to write out their operations orders in time to make changes as continual study throughout the period dictated. Plans were discussed with higher echelons and the latter became more familiar with the difficulties and needs of the lower echelons. This led to a better understanding throughout.

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(B). Rehearsal #1.

Battalion Headquarters, and attached units boarded the U.S.S. NAFA, (APA-157), at KAHALUI docks on 28 December, 1944. Lending Team equipment was loaded on 27, and 28 December, 1944. The U.S.S. NAFA, sailed off HONOLULU, T.H., at 0715, on 29 December, 1944, and arrived off SAND ISLAND, at 1630, on the same day.

The ship remained here until 6 January, 1945. During this interval, there were continual staff conferences and rehearsal order was completed. Fifty percent of the troops were given liberty each day, while the remaining fifty percent attended school and were given a minimum of one (1) hour physical exercises per day.

On 6 January, 1945, the U.S.S. NAFA, sailed for KAHALUI BAY for exercises designed primarily to aid Boat Officers and coxwains, the ship arrived off MAUI on 7 January, 1945. Debarkation exercises were held for troops, while en-route to MAUI. All LIXs held on the 7th, 8th, and 9th of January, 1945, were essentially the same. Troops of which the Engineer Battalion, and the Artillery Battalion constituted a majority, were embarked in LCVPs, and made dummy runs into the beach, boats never landed, but instead, when approximately 300 yards from the beach, turned around and returned to the ship.

This rehearsal was an absolute waste of time and might have hindered the plans for the main rehearsal scheduled for the 12th through the 17th of January. A new and entirely different debarkation schedule had to be made and cut and troops briefed upon the new plan. Engineer and Artillery troops acted as assault troops, so that boat officers and coxwains could have the necessary training, which training should have been had prior to the embarkation of troops. It was misleading to the troops aboard and only because of constant briefing by troop officers was a bad situation averted.

(C). Rehearsal #2.

On 10 January, 1945, Companies "A", "B", and "C" of LT #1, CT #25 embarked aboard LSTs #928, 713, and 789 respectively. On 8 January, 1945, all officers and men (less the Battalion C.O. and staff) who were to transfer to LSTs for the main rehearsal, did so and on 9 January, 1945 the U.S.S. NAFA sailed again for SAND ISLAND, HONOLULU, OHAU, T.H. and docked there at 1630 on the same day. The LSTs remained in the vicinity of KAHALUI BAY until the 12th of January, 1945, when the U.S.S. NAFA sailed for MAUI to participate in the main rehearsal. 50 percent of the personnel aboard were granted liberty. Again schools were held for troops and physical exercise given.

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BLT #1/25, OPERATION REPORT, SECTION I, Cont'd.

On 12 January, 1945, the U.S.S. NAFA sailed for MAHALA BAY, MAUI. Debarkation drills were held for troops in accordance with rehearsal order while the ship was enroute. On 13 January, 1945, the first LEX was held. Troops embarked in LVTs as per order, crossed LD, went to within 300 yards of the beach and each wave returned at its respective LST. This was a battalion LEX. The exercise revealed that wave guide officers did not carry out their orders. They seemed to have the belief that their only purpose was the boat ride rather than aiding the LVTs in their run to the beach. This was explained to them by the C.O. of LT #1, CT #25 at a conference held for wave guide officers aboard one of the LSTs.

LEX #2 was held on 14 January, 1945. The wave formed as per order, crossed the LD and each wave landed on schedule. Troops debarked and went inland approximately 100 yards and secured. The Battalion Command Post was set up and functioned in its entirety before the problem was secured. All communications were tested and the Shore Party and Beach Party were each set up and received token loads. The control boats were continually out of position. This made it difficult for waves to be properly formed and cross the LD according to schedule, although due to the work of LT #1s commanding officer and Executive Officer, the waves were properly dispatched and the landing schedule met.

LEX #3, a Corps exercise, held on 15 January, 1945, involved an overnight problem ashore. Again the waves formed, crossed the LD and landed as per plan. The Control boat was out of position once again, which made it necessary for the LVTs to use an azimuth to the beach which differed from the one announced by the NAVY to aid boat guide officers. Fortunately, the officers knew the beach upon which this LT was to land and not mistake was made as a result.

The LT moved inland well and after an advance of 500 yards, the turning movement to the right began. LT #2 moved in on LT #1s right flank. The CP and OF were set up and functioned well. Attached units such as the Naval Gunfire Officer and the Air Liaison Officer were given mission after mission to fire on all possible targets. The night was spent ashore, the situation remaining tactical throughout.

At 0700, 16 January, 1945, the problem secured and troops reembarked aboard their respective LSTs. All personnel from Headquarters Company, both officers and men and all Company Commanders of LT #1, CT #25 returned to the U.S.S. NAFA).

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OPERATION REPORT, SECTION I, Cont'd.

The exercise failed in it's purpose that (1) The LT did not have one of it's LSTs which was assigned it for the actual operation, (2) LT #3, the unit on LT #1's right, landed it's troops in LCVs which gave a false picture of the situation, (3) The penetration inland was not sufficient to permit any use of tactics by the C.O. of LT #1. This was due to the limit of the use of terrain due to private property, (4) All LVTs and LVT personnel used by the LT were changed for the actual operation. In the forward area exercise the same problems that confronted the LT on this rehearsal were again met and again thrashed out. Therefore, in reality, nothing was accomplished except that wave guide officers were again properly instructed and trained as to their duties. On 17 January, 1945, Co. "B", LT #1, CT #25, transferred from LST #713 to LST #787 at KAHALUI, MAUI.

SECTION II - MOVEMENT TO OBJECTIVE

On 17 January, 1945, the U.S.S. NAFA and all LSTs, less #787, assigned this LT, arrived off OAHU. The U.S.S. NAFA docked at her berth off SAND ISLAND, while the LSTs, less #787, docked at WLSTLOCK. LST #787 arrived at WLSTLOCK on 18 January, 1945. Troops were given physical exercise and schools were held during this interim before sailing for staging area. 25 percent of all troops were given liberty. All orders for the operation were given LST troop commanders in sufficient numbers to enable each LST to hold proper schools to brief troops on the operation and the exercise to be held off TINIAN.

On 22 January, 1945, the LSTs sailed for LNIWETOK. The U.S.S. NAFA did not sail from the HAWAIIAN AREA until 28 January, 1945. As a result the LT was divided into two (2) convoys and all changes that took place after 22 January, 1945, could not be given the LST units until the SAIPAN and TINIAN AREA was reached.

The LSTs reached LNIWETOK on 5 February, 1945, and left the morning of 6 February, 1945. The APA convoy reached LNIWETOK 6 February, 1945, after the LST convoy had left. A conference was held aboard the CT #25 ship (U.S.S. WINSDALE) to iron out any last minute difficulties prior to the rehearsal at the staging area.

On 6 February, 1945, the APA convoy which included APA 157, left LNIWETOK for the Staging Area. During the entire trip, daily schools were held for both officers and men. Each subject was completely covered by an officer.

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BLT #1/25, OPERATION REPORT, SECTION II, Cont'd.

On 11 February, 1945, the AFA convoy arrived off SAIPAN. All personnel including the LT C.O. and his staff (less Bn-X) who were assigned to LSTs, transferred to their respective LSTs. The LEX scheduled for 12 February, 1945 was cancelled. LSTs were loaded with LVTs from the 10th Amph. Tractor Battalion to be used for the LEX and operation

On 13 February, 1945, LEX #2, a Corps exercise was held off IILIAN. The waves were formed, crossed the LD, went to within 300 yards of the beach and returned to their respective LSTs. Again the same difficulties were presented anew that presented themselves in prior LEXs. LVTs bunched up on the way into the beach, and went into the wrong beach.

After all troops were reembarked aboard their LSTs, a conference was held by the LT C.O. of all officers, both NAVAL and MARINE, who were to partake in the operation and again the errors were pointed out. The exercise had been the first time that LT #1 had used the LVTs assigned to it for the operation.

On 15 February, 1945, the LSTs sailed for the target.

### SECTION III - SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT

The assault troops of the LT who were to be landed in LVTs were loaded on LSTs and LSMs. This was the situation when the LST convoy left the SAIPAN AREA on 15 February, 1945.

On "D" day the LSTs arrived in their unloading area for launching LVTs at 0710. All troops were loaded in LVTs by 0720 and at 0730 the bow doors of the LSTs opened and the LVTs were discharged. At 0748, all tractors were in the water. Boat Guide officers approached each wave as it formed in the water and led it to the FC #1081 which was the control vessel for the BLUE BEACHES. The waves were formed parallel to the LD in the order of their respective wave numbers in accordance with LT order #1-1945.

The C.O., LT #1, CT #25 was embarked in a free LVT as was the Bn-3. These two (2) free LVTs went directly to FC #1081 and were given last minute instructions and intelligence information by the R-2 and the R-3 of CT #25, who, in addition to staff officers, were stationed on the FC boat for that particular purpose.

At 0830, the first wave crossed the LD and landed for the beach. The succeeding waves crossed the LD as follows:

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WAVE NO.

CROSSED LINE OF DEPARTURE

2	0831
3	0837
(No wave #4)	
5	0847
6	0852
7	0940 (On call)
8	1008 -do-
9	1104 -do-
10	D plus 2 1130 -do-
11	-do- 1207 -do-

The first six waves were well formed and well controlled including boat guide officers, were well briefed and the approach to the beach was excellent. However, Wave # 5 landed too far to the left and when the troops were put ashore, they were on the right portion of Beach YELLOW #2 and the left portion of Beach BLUE #1.

The waves landed as follows:

WAVE NO.

LANDED

1	0900
2	0902
3	0907
(No wave #4)	
5	0917
6	0922
7	0955
8	1021
9	1118
10	1145 D plus 2
11	1217 -do-

As the fifth wave approached within 800 yards of the beach, the enemy began shelling the LVTs in the water. No direct hits were observed on this LTs tractors. It did harass the tractor drivers, but they kept formation well in spite of the fire. The enemy also fired 20mm and 47mm fire at the tractors and although there were near misses, again there were no direct hits observed. As the fifth wave hit the beach the enemy increased the intensity of his barrages and LVTs all along the beach were hit and disabled. Troops disembarked well and proceeded inland, because for some reason the enemy concentrated on the beaches rather than the troops. All LVTs that were not disabled immediately after unloading their personnel, commenced their run back toward the LD. The enemy continued to fire at these isolated LVTs while on their return trip, although again no direct hits were observed.

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BLT #1/25, OPERATION REPORT, SECTION III Cont'd.

All waves that came in after Wave #5 received the same type of enemy fire. The enemy's apparent plan was to make the beach untenable for the landing of supplies and reinforcements and then wipe out the assault troops with artillery and mortar concentrations.

Because of this heavy fire the Shore Party and Beach Party did not function. Co. "B", 4th Fnr. Bn., was badly disorganized due to casualties and there was no organized shore or beach party operating on D day.

The tactical plan for landing LT #1/25 was to land two rifle companies abreast on the left portion of Beach BLUE #1. This was done with Company "A" landing on the left half, and Company "B" on the right half of the LTs zone of action. These two companies landed in two waves, Waves #2 and 3 (Wave #1 was composed of LVTs). Each company was assigned seven (7) LVT(2)s in Wave #2 and six (6) LVT(4)s in Wave #3. There was no Wave #4 for the reason that LT #3/25 on LT #1/25s right flank landed in a column of companies and that necessitated a different time schedule for their second company allowing them to land a fourth wave. As a result, LT #1/25 landed no Wave #4, but waited for the fifth wave to send its reserve Co. in, to coordinate its landing with LT #3/25s reserve company.

Co. "C" landed in the fifth wave in 11 LVT(4)s. The two free tractors both came in with this wave. Co. "C" was in Landing Team reserve and was to be prepared to fill any gap between Co. "A" and LT #2/23 on its left.

The sixth wave, consisting mainly of the 81MM mortar platoon, Communication Section, Scout Sniper platoon, and the Engineer platoon landed in eight (8) LVT(4)s. It was necessary to bring the Engineer platoon in because previous intelligence was vague in regards to the terraces and mines on the beach. The mortars were in this wave to initially aid the assault troops in their movement forward toward AIRFIELD #1. It was expected that by the time this wave landed, the assault troops would be well inland, and the Scout Sniper platoon would commence mopping up operations in the beach area.

The seventh wave consisted of LSMs carrying the detachment of Co. "A", 4th Tank Battalion. The LSMs because of the intensive artillery fire on the beach should have come in singly, unloaded, and withdrawn. However, three (3) LSMs came in not 50 yards apart. The LSMs, while proceeding to and while on the beach, were hit repeatedly by heavy caliber guns, believed to have been three (3) inch. They also drew a very heavy and



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REPORT, SECTION III, Cont'd.

very accurate enemy artillery barrage, and troops that were dug in on the beaches in the vicinity of the LSMs, suffered heavy casualties. It took much too long for the LSMs to unload their tanks.

The eighth wave consisted of the Shore Party, LT QM section, plus two (2) radio jeeps. Because of the nature of the beaches, and the intense fire, the wave was held off for quite some time. At 1008, however, the wave was called in to allow the Shore Party to set up and land supplies for the night. The wave encountered heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire and casualties were heavy.

The ninth wave was composed of the 37th platoon, Regimental Weapons company. These were landed in LCVs and came directly from the U.S.S. NAFA (APA-157). In addition, the wave also included a TD - 1r Bulldozer which belonged to the Engineers. It was planned to have this bulldozer make a road inland for the vehicles that were to follow.

The tenth and eleventh waves contained the LT's vehicles and were also on call. Because of the heavy fire, and because of the sandy beaches, these waves were not called in until "D" plus 2.

The control plan for LT #1, CT #25 consisted of the following:

(a). Two Boat Guide Officers per wave. One of the officers proceeded the wave in an LCVF and one followed. In this manner, any LVTs or LCVFs that might lose contact, were given proper aid or instruction by the Boat Guide Officer. The primary duty of the first Boat Guide Officer was to lead the wave into the correct beach.

(b). The LT quartermaster was stationed aboard the FC #1081. This officer was given an SCR 300 on the LT channel and communications were had originally directly from the LVT to the FC boat; after the landing, from the beach to the FC boat. This proved very successful. All call waves were sent in via orders sent by the C.O., LT #1, CT #25 to the control boat by this method of communication. The CT #25 C.O. and staff were also aboard the FC boat and the situation ashore was continually given the C.O., CT #25 via SCR 300 communication.

(c). The plan of control of supply was to load tractors and LCVs both from the LSMs and the NAFA-157 and send it to the control vessel with two (2) slips indicating it's cargo. As it reported to the control vessel, it gave

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BLT #1/25, OPERATION REPORT, SECTION III, Cont'd.

these slips to the officer in charge of cargo on the said ship. Then the LVT or LCVF laid off behind the LD, and when that type of cargo was needed ashore, the officer aboard the control vessel sent that boat or tractor into the beach.

(d). The SCR 300 was the LT's method of radio communication between it's various units. The three (3) rifle companies had SCR 536 radios for inter-platoon control.

#### SECTION IV - NARRATIVE OF OPERATION

D Day - 19 February, 1945.

LT #1, CT #25 landed as scheduled with Co. "A" on the left and Co. "B" on the right. Immediately upon landing, the companies started to move inland. Resistance, initially, consisted of machine gun fire and sniper fire. Co. "C" landed in the fifth wave and as it approached the beach the enemy began a terrific artillery and mortar barrage on beaches BLUE #1, and YELLOW #2. As Co. "C" landed it moved inland 75 yards and set up directly behind Co. "A", protecting Co. "A's left flank. The unit on Co. "A's left flank landed too far to the left and as a result it became necessary to have Co. "A" hold contact with them and LT #1 extended it's zone of action to the left. Companies "A" and "B" moved inland 125 yards, reorganized and pushed forward to AIRFIELD #1. The extension of AIRFIELD #1 was reached by the front line at 1130. When the AIRFIELD was reached, Co. "B" began it's turn to the right and as a result a gap developed between it and Co. "A". This gap was plugged by one (1) platoon of Co. "C". Co. "A" could not turn with Co. "B" for the reason that the unit on it's left did not move and contact would have been lost at this critical point in the operation. The C.O. LT #1 ordered Co. "C" to fill in any gaps that would result because of the turning movement of Co. "B". At 1330 Co. "B" had completed it's turning movement and occupied positions generally on the high ground East of AIRFIELD #1. (TA 165-H,D). At 1400, Co. "L", and Bn., 25th Marines, moved into position on Co. "B's right flank and a coordinated attack was attempted. Co. "L" left flank and Co. "B" right flank were able to push 100 yards further inland but because of intense machine gun and small arms fire they had to fall back to their original positions. Co. "A" remained in it's original position just East of AIRFIELD #1 but the unit on it's left pulled further to the left, leaving a gap of 75 yards, which gap was covered by fire. This line was held for the night (Appendix #1, Section #4)

Tanks were landed in LSMs. As the LSMs approached the beach, they drew very heavy Artillery and Mortar fire. It took

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BLT #1/25, OPERATION REPORT, SECTION IV, Cont'd.

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much too long to unload the tanks and as long as LSMs were unloading the barrage on the beaches was great in intensity. Supply and evacuation of wounded were difficult because of the heavy enemy Mortar and Artillery fire. When any boat would approach the beach, the enemy would commence his prearranged fire in that vicinity. As a result, when darkness fell that night, LT #1 was badly in need of 60 and 81mm mortar ammunition, machine gun and small arms ammunition. The Bn-4 was wounded immediately upon landing and was evacuated shortly thereafter. However, the C.O. of Headquarters Co., Captain STOWELL, took over and worked all day and all that night, so that by 2230, all companies were well supplied with all their necessities. This was all done under continual enemy Artillery and Mortar fire on the beach. There was no organized shore party set up on BEACH BLUE #1 or 2. Two (2) tractors hauling supplies were hit by enemy Artillery.

At 1750, 1st Bn., 24th Marines set up a secondary defensive line in rear of our front lines. The CP was set up in (TA 165-F). During the day, communications to the companies was maintained by SCR 300 to Co. "A" who in turn would either relay it to the other companies via the SCR 300 set or via runner. Co. "B" radio was not in good order and Co. "C" lost their's on the beach. For the night, wire was run to all companies and this proved very satisfactory.

D plus 1 - 20 February, 1945.

Night activity was limited to enemy patrols attempting infiltration. However, none penetrated our lines, although casualties were suffered as a result of their activity. The enemy used grenades, small arms fire, and Knee Mortars all thru the night. The enemy also at different intervals throughout the night laid a Heavy Artillery and Mortar barrage on the beaches and in the vicinity of AIRFIELD #1.

The Battalion strength as of 0800 on D plus 1 could only be given in approximate numbers as follows: 31 officers and 721 enlisted.

The attack order for the day was issued at 0700. K hour was to be 0830, an air strike was called from K-15 to K hour and a Naval Gunfire Barrage was called from K-15 to K plus 10. Companies "A" and "B" were to attack in the same zone of action originally assigned to them in LT #1's Operation Order # 1235. Co. "C" was to follow in close support of Co. "A" and protect Co. "A" s left flank. The objective was to be the G-1 line in the LT #1's zone of action. Co. "A" at 0830 moved one platoon across the airport and attempted to move in a northerly direction to come abreast of Co. "B".

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BLT #1/25, OPERATION REPORT, SECTION IV Cont'd.

It encountered heavy enemy machine gun and small arms fire. Due to the fact that the unit on Co. "A" left was too far left in its zone of action, Co. "A" was still fighting in that unit's zone of action. Co. "B" held its front lines intact, waiting for Co. "A" to come abreast and jump off toward the objective together. Co. "A" knocked out one pillbox by the use of the adjacent unit's tanks that were on the AIRFIELD # 1. However, the unit on the left did not move its right flank and Co. "A" could not advance against the heavy machine gun and small arms fire from its and left flank. At 1600 Co. "B" was ordered to attack and a gap developed. Co. "C" would fill it. Co. "B" moved its right flank to join in with Co. "E" LT #2/25 (165 E). Co. "C" filled the gap between Co. "A" and Co. "B" and Co. "A", and Co. "A", because of its exposed left flank had to fall back to position East of AIRFIELD #1. This line was held for the night (See APPENDIX #1, SECTION #4). During the day, the enemy time and time again laid heavy mortar and artillery barrages in the vicinity of AIRFIELD # 1 and all along the beaches. During one of these artillery barrages at 1100, the CP received a direct hit and six (6) corpsmen were killed and four (4) others wounded. At 1130, the C.O. of Co. "C", Capt. HA SHBARGER was wounded and evacuated and Lt. HJELM was killed in action. Lt. DAY, Co. "A" was wounded and evacuated at 1300.

Supply, although still a great problem because of fire on our beach, was solved somewhat, the establishment of a dump in 165 I and LVTs were used to haul supplies almost exclusively. Communications were still a problem because it was not possible to replace the SCR 300s that were not in working order. Batteries were not obtainable because supplies in general were difficult to bring in due to enemy fire on the beaches. The CP was moved to a position forward of the dump in TA 165 I. Co. "B" reported a mine field in TA 165 D, E.

D plus 2 - 21 February, 1945.

Night activity was again limited to enemy two and three man patrols, who would attempt infiltration of our front lines. Enemy used Knee Mortar and small arms fire. The enemy harassed the beaches and vicinity of AIRFIELD # 1 with heavy mortar and artillery fire. All enemy patrols were stopped by our front line s.

The Battalion strength as of 0800 was 23 officers and 567 men. The strength of each Company was as follows:

	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
Headquarters	10	152
Co. "A"	3	99
Co. "B"	6	157
Co. "C"	4	159

The order for continuation of the attack was issued at 0700. An air strike was requested from K-10 until K plus 20 and a Naval Gunfire Barrage from K-10 until K hour. With Co. "B" on the right and Co. "C" on the left, the LT would attack in it's assigned zone of action ( See APPENDIX 1, SECTION IV). Co. "A" would follow Co. "C" prepared to fill any gap that might exist between Co. "C" and the unit on it's left. The objective to be the O -1 line in LT #1's zone of action. K hour was to be 0830.

Co. "B" encountered heavy enemy machine gun and small arms fire. Virtually every mound to it's front was a pillbox. Against this type of opposition, with the aid of three tanks assigned it, Co. "B" reached TA 183 F at 1600. Co. "C" moved it's right flank abreast of Co. "B", but could not move it's left flank because enemy machine gun fire coming from the vicinity of South West corner of TA 165 A. Co. "A" moved along the East Bank of the extension of AIRFIELD #1 and kept contact with Co. "C" left flank. Co. "C" was assigned five tanks and lost three during the attack as a result of enemy mortar and artillery fire. Co. "B" also lost one of their tanks due to enemy fire. At 1630, Co. "B" made contact with the unit on it's right. At 1715, LT #3/25, relieved Co. "B" and Co. "B" was assigned a sector for the night between Co. "A" and Co. "C". This line was held for the night ( See APPENDIX #1, SECTION IV). The CP was moved to TA 165 E at 1600. The unit on Co. "C"'s left did not move and as a result there was a gap of 100 yards between Co. "A", which was still on Co. "C"'s left and LT #2/24, the unit on LT #1's left. This gap was covered by fire.

At 1000, the Commanding Officer of LT #1/25, LtCol. H. U. MUSTAIN, was killed in action while checking front line positions, by enemy artillery fire. Major MEE immediately assumed command.

D plus 3 - 22 February, 1945.

Enemy patrols were constantly harrassing our front lines and attempting to infiltrate through. None were able to break through, although the Battalion suffered casualties as a result of their activity. Enemy again used the knee mortars and small arms fire.

Battalion strength as of 0800 was 22 officers and 563 enlisted. The strength of the companies was as follows:

	OFFICERS	ENLISTED
Headquarters Co.	9	175
Co. "A"	3	93
Co. "B"	5	147
Co. "C"	5	148

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BLT #1/25, OPERATION REPORT, SECTION IV, Cont'd.

The attack order was issued to the Company Commanders at 0730. LT #1, CT #21 on LT #1, CT #25s left would attack with its right flank just East of the taxi way leading from AIRFIELD #1 to AIRFIELD #2. All companies would jump off at "K" hour and as LT #1, CT #21 came abreast of our lines, Co. "A", then Co. "B" and eventually Co. "C" would be pinched out from the zone of action (Appendix #1, Section #4). Air strike was called from K-15 to "K" hour and Naval gunfire barrage from K-20 to "K" plus 20. "K" hour was set at 0835.

LT #1, CT #21 moved out at "K" hour. At 0900, Co. "A" was pinched out, and Co. "B" moved out abreast of LT #1, CT #21 for 100 yards. Small arms fire was met, but Co. "B" was able to move out. However, LT #1, CT #21 suddenly at 1030 fell back to its original jump off positions and Co. "B" had an exposed left flank. Co. "A" was again committed to fill the gap between Co. "B"s left flank and LT #1, CT #21. However, Co. "A" could not stretch the distance and LT #1, CT #21 was so informed by C.O. LT #1, CT #25. C.O. LT #1, CT #21 informed Major MEL that LT #1, CT #21 would fill the gap, but this was never done. At 1000, a hard, cold rain began to fall and continued for the remainder of the day. LT #1, CT #21 did not attack any further during the day and the companies held their positions. (Appendix #1, Section #4).

At approximately 2000, the companies were informed that LT #2, CT #24 would relieve LT #1, CT #25; that said relief would take place prior to daylight on "D" plus 4. Guides from each company returned to the CT to guide LT #2, CT #24 into position at 2100. The temperature dropped during the night and a cold North West win swept the island. LT #1, CT #25 still had not received the blankets that were to be landed D plus 1.

D plus 4 - 23 February, 1945.

Night activity consisted of small enemy patrols harassing our front lines. These caused some casualties, but again none penetrated our lines.

The Battalion strength was 23 officers and 620 enlisted. The strength of each company was as follows:

	OFFICERS	ENLISTED
Headquarters Co.	10	171
Co. "A"	3	87
Co. "B"	5	133
Co. "C"	5	137

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REPORT, SECTION IV, Cont'd.

At 0530 LT #2, CT #4 arrived in the vicinity of LT #1, CT #25s CI and was led into position; all companies were relieved by 0700. The companies went into a reserve area around the CI in (TA-165-E). The Battalion set up a perimeter defense for the night. Some blankets were brought up for the men but not enough for one per man. The men cleaned up, although there were no new clothes available. There was no enemy contact made during the night but the enemy did bracket our area with heavy mortar and artillery fire.

D plus 5 - 24 February, 1945.

There was no enemy contacts made during the night. Again the enemy threw artillery and mortar barrages, but none fell in our area, although the barrages fell very close. The day was spent cleaning weapons, reorganizing the platoon of the rifle companies and smaller units. At 1000, C.O., Bn-3, and the three company commanders made a reconnaissance of LT #2, CT #24s front lines and the situation to their immediate front. At 1300, the C.O., Bn-3 and Commanding Officer Co. "C" made a reconnaissance of CT #21s situation. Both LT #2, CT #21 and LT #3, CT #21, the front line LTs, were contacted and the situation was reviewed and routes of approach into each zone was noted. This was completed by 1500. At 1500, LT #1, CT #25 was attached to CT #24. At 1530, C.O. LT #1, CT #25 and Bn-3 contacted C.O. CT #24 in person, and the entire situation of it's zone of action reviewed. LT #1, CT #25 was ordered to remain in it's present area and await orders. At 1630, LT #1, CT #25 received an order to attach Co. "C" to LT #3, CT #24. Co. "C" left the area at 1650. There was no enemy activity during the day, although enemy artillery and mortars fell very close.

D plus 6 - 25 February, 1945.

There was no enemy contact made and all was quiet during the night. At 0930, Co. "C" was detached from LT #3, CT #24 and at 1030 returned to the reserve area and reoccupied it's former positions that it had occupied prior to being detached. At 1030, LT #1, CT #25 was detached from CT #24 and reverted to CT #25.

At 1230 this LT joined 214 men and one officer from the 30th Replacement Draft. These men were assigned to the companies as follows:

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BLT #1/25, OPERATION RUMORE, SECTION IV, Cont'd.

	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
Headquarters Co.		1
Co. "A"	1	88
Co. "B"		63
Co. "C"		62

At 1245, the TQM officer Lt. MADDON reported to the CP and reported that the ship, U.S.S. NAFA (APA-157) was completely unloaded and the said officer was assigned to Co. "A".

At 1300, at a Regimental meeting, LT #1, CT #25 was informed that it would relieve LT #3, CT #24 the next day on the front lines in TA 183-I to 184-K. At 1430, the O.O., Bn-3 and the three company commanders went forward and made a reconnaissance of LT #3, CT #24's situation and front lines. This was completed by 1700. At 1900, the order of the relief for the next day was given, said relief to be completed by 0630. At 1915, attached Engineer platoon and Artillery FO's rejoined the LT.

D plus 7 - 26 February, 1945.

Again there was no enemy activity except large mortar and artillery barrages in vicinity of the LT's area, however, no casualties were suffered as a result.

The strength of the Battalion as of 0700 was 25 officers and 806 enlisted.

The plan of attack had been given to the Company Commanders the previous night. At 0530, Co. "B", followed by Co. "C", which was followed in turn by Co. "A" would effect a relief. Guides were obtained from LT #3, CT #24 for this purpose. The relief was completed by 0650. The LT scheme of maneuver was to attack in it's zone of action with Co. "B" on the right and Co. "C" on the left. Co. "A" was to follow Co. "C" in close support. Immediate objective was the high ground in TA 183-J, F. "K" hour was 0800, but was delayed until 0820. LT #3, CT #23 held the high ground on the left in TA 183-D, I and LT #2, CT #25 was on the immediate right on the LD. An artillery barrage was laid down 250 yards in front of the front lines at K-15 and at "K" hour was lifted 100 yards and on five minute intervals was moved up an additional 100 yards for 20 minutes. The attack jumped off 0820. The front lines moved up well for 150 yards against small arms fire but then the enemy opened up with machine guns and mortars. This pinned Co. "C" on the left and Co. "B" held up so that it could keep contact with Co. "C" and also because the unit on it's



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right was also stopped by fire. Two (2) tanks were sent to Co. "B" and two (2) tanks were also sent to Co. "C". Tanks were not used originally because their arrival at the front lines would always result in heavy enemy artillery and mortar barrage and it's disadvantages greatly outweighed it's advantages at this point of the battle. Co. "C"s tanks fired 75mm into and in the vicinity of "Turkey Knob" where most of the machine gun fire seemed to be coming from. However, the enemy mortar fire became more intense because of the presence of the tanks. Our artillery Fo's attempted to counter battery this fire but because of lack of observation this was ineffective. Air spot was requested but the air observer could not locate the enemy mortars.

At 1400, Co. "C" attempted to send one platoon around their right flank and with the aid of a tank envelope the opposition in the vicinity of "Turkey Knob". Lt. DUANE of Co. "C" volunteered to lead this unit in spite of heavy enemy machine gun and mortar fire. While in the process of leading the platoon and a tank that would support the envelopment by fire. An enemy mortar barrage shifted to the area that the platoon was attempting to work up and Lt. DUANE was killed. The enemy stepped up it's barrage and also it's machine gun fire and the platoon was forced to withdraw. It was necessary to lay smoke in front of Co. "C" to pull out their casualties. Co. "C"'s position was untenable and Co. "C" was ordered to fall back 100 yards and set up a line in TA 180 N O and 184 K. Co. "B" extended it's lines to the left and tied in. Co. "A" was committed on Co. "C"'s left and tied in with LT #3/23 on the high ground to the left. Co. "L", LT #3/24 was attached at 1530 and was ordered into reserve behind Co. "C". The enemy continually throughout the day laid mortar and artillery fire on our front lines. The CF was moved up to 183-N.

D plus 8 - 27 February, 1945.

There was a great deal of enemy activity for the night and 103 enemy dead resulted. Co. "A" captured 1 POW. The enemy attempted to infiltrate through our lines and this attempt was nullified.

The Battalion strength at 0800 was as follows:

	OFFICERS	ENLISTED
Headquarters Co.	6	151
Co. "A"	8	202
Co. "B"	5	187
Co. "C"	4	155

K hour was set at 0800. The attack order was issued the previous evening. Permission was requested from CT #25 to allow LT #1, to follow CT #23's right flank LT, until such time as they have driven far enough to front to allow LT #1 to work a column of companies around "Turkey Knob" in an envelopment action. This request was granted and the order was given

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BLT #1/25, OPERATION REPORT, SECTION IV Cont'd.

for Co."A", followed by Co."C", to follow LT #3/23 until that unit moved forward sufficiently, and on order from C.O., LT #1/25 to attack the high ground in the vicinity of "Turkey Knob", smash all resistance, clean out all enemy opposition East of "Turkey Knob" and upon completion of this, Co."B" still on the low ground and tied in with LT #2/25 would attack to it's front and tie in with the units on the high ground. Co."L", LT #3/24 moved into position vacated by Co."C" on Co."B"'s left flank.

At k hour, Co."A" and Co."C" in column were in rear of LT #3/23 on the high ground in their zone of action. LT #3/23 did not move out and as a result the envelopement of "Turkey Knob" could not occur. At 1500 on Bn.C.O., LT #1/25 order, Co."A" passed through LT #3/23 in their zone of action and attempted to cross the open field with the aid of three tanks which were attached to LT #3/23. Prior to the attack, a rocket barrage was laid in the woods to the left of "Turkey Knob". As the troops and tanks reached the center of the open field, enemy artillery, 47mm and mortar fire opened up and knocked out two tanks, the third tank was hit but withdrew. Troops also received heavy machine gun fire from vicinity of high ground in rear of "Turkey Knob". At 1715, Co."A" was ordered to fall back to positions it held the previous night. During the entire day Co."B" on the low ground received heavy machine gun and mortar fire. Again counter-battery fire was called by our FO but results were poor due to lack of observation. The LT tied in with Co."A" on the left, Co."C" on Co."A"'s right, Co."L" on Co."C"'s right and tied in with Co."B", the LTs right flank company( APPENDIX #1, SECTION IV)

The companies received replacements at 1600 as follows:

	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
Headquarters Co.		
Co."A"		10
Co."B"		10
Co."C"		15

D plus 9 - 28 February, 1945.

Enemy night activity was limited to patrols, which probed our lines. None came through during the night.

The strength of the Companies as of 0800 was as follows:

	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
Headquarters Co.	10	146
Co."A"	5	197
Co."B"	5	188
Co."C"		148

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BLT #1/25, OPERATION REPORT, SECTION IV, Cont'd.

"K" hour was 0815. New boundaries were assigned (Appendix #1, Section #4). LT #2, CT #23 relieved LT #3, CT #23 On LT #1, CT #25s left. Artillery preparation from K-15 to "K" plus 15, 300 yards in front of our lines. A rocket barrage was laid in the woods North of "Turkey Knob" at K-5. The attack order was for Co."A", followed by Co."C", who was in turn to be followed by Co."I", LT #3, CT #24 to attack to the high ground of "Turkey Knob". As this was done, Co."B" on the low ground was to attack to the front and tie in with Co."C" on the high ground thus completing a double envelopment.

At "K" hour, Co."A", moved out. Against heavy machine gun fire. The infiltrated 50 yards into the woods North of "Turkey Knob". As it reached this point the enemy laid a heavy mortar and rocket barrage, plus volumous machine gun fire from the high ground 100 yards to the front and from LT #1s left flank, which ground commanded the entire zone of action of LT #1. This commanding ground was in LT #2, CT #23s zone of action but LT #2, CT #23 could not capture it. LT #2, CT #23 did not move forward. Our FOs called counter battery artillery fire but this did not diminish the enemy barrages. At 1030, Co."C" was ordered to reinforce Co."A" in the woods, and one platoon of Co."C" was so ordered. At 1200, the situation was critical, Co."A" and the platoon of Co."C" had suffered heavy casualties and Co."C" was ordered into the woods to be followed by Co."I", LT #3, CT #24. The line in the woods had to be held at all cost to allow Co."B", who was ordered at that time to attack and tie in with Co."C" in the vicinity of "Turkey Knob". At 1215, Co."B" with two (2) tanks attached, moved out toward the high ground East of "Turkey Knob". At 1500, Co."B" reached the base of the amphitheater East of Turkey Knob against heavy enemy machine gun fire. As it began it's movement up to the high ground, the enemy, well established and dug in on said high ground, began to throw mines and grenades on the front lines of Co."B". One tank was knocked out as a result of enemy mines. Also well emplaced machine guns enfiladed the entire front lines and Co."B" was forced to fall back to the low ground at 1630. While Co."B" was attacking, Co."A" fired two (2) tanks into the blockhouse North of "Turkey Knob". There was no penetration of the blockhouse by the 75MM shell although at least 85 rounds were fired. Upon realization that a junction between Co."B" and the units on the high ground could not be made, the C.O., LT #1, CT #25 knew that the positions held by Companies "A", "C" and "I", LT #3, CT #24 would be untenable to hold for the night. Therefore at 1645, an order for withdrawal was issued and at 1700, under cover of smoke, the companies in the following order withdrew: Co."A", Co."I", and finally Co."C". The companies all fell back to positions held the previous night. Casualties for the day were heavy.

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BLT #1/25, OPERATION REPORT, SECTION IV, Cont'd.

D plus 10 - 1 March, 1945.

The enemy was very active during the night. Front lines received small mortar and machine gun fire and commencing at 2200, the enemy continued until daylight to fire heavy mortars, and rockets into LT #1, CT #25s front lines.

The strength of the companies at 0800 were as follows:

	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
Headquarters Co.	10	140
Co. "A"	3	82
Co. "B"	3	158
Co. "C"	4	135

"K" hour was 0830. Co. "L" CT #24 was relieved by Co. "K", LT #3, CT #23. The order for the attack was the same as for the day previous with the substitution of Co. "C" for Co. "A", Co. "I" for Co. "B" and Co. "A" for Co. "I". The attack was preceded by a 15 minute artillery barrage, plus a rocket barrage at K-3 in the wooded area North of "Turkey Knob". LT #1, CT #24 relieved LT #2, CT #23 on LT #1, CT #25s left flank.

At "K" hour, Co. "C" attacked and moved 100 yards into the wooded area against heavy machine gun and small arms fire. Again the enemy commenced a heavy mortar and rocket barrage. At 1000 Co. "A" crossed into the woods, and tied in on Co. "I"s right. All companies were receiving heavy machine gun fire and small arms fire in addition to the heavy mortar and rocket fire. Counter battery fire was called by the artillery FO's, but again results were unsatisfactory. Air spot was requested, but the observer was of little help to the situation, although he did observe enemy positions, not in this LT zone of action. At 1200, Co. "B" moved forward to attempt the junction with the units on the high ground. However, it again encountered heavy machine gun and small arms fire plus mortar fire. At 1630, Co. "B", still attempting to capture the high ground to their front, could not do so and at 1700 fell back to its original positions. There was no movement forward on either LT #1 CT #25s right flank or left flank from either LTs "K" hour positions. The positions held by Companies "A", "C" and "I" were untenable because of the LTs exposed right and left flank and the fact that the high ground to its left front and left flank was not captured. This situation gave the enemy observation and excellent fields of fire, which enfiladed our front lines. It was impossible to move forward without voluminous enemy machine gun fire from our left front in the zone of action LT #1, CT #24.

BLT #1/25 OPERATION REPORT, SECTION IV, Cont'd

As a result of this situation at 1645, companies "C", "I" and "A" withdrew in that order under a heavy smoke barrage, to positions occupied the night before. The front line companies from left to right were "C", "A", "I" 3/23, "K" 3/2 3 and "B".

D plus 11 - 2 March, 1945.

The enemy throughout the night fired artillery, mortar and rockets into LT #1/25's front lines. A few enemy patrols attempted infiltration but none were successful.

The strenght of the companies as of 0800 was as follows

	OFFICERS	ENLISTED
Headquarters Co.	10	136
Co. "A"	2	68
Co. "B"	3	142
Co. "C"	3	101

K hour was 0630. The scheme of maneuver was to infiltrate and capture the high ground by a double envelopment. At 0630 with no preparation other than the ordinary harrassing fire, the LT jumped off, Co. "C" on the left and Co. "I" on the right; Co. "A" in reserve, while Co. "B" jumped off to work it's way up from the low ground and make the junction with Co. "I" near "Turkey Knob". This was successful for the first fifteen minutes. At approximately 0650 the enemy opened up his mortar and rocket barrages, plus his well emplaced and well entrenched MGs. Against this opposition, with no aid from either flank LT, the LT worked it's way forward, at 1430 the units Co. "B" and Co. "I" were 65 yards from a junction on the high ground. Throughout the day our artillery and mortar FOs searched and traversed in an attempt to destroy the enemy gun positions but were not successful. At 1445, the enemy unleashed a terrific artillery, mortar, and rocket barrage, plus all it's MGs and small arms fire in the vicinity and as a result, with fire coming from all directions; to their front, left, and right flanks, Co. "B" was again forced to fall back with heavy casualties. The LT C.O. again, because the situation was untenable for reasons explained previously, ordered the companies to withdraw to previous held positions in the following order; Companies "I", "A" and "C" (See APPENDIX #1, SECTION IV). At 1800, LT #1 was informed that LT #1/23 would effect a relief of it's lines at 0630 on D plus 12. At 1750, replacements reached the front lines and were immediately put in positions with their respective companies in order to cover the zone of action required of the LT for the night.

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BLT #1/25 OPERATION REPORT, SSECTION IV Cont'd.

The strength of the companies as of 1700 was as follows:

	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
Headquarters Co.	10	134
Co. "A"	2	58
Co. "B"	3	107
Co. "C"	3	98

The number of replacements received this date are as follows:

	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
Headquarters Co.		
Co. "A"	2	80
Co. "B"	2	47
Co. "C"	1	71

D plus 12 - 3 March, 1945.

The enemy again during the night attempted to send patrols through our lines, but these were all stopped. Throughout the night, the enemy fired heavy mortar and rocket barrages.

The strength of the companies as of 0800 was as follows:

	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
Headquarters Co.	10	136
Co. "A"	4	156
Co. "B"	3	130
Co. "C"	4	162

At 0500 guides were ready to lead LT #1/23 into position. At 0530 LT #1/23 moved up and the relief was completed by 0700. The battalion less Co. "B" which was attached to LT #1/23 moved to a reserve area in TA 182 W. The troops were given 10 in 1 rations and clean clothes. After cleaning their weapons they cleaned up and companies were again reorganized. There was no enemy activity during the day.

D plus 13 - 4 March, 1945.

The night was quiet, and there was no contact made with enemy units. There were a few artillery and mortar barrages in the vicinity of the reserve area, but no casualties resulted.

At 0730, Co. "B" was relieved on the line by 3/23 and rejoined LT #1/25 in the reserve area at 0930. The day was spent in cleaning weapons and the completion of reorganizing the rifle companies. At 2100, the LT received the order for the following day. The LT with Co. "A" on the right and Co. "C" on the

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BLT #1/25 OPERATION REPORT, SECTION IV Cont'd.

left, would relieve LT #1/23 in the approximate positions LT #1/23 relieved LT #1/25 two days previously. Co. "B" would be LT reserve and in position 150 yards in rear of Co. "C". The plan of maneuver was for LT #1/25 to hold while CT #24 was to capture the high ground to the left front of LT #1/25's zone of action and sweep to a junction with LT #2/25. LT #1/25's mission was to hold and contain the enemy while this movement was to take place.

D plus 14 - 5 March, 1945.

The night was again quiet and no contact was made with the enemy.

The strength of the companies as of 0700 was as follows:

	OFFICERS ENLISTED	
Headquarters Co.	10	136
Co. "A"	4	162
Co. "B"	4	136
Co. "C"	4	167

At 0500, LT #1 moved from its reserve area in TA 182 W to effect the relief of LT #1/23. This relief was completed by 0715. The entire day was spent holding, but CT #24 never accomplished the capture of the high ground.

Throughout the day, the enemy fired mortar and artillery barrages. These barrages were again counter battered by LT #1/25's artillery FOs. This proved to be quite successful, except that late in the afternoon, the enemy apparently caught on to our tactics and began to move his mortar and rocket positions. This meant that our artillery, because our observation of the enemy, other than by air spot, was nil, had to search and traverse in an attempt to counter battery any enemy mortar, rocket, or artillery fire. Cooperation of the artillery in this respect was very good, except that the shortage of ammunition made some of the counter-battery ineffective.

Throughout the day tanks were employed to fire into the blockhouse in rear of "Turkey Knob" and in the vicinity thereof. Because of the rough terrain, the use of tanks was limited. However, at the sight of tanks, the enemy opened up his artillery and mortar barrage and after the tanks accomplished their mission, they were withdrawn to a defiladed position in rear of LT #1/25's reserve Co. The companies held their respective positions for the night. One platoon of Co. "B" plus one section of 37's were sent to the low ground to tie in with Major ABILLS Provisional Battalion. One section of 37's were set up on line with the reserve company to form a secondary line.

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BLT #1/25, OPERATION REPORT, SECTION IV Cont'd

It was impractical to place 37's on the front lines, because of limited fields of fire, and also because of the vulnerability of the crews and guns.

D plus 15 - 6 March, 1945.

The night was fairly quiet. The enemy only fired mortar and rocket barrages occasionally to harass LT #1/25's front lines. There was some contact made with enemy patrols, but they withdrew after being fired upon.

The strength of the Battalion was 22 officers and 586 enlisted personnel.

K hour 0900; Naval Gunfire barrage from K-10 to K plus 71, but this was not heard or observed by LT #1/25. New boundaries were assigned (See APPENDIX #1, SECTION IV). LT #1/25 with Co. "C" on the left and Co. "A" on the right jumped off at 0800. Co. "A" moved 125 yards, but Co. "C" did not move its left flank to keep contact with Co. "A". Resistance was heavy, the enemy used Machine Guns, small arms, and mortars. This line was held for the night. Tanks were used on the right in Co. "A"'s sector to aid their movement forward. They fired on targets of opportunity. After their mission was completed they were withdrawn, because of the heavy mortar and rocket barrage that they customarily drew. The reserve Company, Co. "B", did not move. Again one platoon of Co. "B" plus one section of 37's was tied in with Major ASBILLS Bn. for the night. Artillery FOs fired counter-battery fire at all times that the mortars and rockets fell in our lines.

D plus 16 - 7 March, 1945.

The enemy was active throughout the night. Frequent clashes between enemy patrols and front line units were reported. The enemy used hand grenades and small arms fire.

The strength of the companies as of 0800 was as follows:

	OFFICERS	ENLISTED
Headquarters Co.	10	132
Co. "A"	4	141
Co. "B"	4	145
Co. "C"	4	140

K hour was 0830. The order for the day was to hold and contain the enemy while CT #24 moved across LT #1/25's front and made contact with LT #2/25. This never occurred but while so holding tanks, including a flame tower tank, were



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BLT # 1/25, OPERATION REPORT, SECTION IV Cont'd.

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employed in the right sector of the LT zone of action. These tanks fired at all possible enemy positions and emplacements. The enemy again placed barrage after barrage of mortars and rockets in LT #1/25's front line positions. Also machine gun fire and small arms fire were received from the high ground in front of LT #1/25's zone of action as well as in front of our own lines. Counter battery was used each time the enemy fired, and proved to be moderately effective. The lines remained intact for the night.

D plus 17 - 8 March, 1945.

The night was again active with enemy patrols feeling out our positions. During the night, the enemy fired artillery and mortar barrages into LT #1/25's front lines.

The strength of the companies as of 0700 was as follows:

	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
Headquarters Co.	10	131
Co. "A"	4	134
Co. "B"	4	138
Co. "C"	3	134

K hour was set at 0700. The same plan of maneuver was ordered as was used the day before. However, LT #2/24 again did not move and as a result LT #1/25's lines also did not move forward this day.

Tanks were again used by Co. "A" in LT #1/25's right zone of action. All caves, crevices, and emplacements were fired at. A flame thrower tank was employed to burn all targets that were fired at with 75mm shells.

The enemy employed his usual tactics of firing mortar and rocket barrages during the day. The enemy fired smoke to blind the tanks, when the tanks attempted to knock out enemy positions. Again our FOs both mortar and artillery would counter battery all enemy fires. At 1445, the enemy opened up and placed a heavy mortar barrage on the left of the LT's sector and bodies could be observed flying in the air. Co. "C" reported one platoon badly hit and at 1530, Co. "B" was ordered to relieve Co. "C" and Co. "C" was ordered into reserve. During the day, enemy small arms and machine gun fire were received, particularly from the left of the LT zone of action.

D plus 19 - 9 March, 1945.

Enemy activity amounted to small patrols that harassed our front lines with hand grenades and small arms fire.

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BLT # 1/25, OPERATION REPORT, SECTION IV. Cont.

At various intervals during the night, the enemy fired his mortar and rocket barrages concentrations in our front lines.

The strength of the companies as of 0700 was as follows:

	OFFICERS	ENLISTED
Headquarters Co.	10	131
Co. "A"	4	127
Co. "B"	4	129
Co. "C"	3	115

K hour was set at 0700. The scheme of maneuver was not changed from the previous two days. While holding, LT #1/25 again employed its tanks and fired on all possible targets. No movement was made until 1400 when LT #1/24 moved its right flank. Co. "B" moved out abreast and moved its left flank 50 yards forward and kept contact. Co. "A"'s lines remained intact and the LT held those lines for the night. At 1430, LT #1/25 was informed that LT #2/24 had relieved LT #3/25 and the plan for the next day would be to relieve LT #1/24 with LT #3/25 and CT #25 with the two LTs abreast would push forward and break the pocket of resistance (See APPENDIX #1, SECTION IV). New boundaries for the next days attack were assigned.

During the day, the tanks were again put in position and fired on all targets of opportunity. Late that afternoon, it was observed that enemy activity was almost nil with the exception of small arms and small mortar fire. The enemy heavy mortar and rocket barrages were less frequent and of less intensity than ever before, although it still was quite a threat to our front lines.

D plus 19 - 10 March, 1945.

Enemy activity during the night was limited to patrols and infrequent mortar barrages.

The strength of the companies as of 0800 was as follows:

	OFFICERS	ENLISTED
Headquarters Co.	10	131
Co. "A"	4	125
Co. "B"	4	124
Co. "C"	3	112

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K hour was set at 0600. At K hour, LT #1/25 moved forward against enemy small arms and "knee mortar" fire. Small pockets of resistance were wiped out in the movement forward. Groups of 10 or 20 of the enemy would attempt last ditch waves and well dug emplacements, but these were

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BLT # 1/25, OPERATION REPORT, SECTION IV Cont'd.

destroyed by our accurate small arms fire. At 0930, Co. "A" had pushed 400 yards and instead of reaching Co. "F" LT #2/25, it pushed beyond that unit and made contact with Co. "E", LT #2/25, the right flank company of LT #2/25. Co. "B" kept abreast of Co. "A" and the entire line had pushed 400 yards from the LD. It was during this drive that Captain KL DALL, C.O., Co. "B", LT #1/25, while leading his company forward was fatally wounded. He was on the front lines at a time when it was held up temporarily by a small pocket of 20 Japanese. He was attempting to move forward under withering small arms and MG fire, when he was killed. During this drive LT #1/25 killed 118 enemy. As Co. "A" contacted LT #2/25, Co. "F" 2/25 was pinched out of the front lines, Co. "E", LT #2/25, pulled over and pinched Co. "A" out and made contact with a platoon of Co. "C" who had been put in the line to fill a gap of 50 yards between Co. "A" and Co. "B" during the drive forward. At this time 2 platoons of Co. "C" were committed on Co. "B"'s left to fill a gap that had developed between it and LT #3/25. As LT #2/25 pushed across LT #1/25's front it bypassed a pocket of resistance and this pocket was completely surrounded at 1700. Co. "G", LT #2/25 tied in with Co. "C" on Co. "E"'s left. Co. "A" at 1300, as soon as it was pinched out by Co. "E", LT #2/25 was ordered by LT # 25 to be attached to LT #3/25. At 1700 Co. "A" left the area of LT #1/25 and moved to the area ordered by LT #3/25 in rear of it's front lines. Co. "E" at 1430 pinched out the platoon of Co. "C" which was committed on Co. "B"'s right flank and direct contact was made with Co. "B". At 1730, the gap still existing, the units were ordered to contain the pocket for the night. This was done and the companies held their lines for the night.

D plus 20 - 11 March, 1945.

The enemy which was contained in the pocket attempted to break through our lines during the night, 18 enemy were killed. There were frequent skirmishes between LT #1/25's front lines and small groups of the enemies in which hand grenades and small arms fire were exchanged.

The strength of the Companies as of 0800 was as follows:

	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
Headquarters Co.	9	131
Co. "A"	4	111
Co. "B"	4	112
Co. "C"	3	105

At 0830, LT # 2/25 attacked the pocket of resistance employing double envelopement tactics. LT #1/25 held it's lines intact and aided the envelopement by fire. At 1030, the pocket of resistance had been liquidated by LT #2/25.

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BOT #1/25, OPERATION REPORT, SECTION IV Cont'd.

At 1100, Companies "B" and "C" were ordered to mop up the area to it's direct front as far forward as the beach road to TA 184 V, W, and X. Although the pocket of resistance had been cleaned out snipers were still active in the area. At 1130 with Co. "C" on the left and Co. "B" on the right, the companies began the systematic mopping up of the area. All caves were blown with the aid of the Engineer Platoon which was attached to the LT. The LT moved to the beach road and upon reaching the road, was ordered to again mop up and caves that might have been bypassed and to work back up to the vicinity of the blockhouse in 184 E. Again Engineers were employed to blow enemy caves and emplacements.

The companies did not complete mopping up until 1530. At this time LT #25 ordered LT #1/25 to form a secondary line in rear of LT #2/24 in the vicinity of 184 R, W, and G. At 1730 Companies "B" and "C" were in position in rear of LT #2/24. Co. "C" was ordered to send one platoon plus a section of MGs to the beach to provide security against any attempt by the enemy to counterattack by sea. These positions were held for the night. Co. "B" was ordered to effect a relief of Co. "G", LT #2/25 by 0730, on D plus 21. on LT #2/24's left in TA 184 S.

D plus 21 - 12 March, 1945.

The night was relatively quiet. A few bypassed enemy snipers attempted to get back to their units but these were killed by the secondary line set up by LT #1/25.

The Battalion strength as of 0600 was 20 officers and 458 enlisted personnel.

At 0615, Co. "B" moved out and began the relief of Co. "G", LT #2/24. This relief was completed by 0730. The plan was for Co. "B" to hold it's positions while LT #3/25 attacked across it's front to the sea. While so holding, Co. "B" fired bazookas, MGs and small arms at enemy emplacements. An enemy rocket launcher was destroyed by bazooka fire in TA 184 S. At 1130 Co. "C" was ordered to follow Co. "F", LT #2/24 in the attack which was the right flank of LT #2/24. At 1300, Co. "F" because of fire to their left front fell back to positions they had held the night before. Co. "C" held it's lines and set up a secondary line behind Co. "F", LT #2/24. At 1600, Co. "C" was again ordered to provide one platoon plus MGs as security against counter attack or infiltration by the enemy from the sea. During the day the Engineer Platoon blew caves and emplacements in rear of our area.

LT #3/25 did not break the pocket of resistance to their front and the companies held for the night.

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BLT #1/25 OPERATION REPORT, SECTION IV Cont'd.

D plus 22 - 13 March, 1945.

Enemy activity for the night again consisted of isolated and by passed Japs who were in caves and during the night attempted to rejoin their units. A cave was discovered by Co. "B" in the vicinity of it's CI in TA 184 S and during the night two Japs were killed therein by a patrol. The cave was blown shut immediately thereafter.

The Battalion strength as of 0730 was 20 officers and 457 enlisted.

The plan for the day remained the same as the day before. Co. "B" again fired it's MGs, bazookas, and small arms fire at targets of opportunity to the front, while waiting for LT #3/25 to attack to the sea. This never occurred during the day. Co. "C" held it's lines in the rear of Co. "F", LT # 2/24. While so holding Co. "C" sent patrols to rear areas to blow caves and emplacements. There was no change in the front lines of either Co. "B" or Co. "C". Co. "C" was ordered to relieve Co. "I", LT #3/25 by 0630 the next morning. The lines held for the night.

D plus 23 - 14 March, 1945.

The night was fairly quiet. A few isolated enemy attempted to harass Co. "B"'s front lines but these were killed.

The Battalion strength as of 0730 was 20 officers and 453 enlisted personnel.

Co. "C" effected the relief of Co. "I", LT #3/25 by 0615. Co. "C" and Co. "B" fired bazookas, MGs and small arms fire during the day. The plan remained the same as before to allow LT #3/25 to move from the high ground West of the Ocean, down the corridors held by the enemy and push on to the sea.

At 1530, LT #1 was informed that LT #2/24 was ordered to move to the high ground, and with CT # 25 make the push to the sea. The hour for the attack was 1700. LT # 1 was to extend it's right and tie in with a composite Company of Regimental Weapons Company and H&S Company which was formed and sent up to the front lines to hold for the night,

At 1600, Co. "B" was ordered to be attached to LT # 2/24 in the vicinity of TA 184 I. At 1430, LT #3/25 had reached the beach road and pinched out Co. "C" and made contact with the provisional company. At 1630 Co. "C" was ordered into reserve area in TA 184 H. A reconnaissance was made of LT #2/24's lines

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BLT #1/25, OPERATION REPORT, SECTION IV Cont'd.

by the C.O. and Bn-3 of LT #1/25. The situation remained the same for the night. LT #1/25 ordered it's Mortar Platoon to join this composite company and the lines were tied in. The Division Reconnaissance Company set up a secondary line in rear of the Provisional Company near the sea. The lines for the night were as follows: One platoon of Co. "C" on the left, Co. "B" on its right, two platoons of Co. "C" and Composite Regimental Weapons and H and S Company on the right with it's flank on the sea. The attack scheduled for 1700 was postponed until the next day.

D plus 24 - 15 March, 1945.

The enemy realizing the hopelessness of the situation became active during the night in an attempt to kill as many Marines as possible. Hand grenades and small arms skirmishes took place throughout the night.

The Battalion strength as of 0700 was 20 officers and 446 enlisted personnel:

	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
Headquarters Co.	10	132
Co. "A"	4	92
Co. "B"	4	108
Co. "C"	3	111

The plan remained the same. However, 25, 5 gallon cans of Napalm were thrown by front line units on enemy positions and set off with illuminating grenades. This did not work out as well as had been hoped for. The Napalm went up in one big puff, rather than burn for any length of time. At 1400, LT #3/25 began to move across Co. "B"'s front and pinch it out of the front lines. At 1600, Co. "B" was ordered to be attached to LT #2/24 on the high ground in the vicinity of TA 184 I. At 1430 LT #3/25 had reached the beach road and pinched Co. "C" out and made contact with the Provisional Company. At 1630 Co. "C" was ordered into a reserve area in TA 184 H. A reconnaissance was made of LT #2/24's front lines by the C.O. and Bn-3 of LT #1/25. The situation remained intact for the night.

D plus 25 - 16 March, 1945.

The night was quiet with occasional sniper fire. There were no enemy mortar or rockets active during the night.

At 1100, the pocket of resistance was wiped out and LT #1/25 was assigned a sector for mopping up purposes. All enemy dead were to be reported and buried; all dumps collected and hauled by vehicle to the Regimental Dump; Marine dead to be carried to the nearest road and reported to the burial officer and all caves to be blown shut or reported to CT #25.

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BLT #1/25, OPERATION REPORT SECTION IV CONT'd.

At 1030, Co. "A" reverted to LT #1/25 and at 1100, Co. "B" reverted to LT #1/25 control, less one platoon which still attached to LT #2/24. This platoon reverted to Co. "B"

At 1245, with Co. "C" on the left, and Co. "B" on the right, the LT began the mopping up operations. A methodical and aystematic method of cleaning up the area was used and truck load after truck load of supplies and equipment was sent to the regimental dump. Approximately 62 enemy dead were buried, numerous caves blown and 18 Marine dead moved to roads and the burial officer notified.

The mopping up operations were completed by 1700 and the companies reached the rest area in the vicinity of TA 184-N. At 1730, LT #1/25 was ordered to establish a security line on the high ground North of "Turkey Knob". This was done and the companies in position by 1830. Co. "C" and "B" established that line, Co. "A" remained in reserve.

D plus 26 - 17 March, 1945.

The night was quiet. At 0830 LT #1/25 was ordered to report to Beach BLUE for embarkation aboard the LST # 634 for transportation on the APA 178, USS LANDER. At 0930, all units were on the beach in assigned area awaiting the arrival of the LST. At 1530 the LST #631 arrived off Beach Blue #1 the troops were loaded aboard and embarked as 1830

The strength of the Battalion as of 1830 was 20- officers and 438 enlisted.

	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
Headquarters Co.	8	122
Co. "A"	4	98
Co. "B"	4	112
Co. "C"	3	106

#### SECTION V. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

##### 1. Battalion Organic Weapons.

(a) All small arms proved satisfactory.

(b) The new flame thrower with the match ignition worked excellently.

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BLT #1/25, OPERATION REPORT, SECTION V Cont'd.

(c) This Battalion landed with six 81mm Mortars in the Mortar platoon. Of these, two were destroyed on the beach. It is recommended that the Table of Allowances be changed to give the 81mm Mortar platoon, 6 81mm mortars, two one ton trucks, with one ton trailers, and the the Table of Organization be changed, so as to give the Mortar platoon twenty five additional men.

The 81mm Mortar Shell was too light to penetrate almost all enemy positions but due to the alacrity with which fire could be called and the closeness to the front lines, defensive fire could be placed, the fire of this platoon succeeded in keeping enemy movement above ground to minimum and seriously hampered his ability to counter attack.

It is impossible to supply and displace an 81mm Mortar platoon with the present allowance of transportation.

During the latter part of the operation, many rounds of 81mm Mortar ammunition dropped short. This was especially true of the White Phosphorous shell which was so erratic, it was unsafe to fire.

(d) The 60mm Mortar is still well suited as a Company supporting weapon. The illumination furnished by this weapon is indispensable.

(e) It is recommended that a company of 4.2 Mortars be adopted in Regimental Weapons Company.

(f) The new bazooka proved much easier to carry; the generator ignition very dependable and it was accurate up to ranges of 300 yards. During this operation the rocket shell lacked the penetrating force needed for most of the enemy pillboxes.

(g) It is recommended that all light machine guns be manufactured with a butt stock and bipod similar to the BAR. This makes the gun a smaller target, does away with the tripod and permits more ammunition to be carried. The complete gun is a one man load.

(h) Men equipped with flame throwers, bazookas, and the gunners, and assistant gunners in Machine Gun squads and Radio men should be armed with pistols instead of carbines. Wiremen should be armed with Thompson Sub Machine Guns.

(i) The infantry needs a single expendable, light rocket launcher with a low silhouette. This weapon would be capable of throwing a heavy shell at short ranges, and could be placed as to hit enemy positions that could not be hit by any of our other weapons.

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2. Tanks.

(a) Tanks were landed too early. The beach was not prepared for them. After landing, it was some time before they could clear the beach. During this interval they drew heavy fire on the beach which fires caused many casualties not only among the tanks but to the shore party, beach party, and infantry and thereby delayed the making of a road which would have given quick exit from the beach.

(b) It is recommended that one tank equipped with a dozer blade, and a flail tank land in the last wave of infantry on the beach, in order to clear a path for the subsequent tank platoons. The regular armored bull-dozer does not have sufficient armor to work on a hot beach. Tank maneuverability was very limited by the terrain. Tanks equipped with dozer blades did not have the power in numerous instances to clear roads for future tank operations. It is recommended that some tanks in each company have more powerful engines and clutches installed so that they will be capable of having a dozer blade mounted on them. This would do away with one whole tank company depending on one dozer tank.

(c) Tanks should be equipped with a high velocity deep penetrating weapon. The 75mm gun was incapable of penetrating some fortifications, with as many as three hundred rounds.

(d) The Tank Battalion should have a reconnaissance company and each tank company should have a platoon of this reconnaissance company attached. This reconnaissance platoon should scout the terrain over which the tanks are to be used at least by dusk on the evening before the attack. The evening before the attack this platoon should be capable of giving the tank commander the situation as to location of mines, AT guns, terrain and select the best tank approaches from the tank park to a point selected by the infantry commander. This would alleviate the loss of information when new tank platoons or companies relieve or replace those that have been working in certain zones.

3. Artillery.

(a) The 1st Battalion, 14th Marines did an excellent job in setting up so early and rendering supporting fires. Apparently the 75mm Pack Howitzer made this early landing possible. If this is the case the 75mm Pack Howitzer should be retained for supporting fires immediately after landing, but

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should be replaced by 105MM Howitzers as soon as possible. The 75MM shell lacked the concussion necessary to get the enemy out of his positions, or neutralize his effectiveness. The 105MM Battalion in general support was not always available.

(b) There should be closer coordination between the Corps artillery and the infantry. Corps artillery working from a map refused to bring their 155 MM guns as close to the front lines as requested by the Battalion Commander through his 14th Marine FO. It should be up to the Battalion Commander to weigh the possibility of having a few of his men hit by shrapnel against the damage that would be done against a close-in enemy that had held up the advance for days.

(c) It is recommended that light artillery displace so as to be able to fire down draws when it become apparent after days of firing that fires across draws are incapable of neutralizing the enemy. This situation occurred when this Battalion's lines were in TA.

(d) Artillery FO's should be equipped with a radio that can be carried on one man's back, as it is difficult to use the SCR 610 in the front lines.

#### 4. Regimental Weapons.

(a) At present Regimental Weapons Company does not have a weapon capable of negotiating rough terrain nor one able to operate under even enemy small arms fire.

(b) The half track is very vulnerable to enemy small arms fire. The 75MM gun lacks the penetrating force to give the infantry the support required. This vehicle is incapable of following the infantry except along roads and on smooth rolling terrain.

(c) The 37MM guns lack the punch to justify it's existence in an operation such as IWO JIMA. It does not lend itself to man handling over rough terrain. The use of the 37MM gun is limited to defense against small enemy tanks along roads.

(d) It is recommended that the 37MM gun be abolished and that Regimental Weapons be equipped with six (6) 105MM guns on full tracked weapon carriers. The 75mm half track should replace the 37MM gun.

#### 5. Rockets.

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(a) The Barrage Rocket was not very effective during this operation. However, it is recommended that they be retained for future operations. This rocket should have better fire control and a longer range. The detachment should have its own communications between the battery and the FO rather than using an overloaded Battalion radio. This rocket, like all rockets, gives warning of its approach and permits the enemy to take cover.

(b) The 7.2 rockets were a step in the right direction. They are heavy and create a great deal of concussion, but the launcher lacks mobility. This launcher should be mounted on a full tracked weapons carrier. To use the launcher in its present state ties up a tank as a prime mover. This rocket should have more range and a fire control system.

#### 6. Engineers.

(a) The present number of Engineers allotted to a Regiment and therefore to a LT is inadequate. It was impossible to clear the beach and the rear areas of the LT of mines on "D" day. As a result many tanks and Amphibian tractors were knocked out. Engineer platoons did not receive replacements. As a result, during the latter part of the operation, Engineer platoons had dwindled to a squad. In future operations if it becomes necessary to use combat Engineers as well as assault Engineers I don't know what the LT would do. It is recommended that the landing team have one platoon of assault Engineers attached and a platoon of combat Engineers in Regimental Reserve.

#### 7. Aviation Ground Support.

(a) Prior to "D" day, aviation accomplished little that would benefit ground troops.

(b) On "D" day, aviation failed to spot the locations of enemy artillery and mortar positions. It appears that when it became apparent that actual location was impossible and the nature of the terrain, aviation would have resorted to systematic area bombing with heavy bombs covering the Northern end of the island. Due to the very limited visibility of ground troops, most calls for air support from the infantry were guesses at best on "D" day.

(d) Aviation Ordnance Officers after looking at the terrain should have been able to deduce that the heaviest bombs available were needed and that strafing attacks from three and four thousand feet could not have any effect on the cover

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and fortifications of the enemy. On the whole aviation support la cked concussion and demolition effect.

(e) The Army F-51 squadrons gave the proper support necessary during the latter part of the operation. It is regretable that this could not have been done sooner with more planes participating armed with 1000 pound bombs. The infantry need heavy bomb concentrations against a concealed, well fortified enemy. It isn't a matter of the ratio of 64 bombs to hit a known pill box as it is the great concussion in the area neutralizing the enemy infantry supporting the pill box or gun.

(f) It is recommended that instead of making so many dummy runs over a target, Air drop a colored smoke flare on ground to check point of impact before dropping bombs.

#### 8. Support Aviation Observation.

(a) Air observers contributed much information to Battalions through the latter monitoring of the RBZ set.

(b) Air was always willing to observe any area designated. Due to the nature of the enemy's defense the value of their observation was limited.

(c) Because Air Observation shackled so many Grid Coordinates and Target Areas, much information was lost by the RBZ operators getting behind in unshackling.

#### 9. Naval Gun Fire.

(a) The Naval Gunfire preparation was effective in clearing the beach of enemy. The heavy shells were so effective that the enemy evacuated two (2) pill-boxes just above the high water line even though these had no direct hits.

(b) On "D" day, Naval gunfire was called from the maps. This Battalion did not occupy any ground from which to observe.

(c) On "D" day night, Captain ROSSKAM, the Naval gun fire Spotting officer called a continual curtain of fire four hundred yards in front of the lines. This aided immensely in stopping an enemy movement into friendly lines.

(d) After "D" night, Naval Gun fire was used as deep supporting fires for the attacks and as deep defensive fires at night.

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(e) The effectiveness and accuracy of the fire depended on the ship assigned. Some ships could not stay on station and their fires had to be checked continually. Others could keep their fires on the targets designated all night. It appeared some ships need more practice in this phase of gunnery.

(f) Night illumination with star shells were indispensable, both as a morale factor to our troops and in keeping enemy movement to a minimum.

(g) It is recommended that Naval Gunfires, prior to "D" day, cover the most likely enemy position with more 14 inch and 16 inch shells.

#### 10. Replacements.

(a) During the operation this Battalion received six (6) officers and 450 enlisted replacements. In only one case were these replacements received when the Battalion was in a rear area. Therefore most of the replacements went into the front lines immediately. If possible, replacements should be sent to units when they are resting. This permits the men to become acquainted, the officers and NCOs to know their names and the new men learn from the old men what to expect.

(b) It was found that most of the replacements lacked basic knowledge in infantry weapons. (Such as not knowing a bazooka rocket from a 60MM mortar shell; nor knowing one had to take the box off a hand grenade; not knowing how to operate, care for and clean a BAR). These men were not used to battle noises. They didn't know what a 60MM, 81MM, bazooka or rifle grenade sounded like. They could not distinguish between our own fires and those of the enemy. As a result it was more difficult to get them to move. Some officers received had never had any infantry training. They were commissioned specialists and never attended Candidates Class or ROC.

(c) All replacements should know how to operate and maintain every weapon in an infantry battalion.

(d) The above comments do not hold true for Co. "A", 30th Replacement Draft. This company used the same training schedule as this battalion for six (6) weeks. Each rifle company in the Battalion had a platoon of replacements with which they worked with during this time. Co. "A", 30th Replacement Draft could not hold school or fire the various weapons, because all were armed with rifles. It is unfortunate this battalion did not have an opportunity to train the other 250 replacements received.

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BLT #1/25, OPERATION REPORT, SECTION V, Cont'd.

### 11. Intelligence.

(a) The photographs received before and throughout the operation gave a poor portrayal of the terrain. All were taken at too high an altitude and from the wrong directions. It appears that an infantry officer should supervise the photographic missions. He would realize the values of the various terrain features, and could direct the photographing accordingly. All photographs failed to show the steep sides of the valleys and the roughness of the terrain. Not one photograph gave a true picture of the waters edge.

(b) The maps being made from the photographs had the same inaccuracy as the latter.

(c) It is suggested that corrected maps be issued during the operation as captured enemy maps and better photographs become available.

(d) Japanese casualties were frequently found wearing Marine Corps uniforms.

(e) White phosphorous was frequently used by the enemy to blind out tanks and to confuse markers for Air Spot.

(f) The control of fire by the enemy was excellent. He held his fire until the main attack had gotten underway. Then he used most of his machine guns and mortars to cut off the avenue of approach and others to cut off a withdraw action. The enemy did not fire on patrols except with his accurate snipers.

### 12. Supply.

(a) The supply of all types of small arms and rocket ammunition shells, 60MM mortar HE, grenades AT and grenades fragmentation was plentiful throughout the entire operation.

(b) There existed at all times a shortage of shells 60MM mortar illuminating and 81MM mortar light and medium.

(c) Grenades, hand, illuminating were used with excellent results but the supply was very limited.

(d) By having the company armorers with the Battalion dump, it was possible to keep the companies supplied at all times with serviceable weapons, and were able to salvage and keep a stock of serviceable weapons in hand for an emergency.

BLT #1/25, OPERATION REPORT, SECTION V, Cont'd.

(e) Nine flame throwers and all heavy machine guns were kept in the dump during the attack and brought up to the line as replacements or on call.

(f) The supply of rations, water, fruit, fruit juices and PX supplies was excellent. The new "C" ration proved more appetizing and gave more variety to the field ration. It is felt that the improvement in this ration kept many tired people in the lines that would have had to be replaced by fatigue caused by not eating the old ration.

(g) The water landed still had a horrible taste. This has been mentioned in the last three reports. A chemist should investigate, analyze the paint on the inside of these five (5) gallon cans and eliminate the element causing the bad taste.

(h) During the operation, transportation needs were above the Table of Allowances gives a battalion. For future operation where movement is contemplated, it is requested that Battalions be given three one ton trucks with trailers in addition to the present allotment of jeeps and trailers. If this recommendation is not accepted, all weapons except the rifle might as well be left in the Rest Camp. It is contemplated that some of this transportation will be destroyed by enemy fire as in the past.

FENTON J. MEE,  
Major, USMC,  
Commanding 1st Bn., 25th Marines.

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HEADQUARTERS, FIRST BATTALION,  
 TWENTY FIFTH MARINES, FOURTH MARINE DIVISION,  
 FLEET MARINE FORCE, c/o FLEET POST OFFICE,  
 SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

ANNEX. . . #1")

: To accompany Bn.Opn.Report, IWO JIMA, VOLCANO IS.  
 ADMINISTRATION)

CASUALTY REPORT

DATE		KIA	W&E	S&E	W&NE	MIA	TOTAL	EFF. STRENGTH		
		O	EN	O	EN	O	EN	O	EN	
19-20-Feb.	2	64	9	182	3	1	9	2	10	260
20-21 Feb.	1	7	2	24	3			3	34	23
21-22 Feb.	1	5		58	6	12		1	81	22
22-23 Feb.		4		5	4	2			15	22
23-24 Feb.				2	1	1			4	22
24-25 Feb.		1		4	8	1			14	22
25-26 Feb.		1							1	23
26-27 Feb.	1	17		32	11	1	5	1	2	66
27-28 Feb.		12		43	5		3	2		65
28Feb-1Mar.		16	4	64	20	1	3	5	5	108
1-2 March	1	5	1	33	26		5	4	2	73
2-3 March		14		41	1	39	1	7		102
3-4 March		2		3	3					8
4-5 March					1					1
5-6 March		3		11	16					30
6-7 March	1	8		24	6		1	1		38
7-8 March	1	8		13	7		2	1		28
8-9 March		7		7	11					23
9-10 Mar.		1		6	5		1			13
10-11 Mar.	1	6		13	1			1		18
11-12 Mar.		1		6	1					8
12-13 Mar.		1		1						2
13-14 Mar.		2		9	1					11
14-15 Mar.		3		1	1		2			7
15-16 Mar.		1		8	1		1			11

\* THIS REPORT DOES NOT INCLUDE ANY ATTACHED UNITS.

During the entire operation against the enemy on the Island of IWO JIMA, daily casualty reports were submitted by this Battalion at 1400. In order to augment this report a daily report was sent to Regiment at about 2000 by telephone to give them an accurate picture of the Battalion's strength. The 1400 reports were made on a casualty form furnished by the 1st Marine Division. These forms, used in a previous operation, are simple, easy to use, and highly satisfactory. The only objection to their use is as follows:

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ANNEX "1", BLT #1/25, OPERATION REPORT, Cont'd.

Casualties are reported daily on a cumulative basis, for example. If Co. "A" suffered five (5) casualties on 19 February and six (6) casualties on 20 February, your 20 February report would show eleven (11) casualties. If four (4) of the casualties were wounded and not evacuated and three (3) of them were wounded and evacuated and returned to duty, assuming that your original strength was one hundred (100) men, your effective strength would be ninety six (96) men, yet your total casualties would show eleven (11). It is easily possible for a company to accurately show more than 100% casualties and still have sufficient men on hand to operate. This gives a false picture of what is actually taking place.

For purpose of record it may be highly satisfactory for higher echelons to maintain records in this manner but it is recommended that in units as small as Battalions a casualty who has returned to duty be stricken from the casualty list. The same recommendation would hold true for casualties wounded and not evacuated after the original report has been forwarded. This would necessitate keeping and maintaining an additional report in each battalion but would greatly simplify the furnishing of casualty figures.

In addition to casualty reports being made on the blank form furnished by Regiment, a casualty card was kept on every man, and cards of men who became casualties were submitted daily. The Battalion maintained two (2) complete sets of the said cards. One for submission to higher echelon and one for its own use. On the card maintained in our files we inserted all information that was on the card forwarded. In addition, when casualty reports became available, the information was transferred to our cards, giving us a complete and accurate record of every casualty. This greatly simplified compiling Change Sheets at a later date.

It is highly recommended that each battalion be furnished with (2) sets of casualty cards, instead of one, so that one is maintained in battalion and be available for battalion's use.

#### REPLACEMENTS

This battalion received a total of 456 replacements throughout the operation. These consisted of 6 officers and 450 enlisted personnel. We received our first batch of replacements 25 February, 1945. These consist of 1 officer and 216 enlisted men. They arrived at about 1300 when the unit was in reserve. The personnel received at this time were all

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ANNEX "1", BLT #1/25, OPERATION REPORT, Cont'd.

men of Co. "A", 30th Replacement Draft, most of whom had trained with this unit prior to the operation. They arrived at a very opportune moment, at a time of day which gave us sufficient time to properly divide them and distribute them to various companies before dark. These men were all infantry personnel and knew what was expected of the.

On 25 February, 1945, we received 35 enlisted replacements from Co. "A", 30th Replacement Draft, at about 1400. These men arrived in sufficient time to separate them and send them to the various companies before dark, however due to the fact that the rifle companies were in the attack, these men could not be sent to the companies until after dark.

On 2 March, 1945, we received 204 replacements from the 24th Replacement Draft, consisting of 5 Officers and 199 enlisted. These men again reached us in time to be separated and "squared" away before dark but could not be sent to the rifle companies until after night fall, because they were in the attack. This group of replacements were primarily Engineers and a conglomeration of butcher, baker and candlestick makers. I was presented with a roster of the personnel containing the specification number of these men. I was forced to ask the men what their specification number classified them as for I had never seen any of them in an infantry battalion. On questioning several of the men I was amazed to find how little they knew of what was expected of them and what they were to do.

It is recommended that replacements be sent to infantry battalions in active combat only when that unit is in reserve. It is further recommended that only infantrymen be sent to infantry battalions.

#### MORALE

Considering the severity of the battle the morale of the troops were good, there was always sufficient amounts of PX supplies on hand and cigarettes and tropical chocolate were always plentiful.

F. J. MEE,  
Major, USMC,  
Commanding 1st Bn, 25th Marines.

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HEADQUARTERS, FIRST BATTALION,  
TWENTY FIFTH MARINES, FOURTH MARINE DIVISION,  
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ANNEX. . "2")

: To accompany Bn.Opn.Report, IWO JIMA, VOLCANO IS.  
INTELLIGENCE)

The maps and photographs furnished prior to the Operation were adequate in number, however, the portrayal of terrain features was inaccurate as depicted on the 1/10,000 map. The vertical photographs furnished before the operation were adequate concerning the area immediately inland from the beaches, but vertical pictures received during the operation were of no value due to the altitude of the lenses. The blown-up low obliques of the beach and quarry area(TA-166) were excellent.

It is recommended that during future operations captured enemy maps be reproduced and superimposed with target areas for use by all units. Also it is suggested that a line officer be flown over an area to be photographed. During the last operation, pictures were taken of only general areas while pictures of compartments and corridors are needed by infantry troops. The photographing plane should come in at low altitude following draws and valleys.

Hydrographic information furnished before the operation was very good with the exception of information concerning the shelf at the water's edge, and the terraces. This information was misleading for it was thought that the LVTs might have to stop at the shoreline to disembark troops, or if possible to run upon the shore, the troops would possibly have to climb to the top of the LVT before being able to surmount the first terrace.

The system for collection of enemy information (prisoners, documents, materiel) is adequate, however the enemies strict security measures prohibited the gaining of much valuable information during the operation. The evaluation and dissemination of enemy information was excellent for the amount captured. Japanese language personnel were effective in some cases where officer interpreters were available. Many possible prisoners were killed or sealed in caves due to lack of availability of interpreters. Enlisted interpreters proved to be of little aid in capturing POWs or gaining of information from documents due to lack of knowledge of the language. It is recommended that an officer interpreter be attached to this battalion after the initial stages of the landing in future operations. This will enable the front line companies to call an interpreter to remove

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ANNEX "2", BLT #1/25, OPERATION REPORT, Cont'd.

POWs from caves etc. Also, information from POWs and enemy documents pertinent to front line battalions will be effective immediately. Surrender pamphlets and other written propaganda proved to be ineffective during the operation. Vocal propaganda with a loud speaker, was effective during the final stages of the operation when enemy officers were not present, or did not command their men to hold. This method for capturing POWs was ineffective if when the enemy began to come out of a cave, Marines began loud yelling or fired a shot. It is recommended that verbal communications with a loud speaker be used whenever practicable.

Distinctive was the enemies use of white smoke to conceal areas and targets upon which we had observed fire, and to limit visibility to our tanks. The enemy also fired white smoke when we were firing white smoke, causing confusion among our observers and batteries. Also, when we fired an artillery or mortar barrage, the enemy would lay down smoke to hinder FOs observation of our barrage.

There was a distinctive lack of large scale of "Banzai" attacks during the operation. The enemy instead counter attacked in small areas, utilizing terrain for cover and concealment, rather than attempting a suicidal rush. The enemy also utilized massed artillery fire, a change from their previous policy of firing only one or two guns.

Notable were the excellently concealed positions in the area of the "amphitheater" (TA 133-3, 184-F). These positions delivered fire even after tanks and flame thrower tanks had worked in the area for several days. The enemies practice in this area was to pin down our troops with intense small arms fire then to call heavy mortar barrages to fall on our troops.

F. J. NEE,  
Major, USMC,  
Commanding 1st Bn., 25th Marines.

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HEADQUARTERS, FIRST BATTALION,  
TWENTY FIFTH MARINES, FOURTH MARINE DIVISION,  
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ANNEX . . . . . "3")

: To accompany Bn. Opn. Report, IWO JIMA,  
OPERATIONS AND TRAINING) VOLCANO IS.

C.O., LT #1, CT #25 and his staff were informed of the target for the anticipated operation some four(4) months prior to "D" day. This aided materially in the planning phase of the LT in that sufficient information i.e., maps, photographs and intelligence data was obtained to properly prepare plans and orders. It gave the staff sufficient time to allow for changes which inevitably occur during the planning phase of an operation.

In training for the operation, the LT stressed coordination of all units within it's organization. Field problems based upon the artillery, tank and infantry team were stressed. Due to limited terrain the benefits were not entirely satisfactory. These were firing problems, but the terrain, plus range rules, prevented the exploitation of the problem possibilities. Artillery could not be fired less than 800 yards in front of the infantry, tanks could not be used until the latter stages of the problem and infantry could only fire small arms in the closing stages of the problem. This resulted in quite a bit of simulation, which is invariably poor training for troops. Although benefits were derived from the problems, if better training areas were available, troops and officers could be more effectively trained during similar, highly important problems.

The LT participated in four (4) amphibious maneuvers in preparation for the IWO JIMA operations. These rehearsals are completely covered in the basic report under Section #1 and #2. These rehearsals were beneficial, although much effort was wasted because of the change of the LVT organization at SAIPAN from those that participated in MAUI maneuvers. It is recommended that, if at all possible, APAs, LSTs and LVTs and their personnel, that are to participate in the actual operation, take part in rehearsals with troops. Otherwise, lessons learned at rehearsals are wasted when new organization and units are encountered for the first time after rehearsals.

While en route, schools were had for all officers and men. These schools briefed the troops on all phases of the operation i.e., preferred and alternate plans, artillery plan, the Naval Gunfire plan, engineer plan, all intelligence data etc., and these schools proved very satisfactory. Sufficient maps, photographs and charts were available for proper briefing of troops.

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ANNEX "3", BLT #1/25, OPERATION REPORT, Cont'd.

Upon landing and for the duration of the operation of IWO JIMA, an operation map was maintained by the Bn-3. This map was always up to date and the data was obtained and personal check made by the C.O. LT #1 and Bn-3 of front line positions. Liason officers were committed to lead rifle platoons because of officer casualties.

During the operation, many types of enemy fortifications were encountered. Against all log and dirt emplacements the medium tank 75MM shell were effective. However, against concrete emplacement, the 75MM shell is worthless. For example, against an enemy concrete blockhouse, at least 250 rounds of 75MM shells were fired without breaking through the concrete. The muzzle velocity of the 75MM is too slow and the penetration power of the shell insufficient for the destruction of concrete emplacements. It is recommended that a high velocity weapon of the 75 caliber or larger, if practicable, be emplaced upon the medium tank. To discuss the 37AT gun and its capabilities as a weapon against concrete emplacements, would be a waste of time and paper. However, if the terrain is suitable, it may be employed against log or dirt emplacements. The U. S. Marine Corps at this time does not have a weapon in the field capable of penetrating and destroying heavy fortified enemy positions.

The flame thrower tank is an excellent weapon to combat fortified positions, but its capacity load of fuel is insufficient for the proper employment of the weapon. The muzzle of the 75MM is too large and the flame cannot be properly controlled, nor can it be thrown far enough to gain the benefits of the weapons potentialities. It is recommended that a smaller caliber muzzle be used, that each flame thrower tank have an increased capacity full load and also carry a trailer load of extra flame thrower fuel to alleviate the necessity of numerous trips to rear area dumps in order to refuel the tank when the tank is desperately needed in the front lines.

Bazookas were employed and proved effective against all dirt, log and camouflaged positions. It also was effective against some concrete emplacements, but not against heavy concrete emplacements. Since it's range is so limited, it's effectiveness is naturally reduced because infantry cannot in all cases infiltrate against pill boxes and blockhouses that are mutually supporting. The answers to the whole problem is a high velocity weapon of a large caliber placed on a medium tank.

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Since the terrain dictated the use of tanks, tanks

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ANNEX "3", BLT #1/25 OPERATION REPORT, Cont'd.

could not be employed except to aid the infantry destroy enemy pill boxes and blockhouses. However, the arrival of the tanks on the front lines, always resulted in an enemy mortar and artillery and rocket barrage. The effect of this murderous barrage inflicted casualties although the troops were well dug in. As a result, whenever an enemy strong point was encountered, the tank would move into position, fire its mission and withdraw to allow the infantry to gain its objective. The enemy tactics were to counter battery the fire of the tank, although few tanks were actually destroyed from enemy artillery fire, although direct hits by a 150MM or larger rocket or mortar was seen in a number of instances to knock a tank out of action. The enemy also employed the use of smoke to blind the tanks, whenever the tanks began firing upon enemy emplacements. However, this use of smoke indicated to the LT Commander that our tanks were hitting vital and important enemy positions. Therefore, our tanks would increase their fire, although they were blinded by the smoke, and invariably, good results were obtained.

The enemy 47AT gun is an excellent anti-tank weapon. In one infantry-tank attack, one 47MM AT gun put three (3) of our tanks out of commission. Its high velocity, its rate of fire, and its accurateness cannot be underestimated. These AT guns were well emplaced, well dug in and expertly camouflaged. Also as an AT measure, the enemy employed mines in considerable numbers. These mines decreased the use of our tanks immeasurably. However, our engineer personnel, dealt effectively with the mines and removed same before much damage was done. The enemy mined roads, airfields, and terrain leading to their strong points, which strong points were well fortified.

The enemy tactics changed somewhat from what this LT encountered in previous operations. The enemy did not counter-attack in large numbers. The Jap refused to leave his fortification and risk a large scale attack, although he fully realized that the campaign was lost unless at some time during the operation he counter-attacked and drove us from our beach heads. Although this led to his loss of the island, the enemy, nevertheless, fought hard and fanatically throughout the operation and it became increasingly difficult to spot his excellent and well built emplacements. As a result, although victory was always assured, it became necessary to "dig" the enemy out. The enemy did send numerous small patrols to attempt infiltration of our lines, but these were always stopped.

During the operation, after "D" plus 5, a war dog detachment of two (2) war dogs joined the LT. These dogs were used for CP protection and aided materially in the defense.

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ANNEX "3", BLT #1/25 OPERATION REPORT, Cont'd.

However, it was observed that if the handler went to sleep during the night the dog had a tendency to do likewise. Although the dog was easily awakened, this situation could have led to very serious consequences if it were not for the excellent defense organization of the CP security, that is, alert and wide awake sentries around the entire perimeter of the CP. However, the dogs, as a whole, performed a satisfactory job throughout and many times during the operation alerted sentries to enemy patrol activity.

Cooperation with the artillery units was excellent. The forward observers performed very well and all supporting fires whenever needed, were always fired and fired well. This is especially true of the 75mm Howitzer Battalion, 1st Battalion, 14th Marines. However, the supply problem was always the answer to the C.O. LT #1, CT #25's request for more artillery on vital targets. This situation greatly hampered our effectiveness of counter battery fire against the enemy. However, the 155mm battalions, although they had not FO's of their own and depended on the LT's FOs, refused to fire on targets, stating it was too close to our own troops. Since their information was gotten totally from a map, whereas the LT C.O. and his FO were on the ground, knew the situation and could control the fire. It is felt that the LT C.O. is sufficiently acquainted with the limitation and capabilities of his supporting weapons, and his request for fire should be headed, rather than denied by an officer who had never seen the terrain over which the LT is operating.

Most of this report is repetition of the basic report of this LT. Additional recommendations and comments may be found in Section V of the basic report.

F. J. MEYER

Major, USMC

Commanding 1st Bn., 25th Marines.

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HEADQUARTERS, FIRST BATTALION  
TWENTY FIRST MARINES, FOURTH MARINE DIVISION,  
FLEET MARINE FORCE, U.S. FLEET POST OFFICE,  
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

ANNEX . "4")

SUPPLY . . . )

To accompany Bn. Opn. Report , IWO JIMA, VOLCANO IS.

Reference: (a) Regimental SOP #1-45, dated 8 February, 1945.

1. In accordance with reference (a) the following are the comments and recommendations of the supplies and the supply situation as encountered by this Battalion during the last operation:

A. SUPPLY

- (1) The adequacy of all types of mounting out supplies was sufficient in all respects.
- (2) Resupply: During the first three days there was no organized unloading of supplies on BLUE BEACH #1. Supplies during this period were obtained where and whenever possible by the Battalion Quartermaster.

The Regiment did not at any time have a dump established from which supplies could be drawn. After D plus five days however, supplies were obtained through the Regiment from the Division dump as they were required.

During the operation there was one partial change of clothing issued. This was far from sufficient for the period. It is recommended that at least a complete change of clothing be made every week and that socks be issued at least every four days.

- (3) Transportation: The Two Carriers, Cargo, M-29, used by this Battalion proved to be very valuable during the entire operation. They were especially useful during the first few days as they and the LVTs were the only types of vehicles that did not bog down on the beaches. It is highly recommended that the Battalion have at least two of these vehicles for use during the operation.

The Two Trucks, 1-ton, 4x4, were very useful in moving large quantities of supplies faster than could have been done by the use of Trucks,  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton, 4x4, and trailers. These trucks should be retained by Battalion at all times.

B. ORDNANCE

- (1) Weapons: The following is a report of the number type and caliber of weapons used and lost during the operation:

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ANNEX "4", OPERATION REPORT. Cont'd.

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NO. USED</u>	<u>NO. LOST</u>
GUN, machine, cal..30,M1917A1.	18	
GUN, machine, cal..30,m1919A1	18	
MORTAR, 60MM,M2	13	
MORTAR, 81MM,M1	6	2
CARBINE, cal..30,M1	489	
RIFLE, cal..30,M1	424	
RIFLE, BAR, cal..30,M1918A2	81	
PISTOL, Automatic, cal..45,M1911	30	
LAUNCHER, rocket, A.T.	9	
FLAME THROWERS		

- (2) The company armorees were kept with the Battalion dump at all times enabling us to keep the companies supplied at all times with serviceable weapons and we were also able to keep a stock of serviceable weapons on hand for any emergency by salvaging weapons left by casualties.

The heavy machine guns and flame throwers were kept with the dump where they were serviced and sent to the companies as they were needed.

It is recommended that personnel of the supply section be armed with a pistol as it is impossible for them to carry any other type of weapon while performing the work required of them.

- (3) Ammunition Supply: There was a shortage at all times of Shells, 60mm, Mortar Illuminating; Shells, 81mm Mortar, H.E., M43A1 and H.E. M56. The supply of all other types of ammunition was very good. New Types and Packaging: Grenades, hand illuminating, were used with very good results but the supply was limited.

It is recommended that the new container for Shells, H.E., M43A1, 60mm Mortar, be waterproofed as it was found that many of the shells had become rusted due to moisture inside the container.

- (4) Ammunition expended: The following ammunition was expended by this Battalion during the operation:

CARTRIDGE, carbine, cal..30,M1	141,800
CARTRIDGE, grenade, Carbine, M6	1,500
CARTRIDGE, AP, cal..30 (5-rd clips)	28,604
CARTRIDGE, AP, cal..30 (8-rd clips)	220,448
CARTRIDGE, tracer, cal..30,M1	18,300
CARTRIDGE, tracer, cal..30, (5-rd clips)	21,264
CARTRIDGE, tracer, cal..30, (8-rd clips)	8,962
CARTRIDGE, cal..30, belted (all rounds)	842,683
CARTRIDGE, cal..45, ball	9,850

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SHELL, HE, M49A2, w/fuze PD M52, 60mm Mortar	21,268
SHELL, illuminating, M83, w/fuze time fired	1,986
M65, 60MM Mortar:	
SHELL, smoke, WP, T-6, 60mm Mortar	475
SHELL, HE, M43A1, w/fuze PD M52, 81MM Mortar	6,423
SHELL, HE, M56, w/fuze PD M53, 81 MM Mortar	3,088
SHELL, smoke, WP, M-57, w/fuze, PD, M-52	488
81mm Mortar:	
GRENADE, hand, frag. MK11A1, W/fuze, M1DA3	11,241
GRENADE, hand, smoke, WP, M-15	1,254
GRENADE, hand, illuminating, MK-1	486
GRENADE, A.T., M-9A1	1,345
ADAPTER, grenade-projectile, M-1	1,138
ROCKETS, A.T., 2.36", M6A1	36
FLARES, TRIF	116
EXPLOSIVE, shaped charge 40#T5	34
SHELL, smoke, HC-BE, T-8, 60mm Mortar	128
FLAME THROWERS, Portable, M9A9	27

C. TRANSPORT QUARTERMASTER

- (1) We began loading ship at 2130 26 Decmeber, 1944, and completed the loading and had the unit embarked by 0930, 28 December, 1944.
- (2) The following is the difficulties encountered during the loading:
  - (a). When the ship docked the stern of the ship extended beyond the end of the dock. This situation was not remedied until the following day causing a delay in loading.
  - (b). Ammunition did not arrive until after the loading had begun.
  - (c). Ship's crew was very inexperienced in handling vehicles and cargo.
- (3) The unloading of the ship began 19 February, 1945 and was completed 24 February, 1945.

Due to the rough seas the loading of cargo into small boats was very slow.

The ship was damaged on the second night of the operation and orders were received to unload the ship immediately, which was done without any further delay.

D. MEDICAL

- (1) Embarkation: Medical personnel of this Battalion

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ANNEX "4", BLT #1/25, OPERATION REPORT, Cont'd.

consisted of two (2) doctors and forty (40) corpsmen. Five of these corpsmen were attached to each rifle company, two (2) to the 81MM mortar platoon and the remainder to Headquarters Co. to work with the Doctors in the Battalion Aid Station. The company corpsmen were embarked with their respective companies aboard LSTs #787, 789, and 928. The Battalion Surgeon and three (3) Headquarters Co. Corpsmen were aboard LST #789. The Mortar platoon corpsmen and the assistant Battalion Surgeon with eight (8) corpsmen were aboard LST #789. The remaining Headquarters Co. corpsmen were aboard AFA-157. An attached "collecting section" of ten (10) corpsmen and a Marine jeep driver were embarked aboard the AFA-157.

Equipment for the assault was distributed among twelve (12) seabags and the remainder preloaded on a jeep ambulance and trailer. There was a jeep ambulance, two (2) seabags of medical gear, and a case of plasma with the "collecting section".

- (2) Aboard ships: The usual run-of minor complaints such as headaches, backaches, and fungus infection were encountered. No contagious diseases were found in this Battalion. Heads, living quarters, messes and galleys were inspected daily and found to be in good sanitary condition. Cooks and messmen were inspected daily for cleanliness and for contagious diseases.

Clothing was impregnated with insect repellent and with DDT powder as a precautionary measure against possible insect vectors. All personnel in the Battalion received a tetanus booster one week before landing.

- (3) Debarkation: Ten (10) company corpsmen landed with "A" and "B" companies in LVTs of the second and third waves. They carried with them six seabags containing emergency medical supplies. Five (5) company corpsmen and four (4) Headquarters Co. corpsmen landed with "C" Co. in LVTs of the fifth wave carrying three (3) seabags of medical equipment.

The Battalion Surgeon and three (3) Headquarters Co. corpsmen landed in a freeboat behind the fifth wave carrying one seabag of medical equipment.

The Assistant Battalion Surgeon along with

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ANNEX "4", BLT #1/25, OPERATION REPORT, Cont'd.

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eight (8) Headquarters Co. corpsmen landing in LVTs of the sixth wave carrying one seabag of medical equipment.

Seven (7) headquarters Co. corpsmen landed in the eighth wave carrying one seabag of medical equipment.

The jeep ambulance and trailer with two (2) corpsmen and nine (9) of the "collecting section" corpsmen were boated in an LCVF at "H" hour. This boat was not permitted to land until the morning of "D" plus 2.

One (1) corpsmen and a Marine driver were left aboard the APA-157 on call and reached the Battalion Aid Station on "D" plus 2.

- (4) Assault phase: On the beach there was great confusion due to the enemys' heavy artillery fire and the large number of casualties.
- (a). Medical installations: An aid and evacuation station was set up in a shell hole at the waters edge on the center of Beach Blue #1 by the assistant Battalion Surgeon and seven (7) corpsmen. This operated for almost three (3) hours.
- An aid station was set up in a pill box to the left of Beach Blue #1 by the Battalion Surgeon and eight (8) corpsmen. This operated until "H" plus t then it was moved one hundred fifty (150) yards inland to the immediate center of Beach Blue #1.
- Both these installations were effective in the treating of wounded and evacuating them as soon as possible. The Aid Station was, throughout the operation, located with the Battalion CP. Communication and security was provided by the CP.
- (b). Evacuation was effected in the assault phase by placing patients directly in small craft leaving the beach. Later by carrying them via stretcher party or ambulance to the beach party. After the beach party was set up evacuation was quick and easy throughout the operation.
- (c). Casualties treated:
- |                           |     |
|---------------------------|-----|
| Wounded and evacuated     | 354 |
| Wounded and not evacuated | 32  |
| Missing in action         | 1   |
| Combat fatigue            | 114 |
| Sick and evacuated        | 20  |
| Killed in action          | 43  |
| TOTAL                     | 564 |

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OPERATION REPORT, Cont'd.

Many of these cases were evacuated from other units. In turn many casualties in our unit were evacuated by other units. In the confusion on the beach many casualties were treated of which we have no record. Dead were recorded only when they could be confirmed by this unit.

Of the wounds, most were inflicted by shell fragments, the rest by gunshot. Many deaths and cases of shell shock occurred from the concussion of the high explosive artillery used by the enemy. All mental casualties were listed as combat fatigue leaving their final diagnosis to psychiatrists. It is estimated that approximately fifty (50) per cent of the evacuated were stretcher cases. No breakdown of walking and stretcher cases were kept.

- (d) Sanitation was carried out by burying excreta and refuse. Latrine box heads were set up by rear installations. When used in sufficient quantities DDT sprayed from planes is very effective in eliminating flies. In our area the first use of DDT was very effective. The second only slightly. "C" and "10 in 1" rations were provided in ample quantities. Water was trucked up in five gallon cans and at all times adequate in quantity.
- (e) Our dead when possible were covered with ponchos and placed where the burial party could easily find them. Enemy dead were buried in shallow graves or covering them with dirt in the holes where they lay.
- (f) A mild form of diarrhea was fairly common among the men of this Battalion. Symptoms were usually mild and cleared in two or three days. Only a few cases required evacuation and those not evacuated were able to continue on the line.
- (g) Dental cases were referred to the Regimental Dentist for treatment and disposition.
- (h) No civilians were encountered.
- (i) No prisoners of war were treated by this aid station.
- (j) Within the Battalion the medical organization was entirely satisfactory. It is suggested that the

attached "collecting section" be assigned to the Battalion at least one month prior to embarkation in order to become acquainted with their duties and the men with whom they are to work.

- (k) Medical personnel would have been adequate had they not sustained such large casualties. This aid station lost its Assistant Battalion Surgeon by a wound, twelve (12) corpsmen killed, nineteen (19) wounded, and twelve (12) combat fatigue. Replacements were inadequately prepared psychologically for the work they had to do, but did a good job considering that they were unprepared.
- (l) The field medical equipment supplied was more than adequate for our needs. Re-supplies were at all times adequate and a large reserve supply was carried. The serum albumin was very effective and saved time in urgent cases because of its ease in preparation and administration. There was no pilfering and only four (4) seabags were lost.
- (m) The two (2) jeep ambulances were very effective in evacuating casualties. They were maintained for us by Division Motor Transport.
- (n) No Quartermaster supplies were carried.
- (o) No epidemic or malarial control measures were taken by this Battalion outside of routine sanitary precautions and the impregnating and dusting of clothing.

(5) Ashore: The activities during the whole operation have been outlined above under the assault phase.

(6) Recommendations: It is recommended that the collecting section be attached to the Battalion with which they are to work at least one month prior to embarkation in order to be more thoroughly acquainted with the type of work they are to do. Mental casualties were more numerous among replacements corpsmen than among the men who were originally part of our aid station.



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ANNEX "4", BLT #1/25, OPERATION REPORT, Cont'd.

Serum albumin is ready to give in a comes in a much smaller and more convenient package than plasma and is highly effective. Plasma was frequently old and dissolved with difficulty and clogged the filter during the administration. It was used only in abdominal wounds (when patients could not drink) and when no albumin was at hand. It is also preferred for deep shock and should by no means be deleted.

F. J. MEE,  
Major, USMCR,  
Commanding 1st Bn.; 25th Marines.

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HEADQUARTERS, FIRST BATTALION,  
TWENTY FIFTH MARINES, FOURTH MARINE DIVISION,  
FLEET MARINE FORCE, c/o FLEET POST OFFICE,  
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

ANNEX

"5")

: To accompany Bn. Opn. Report, IWO JIMA, VOLCANO IS.  
COMMUNICATIONS)

Communication within the Battalion consisted solely of wire, radios SCR -300 and radios SCR - 536. One SCR- 300 was with each company at all times and one remained in the Battalion CP as Net Control. One was sent out with the Bn. C.O. wherever he went. This set was usually at the Battalion O.F. We also used two 300s with the Mortar Platoon for calling fire missions. However, due to the fact that the Bn. Net is so loaded, that is, the three companies are using the net almost constantly, I recommend that the mortars should be taken off this net. As need for called mortar fire is nearly always immediate, using radios on this Battalion channel is a handicap. If it were possible to acquire a separate channel for mortars it would expedite effective firing of these weapons. If a separate channel is not available, it is my recommendation that they use wire exclusively.

Operational failures of the SCR 300 were slight. However, there is still considerable trouble from the handset. A portion of the last supply of BA-80 for Radio SCR 300 seemed to vary greatly in performance. Quite a few of these were noticeably weak when first installed in the sets and others seemed to have a very short life when normally the BA-80 is good for at least 20 hours.

It is my recommendation that arrangements be made in future operations to send in a nominal supply of Radio Batteries of all types as soon as possible on "D" day. Assault elements cannot carry in an adequate supply of batteries due to the fact that they are overburdened with equipment. On IWO JIMA this need for batteries became almost acute before batteries were finally landed. However, after landing of higher echelons, supply and repair were more than enough. We lost quite a few 300 to mortar and artillery fire and it is suggested that plenty of spare sets be available for assault units. In using SCR 300 as a means of communicating with tank units, it is my belief most trouble encountered is due to the tank noise interfering with the operator in the tank's reception. I believe use of the auxiliary headset would reduce this to a minimum.

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ANNEX I, ILT, 1/25, OPERATION REPORT, Cont'd.

Radios, SCR 533, were very effective within the company. They were employed as follow: one (1) in the company CF and one (1) with each platoon. This arrangement reduces use of runners to a minimum and had proven very satisfactory.

Radios SCR 610 were used chiefly as a channel of communication with higher echelons. Proved very satisfactory in the IWO JIMA operation. The TBX-8 is a great improvement over the old model, but it is my recommendation that the Radio SCR 694 replace the TBX.

Wire communication was used extensively throughout the operation with the usual trouble of broken wires and shorted lines. Wire was not kept up with the companies at all times in the assault due to the shortage of linemen at times, but with a full complement of linemen it is my belief that wire communications should move with the Company CF at all times.

A network of sound powered telephones were employed within the company at night in this manner; one (1) phone in company CF and one (1) with each platoon and sometimes phones out on listening post. These were all in the company installed by Battalion linemen but independent of the Battalion circuit. Company Commanders were highly pleased with the effectiveness of this arrangement. It is my recommendation that each Battalion have a switch-board BD-72 in excess of the 71 as I believe this would expedite greatly the setting up and handling of traffic. I recommend that each Battalion have a complement of at least twenty (20) wiremen.

Loss of sound powered telephones, used in the manner mentioned above, was very high as it was largely dependent on men from the companies retrieving them each day, but the usefulness and effectiveness of these phones, in my belief, greatly overshadow cost of losses.

Before the IWO JIMA operation, due to the lack of trained radio operators, it was suggested that two (2) or more linemen from each company be trained as radio operators and used in that capacity. This was tried, the men having at least two (2) months training in each case, but results were very dissatisfactory. The men are very nonchalant in their attitude toward this duty. In some cases they were known to leave their sets for indefinite periods of time. At such time it was, of course, impossible to contact the unit he was with. Nor will these men handle the sets with proper care. It is highly recommended that if at all possible, each Battalion should be furnished with a full complement of trained operators so one (1) will be furnished each company.

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F. J. MEE,  
Major, USMCR,  
Commanding 1st Bn., 25th Marines.

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HEADQUARTERS, FIRST BATTALION,  
TWENTY FIFTH MARINES, FOURTH MARINE DIVISION,  
FLEET MARINE FORCE, c/o FLEET POST OFFICE,  
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

ANNEX....."6")

: To accompany BLT #1/25 Operation Rep  
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SECTION II.	MOVEMENT TO OBJECTIVE
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F. J. MEE,  
Major, USMCR,  
Commanding 1st Bn., 25th Marines.

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HEADQUARTERS, SECOND BATTALION,  
TWENTY-FIFTH MARINES, FOURTH MARINE DIVISION,  
FLEET MARINE FORCE, C/O FLEET POST OFFICE,  
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

16 April, 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.  
To : The Commanding Officer, Twenty-fifth Marines.  
Subject: Appendix VII to RCT - 25 Operations Report, IWO JIMA, VOLCANO IS-  
LANDS.  
References: (a) Division SOP 1-45.  
(b) Regimental SOP 1-45.  
Enclosure : (a) (80) copies of Appendix VII to RCTI- 25 Operations Report,  
IWO JIMA, VOLCANO ISLANDS.  
1. In compliance with references (a) and (b), enclosure (a) is here-  
with submitted.

JAMES TAUL

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APPENDIX VII TO RCT - 25 OPERATIONS REPORT, IWO JIMA,  
VOLCANO ISLANDS.

BLT - 2/25 OPERATIONS REPORT.

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B - Intelligence.

C - Operations.

D - Supply.

Appendix 1 - Medical.

Appendix 2 - Transport Quartermaster.

E - Communications.

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HEADQUARTERS, SECOND BATTALION,  
TWENTY-FIFTH MARINES, FOURTH MARINE DIVISION,  
FLEET MARINE FORCE, C/O FLEET POST OFFICE,  
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

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22 March, 1945.

BASIC REPORT.

SECTION I - PLANNING AND PREPARATION.

A. Organization.

1. Task Organization.

- (a) 2d Bn., 25th. Marines.
- (b) 2d Plat., Regt Wpns. Co., 25th. Mar.
- (c) 5th Sec., 75mm gun Plat., Regt. Wpn. Co., 25th. Marines.
- (d) Det. 1st JASCO
- (e) FO pty, B Btry, 1st. Bn., 14th Mar.
- (f) Det. Coll. sec., Co A, 4th Med. Bn.
- (g) 2d Plat., Co A, 4th Motor Trans. Bn.
- (h) Co. B, 30th Repl. Draft (less Dets)

2. Tactical Organization. - Tactical organization of BLT 2/25 was as prescribed by Tables of Organization, with the following exception. Two squads of each rifle Platoon were designated as "support squads", and the third squad as an "assault" squad; the set-up of the assault squad was as follows:

RANK

DUTIES

WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

		Carbine	Rifle	BAR	FT	Rocket Lchr	Demo - chgs	Grenades, frag.	Grenades, smoke	Rockets	Pistol
Sgt.	Sq. Ldr.	X						X			
PFC/Pvt.	Demo. Grp. Ldr.		X								
PFC/Pvt.	Demo. Oper.		X				X	X			
PFC/Pvt.	Ass't. Demo. Oper.		X				X	X			
PFC/Pvt.	BAR man			X				X			
Corp.	FT Grp. Ldr.		X						X		
PFC/Pvt.	FT Oper.										X
PFC/Pvt.	Ass't. FT Oper.		X								
PFC/Pvt.	BAR man			X							
Corp.	Rocketeer Grp. Ldr.		X								
PFC/Pvt.	Rocketeer										
PFC/Pvt.	Ass't Rocketeer										
PFC/Pvt.	BAR man							X			

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B. Planning. - Planning for the operation was routine. Planning operation procedures covering medical aspects of an operation and definite camouflage procedure were drawn up, and all officers and men thoroughly indoctrinated.

C. Training. - Training was carried out according to scheduled program by higher echelon. Special emphasis was placed upon tactical methods involved in attack and reduction of a fortified position, and every effort was made to have both fire and maneuver problem realistic by construction of dummy emplacements, use of blank cartridges, use of remote controlled MG's simulating enemy, and moving targets. Particular attention was also paid to indoctrination of all junior officers in tactical handling of troops on the ground, and proper use of all supporting arms and weapons, including those within the BLT plus those of regimental weapons, artillery, and air support. Difficulty was encountered in obtaining areas for use in Training Troops with tanks and this phase was definitely deficient. The public address system was extensively used in lectures and demonstrations. Several two and three day problems were run successfully and with benefit to the Troops. Supplies of all types of ammunition for training were plentiful, but supplies of other necessary materials such as lumber, nails, paint, and targets were hopelessly inadequate and caused considerable waste of time in involving substitutes and expedients. It is also felt that the visual training aids program should be radically revised in order to increase quantities of films and film strips available, but mainly to provide some place within each regiment where such training aids could be used during the training day. The theaters, if the outdoor type, are obviously not suited.

D. Rehearsal. - The rehearsals at Maalaea Bay, Maui, were carried out on 13, 14, and 15 January, and at Kahoolawe on 17 January, and accomplished their purpose of testing communications and generally smoothing out the ship-to-shore movement, plus providing officers and men with a knowledge of tactical movements involved.

## SECTION II - MOVEMENT TO OBJECTIVE.

A. Rehabilitation. - During this period, troops were given organized recreation, liberty, and training ashore on a three-day rotation basis, with the organized recreation carried out at Ala Moana Park, and the training ashore (four hours daily) at Sand Island. This arrangement was generally satisfactory.

B. Ship Board Training. - Training in the following subjects, in addition to physical training program, was carried out aboard ship.

Briefing of men in all phases of coming operation.

Review main elements of, and defensive measure in case of, enemy airborne attack.

Instruction in semaphore code.

Weapons instruction and inspection.

Bazooka and flame thrower.

Tank Signals.

Field Order exercises

Instruction in SCR 300 and SCR 536

Scouting and small unit tactics.

Review Bn. SOP

Instruction in casualty reporting.

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Demolitions  
Password, countersign and night security  
Procedure for requesting supporting arms  
Review Intelligence SOP.  
Minefield markers, use and meaning.  
Assault squad duties.

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C. Forward Area Rehearsal. - This rehearsal was conducted as scheduled off Tinian, but did not accomplish much for this BLT, as previous rehearsals had smoothed out all difficulties. However, during the rehearsal when the LST's moved into position behind the L.D. the waves of this Battalion followed the LST's to Tinian. Therefore, there was a delay in dispatching of waves.

### SECTION III - SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT.

BLT Two of Regimental Combat Team Twenty-five, the reserve battalion, began general debarkation at 0700 Feb., 19, 1945 in accordance with annex B to operation plan I-45. This debarkation was carried out successfully, and the sea conditions were excellent. The waves reached the rendezvous area approximately 1000 yards off the starboard bow of the U.S.S. PICKENS (APA 190) as directed by the Boat Group Commander by 0740.

The freeboat proceeded immediately to the primary control vessel, #1081 the floating Command Post of Regimental Combat Team Twenty-five. This battalion was to land on order on Blue Beach One with "F" Company on the left and "E" Company on the right, to support the attack of either Landing Team One or Landing Team Three. However, the tactical situation was such that at 1218 this Landing Team was ordered to land on Blue Beach One with two Companies abreast as planned, and move one Company between Landing Team One on the left and Landing Team Three on the right in order to seize the high ground above the Quarry in Target Area 183VW.

Meanwhile the waves had arrived in the vicinity of the Line of Departure at 0950 prepared to land on order. At 1235, by means of radio, the order was issued by the Commanding Officer and the first wave crossed the Line of Departure at 1242.

Control of each wave was very good, and the first wave landed at 1250. There was about a seven minute interval between each wave, and the fifth wave landed at 1318. However, due to a terrace some 15 yards inland and the texture of the sand on the beach it was almost impossible for the movement of vehicles.

As the waves approached the beach slight small arms fire was encountered, but mortar fire was heavy, well placed and effective. This Battalion immediately went into an assembly area in Target Area 165N preparatory to move "E" Company between Landing Team One on the left and Landing Team Three on the right.

### SECTION IV - NARRATIVE OF THE OPERATION.

19 Feb., D-Day.

BLT Two of Regimental Combat Team Twenty-five, the reserve Battalion, was ordered to land in support of the attack on IWO JIMA, VOLCANO ISLANDS, within this Regimental Zone of action on Blue Beach One. The first wave landed at 1250 in rear of Landing Team Three. The landing waves landed under light machine gun and

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sniper fire but as the succeeding waves hit the beach this fire increased and by the time the entire Battalion was ashore heavy mortar fire was received. This fire was very effective and well placed.

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After moving into the assembly area, Target Area 165N, Company "E" was ordered to move into a position between "K" Company, Landing Team Three on the right, and "B" Company, Landing Team One on the left and attack at 1400 in conjunction with the First and Third Battalions seizing the enemy strong point in Target Area 183V and W. "F" Company prepared to pass through "E" Company at 1515 on objective road N-S through Target Area 183W then N to RJ 183R with "G" Company on the left. When "E" Company was passed through it was to follow "G" Company at 300 yards. Therefore, by 1745 the high ground to the left of the Quarry was seized by "F" and "G" Companies, who were then ordered to consolidate for the night. Contact was established with "L" Company on the right, but "G" Company had an exposed left flank, and "E" Company was ordered to fill this gap. By 1900 contact was made with "B" Company on the left and the front lines established - Target Area 183WVU, 165EI (see overlay attached). Casualties were medium for the day and although Captain London, Commanding Officer of "G" Company was wounded he was not evacuated. The strength as of 1600 was as follows:

- "E" Company - 6 Officers, 207 Enlisted.
- "F" Company - 5 Officers, 202 Enlisted.
- "G" Company - 5 Officers, 195 Enlisted.
- Hq. Company - 13 Officers, 143 Enlisted.
- Navy - 2 Officers, 39 Enlisted.

20 Feb., D + 1.

During the night small local action took place along the front of all Companies. However, heavy mortar and artillery fire continued to fall throughout the night.

At 0530 the attack order was received. Regimental Combat Team Twenty-five with three battalions abreast was to continue the attack and seize O-1 within its zone of action at King hour, 0830. No additional enemy information was available. Naval gunfire supported the attack by fire from King - 15 minutes to King hour in vicinity of 183Q and air supported the attack from King hour to King plus 30 minutes.

This battalion, the center battalion, initially was to stand-fast, until the First Battalion, Twenty-fifth could come abreast of "G" Company on our left flank. "E" Company was to support the attack of the First Battalion with fire, and when the First Battalion came abreast of "G" Company, Company "E" was to mop up rear areas with three tanks attached. There was a five minute mortar preparation prior to the attack. The O.P. and C.P. remained in same location of the night before.

At 0715, the Commanding Officer, the Executive Officer and the Operations Officer were hit by a mortar burst and were wounded and evacuated. Although wounded Lt. Col. Hudson continued his duties as Commanding Officer until Lt. Col. Taul arrived to take command at 0800. Lt. Col. Hudson made his recommendations to Lt. Col. Taul who then reorganized the battalion. Lt. Curran was made Operations Officer and Lt. Huston took over "G" Company as Captain London had been evacuated. Due to the shortage of officers Lt. Col. Taul functioned without the benefit of an executive officer.

During the day the First Battalion was unable to come abreast of our Battalion's left flank. However, "E" Company covered the left flank and supported the attack of the First Battalion with fire. Artillery, Naval gunfire, and air support was used to a maximum. By 1600 our lines were consolidated and had reached

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the high ground in Target Area 166C, 183WQ, (see overlay attached). The strength as of 1600 was as follows:

"E" Company - 6 Officers, 193 Enlisted.  
"F" Company - 5 Officers, 191 Enlisted.  
"G" Company - 5 Officers, 176 Enlisted.  
Hq. Company - 10 Officers, 139 Enlisted.  
Navy - 2 Officers, 34 Enlisted.

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21 Feb., D / 2.

Little enemy contact was made throughout the night.

The battalion was ordered to continue the attack with three companies on line, "F" Company on the right, "G" Company in the center, and "E" Company on the left at 0930. The O.P. moved out immediately to 183R and the C.P. displaced forward at noon to Target Area 183V. The First Battalion did not reach our left flank due to heavy machine gun and mortar fire, but our lines were established on the high ground in Target Area 183 middle of X, SW corner of S, to NE corner R, for a gain of approximately 125 yards, (see overlay attached). Contact was made with First Battalion, Twenty-fourth on the right and "K" Company, Twenty-fifth on the left. The strength as of 1600 was as follows:

"E" Company - 6 Officers, 185 Enlisted.  
"F" Company - 5 Officers, 177 Enlisted.  
"G" Company - 5 Officers, 160 Enlisted.  
Hq. Company - 10 Officers, 139 Enlisted.  
Navy - 2 Officers, 34 Enlisted.

22 Feb., D / 3.

The enemy made infiltration attempts during the night and condition Flash Red was announced at 2015.

This battalion continued the attack at King hour (0830) with "F" Company on the left, "G" Company in the center, and "E" Company on the right. Naval gunfire and artillery laid down preparatory fires from King - 20 minutes to King plus 20 minutes and air remained on call. This battalion did not advance due to the fact that our left flank would have been exposed as the elements on our left had not come abreast. However, small gains were made, one pill box was knocked out and a small counter attack, which formed at 1120 was repulsed. "G" Company and "F" Company suffered heavy casualties from enemy mortar fire laid down prior to the counter attack.

By 1700 our lines were consolidated for the night with "K" Company, Twenty-fifth on the left and "L" Company, Twenty-fourth on the right. (see overlay attached) The strengths of 1600 was as follows:

"E" Company - 6 Officers, 175 Enlisted.  
"F" Company - 5 Officers, 166 Enlisted.  
"G" Company - 5 Officers, 146 Enlisted.  
Hq. Company - 10 Officers, 138 Enlisted.  
Navy - 2 Officers, 31 Enlisted.

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23 Feb., D / 4.

At 0600 this battalion was relieved by the Third Battalion Twenty-fourth and displaced to an assembly area in Target Area 166 ATEG. However, "F" Company

was attached to the First Battalion, Twenty-fourth with the mission of mopping up the area in Target Area 166D. This mission was accomplished although many casualties resulted. At 1600 "G" Company was attached to the Second Battalion, Twenty-fourth as reserve but this company was not committed. Slight gains were made this day. The strength as of 1600 was as follows;

"E" Company - 6 Officers, 170 Enlisted.  
"F" Company - 5 Officers, 153 Enlisted.  
"G" Company - 5 Officers, 138 Enlisted.  
Hq. Company - 10 Officers, 137 Enlisted.  
Navy - 2 Officers, 31 Enlisted.

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24 Feb., D / 5.

At King hour, 0815, the Second Battalion, Twenty-fifth was in reserve for the Twenty-fourth Marines. "F" Company was in reserve for the First Battalion, Twenty-fourth in Target Area 165EA. "G" Company was in reserve for the Second Battalion, Twenty-fourth and "E" Company was in reserve for the Third Battalion, Twenty-fourth. Headquarters Company remained in the Assembly area in Target Area 166F.

At 1600 "E" Company was committed to the line in Target Area in 183Q between "I" Company, Twenty-fourth on the left, and "K" Company, Twenty-fourth on the right and consolidated for the night. Little ground was gained due to the heavy enemy resistance and the nature of the terrain. The strength as of 1600 was as follows:

"E" Company - 6 Officers, 168 Enlisted.  
"F" Company - 5 Officers, 151 Enlisted.  
"G" Company - 4 Officers, 130 Enlisted.  
Hq. Company - 10 Officers, 137 Enlisted.  
Navy - 2 Officers, 31 Enlisted.

25 Feb., D / 6.

During the night heavy infiltration was attempted through "E" Company lines, and "F" Company repulsed two patrols attempting to infiltrate their beach defense in Target Area in 166CDH.

Prior to King hour at 0800, "G" Company, Twenty-fifth went into reserve for the Third Battalion, Twenty-fourth in Target Area 183KL since the Second Battalion, Twenty-fourth was passed through by the Twenty-third Marines. "F" Company, Twenty-fifth was in reserve for the First Battalion, Twenty-fourth in same position of the night before, and "E" Company was on the line between "I" Company, Twenty-fourth on the left and "K" Company, Twenty-fourth on the right. During the day the front lines received heavy sniper, machine gun and mortar fire and little gains were made. Positions consolidated at 1700. By 2200 "F" and "G" Companies returned to the Assembly area in Target Area 166 ABFG because the Twenty-fifth was ordered to relieve the Twenty-fourth Marines prior to 0800 the following morning. The strength as of 1600 was as follows: (150 replacements received at this time)

"E" Company - 6 Officers, 189 Enlisted.  
"F" Company - 6 Officers, 181 Enlisted.  
"G" Company - 4 Officers, 177 Enlisted.  
Hq. Company - 10 Officers, 138 Enlisted.  
Navy - 2 Officers, 31 Enlisted.

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26 Feb., D / 7.

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During the night strong infiltration and enemy activity occurred in company lines in Target Area 183Q.

Regimental Combat Team Twenty-five with a battalion of the Twenty-fourth attached continued the attack at King hour (0800), with the First Battalion on the left, Second Battalion in the center, and the Third Battalion on the right. This Battalion attacked at King hour in order to seize O-1B prepared to continue the attack to O-2 (see overlay attached).

At 0600 "C" Company, Twenty-fifth relieved "E" Company, Twenty-fifth who then reverted to battalion reserve. "F" Company and "E" Company relieved the Second Battalion, Twenty-fourth and at 0845 attacked with "F" Company on the right and "G" Company on the left. The Command Post moved to Target Area 183S at 0910.

"F" Company advanced 50 yards under heavy sniper, machine gun and mortar fire and suffered heavy casualties. "G" Company on the left met heavy resistance and advanced about 75 yards. By 1500 it was necessary to pass "E" Company through "F" Company on the right. The Commanding Officer of "F" Company, Captain Joslin, was wounded and evacuated and Captain Zimmer took command of "F" Company. "F" Company went into battalion reserve and established a secondary line of defense in Target Area 183T. The front lines were consolidated at 1700 and little enemy contact reported during the night. (see overlay attached) The strength as of 1600 was as follows:

- "E" Company - 4 Officers, 157 Enlisted.
- "F" Company - 3 Officers, 151 Enlisted.
- "G" Company - 2 Officers, 150 Enlisted.
- Hq. Company - 11 Officers, 138 Enlisted.
- Navy - 2 Officers, 25 Enlisted.

27 Feb., D / 8.

This battalion continued the attack with "G" Company on the left and "E" Company on the right at 0800, under heavy sniper and mortar fire; both companies made slight gains with heavy casualties. At 1050 the Commanding Officer of "G" Company Lt. Huston was killed in action and Lt. Curran took over "G" Company. At 1200 "F" Company relieved "G" Company. Captain Birkenmeier reported and assumed duties as Operations Officer at 1400.

By 1700 our lines were consolidated (see overlay attached) although ground gained was slight, "E" Company knocked out one pill box and reached the high ground to its front in 184W. Two tanks were used by "F" Company with little success due to the terrain. The strength as of 1600 was as follows:

- "E" Company - 3 Officers, 133 Enlisted.
- "F" Company - 4 Officers, 117 Enlisted.
- "G" Company - 1 Officer, 130 Enlisted.
- Hq. Company - 10 Officers, 120 Enlisted.
- Navy - 2 Officers, 29 Enlisted.

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28 Feb., D / 9.

Little enemy activity was observed during the night.

At 0800 the Second Battalion continued the attack with "F" Company on the left and "E" Company on the right. Because of heavy resistance and nature of the terrain only about 50 yards were gained in the morning. Tanks were once again used with little success and a bull-dozer could not get up to build a road in Target Area 184Q to the First Battalion area. At 1200 the Commanding Officer requested that a 75 mm pack howitzer be sent up to his zone and to his position.

where tanks and self trucks were unable to go. Consequently at about 1500 a 75 mm howitzer was brought up to the front lines in "F" Company sector to neutralize a pill box that was holding up the advance. Although the howitzer was assembled and fired about forty rounds, the direct result to the enemy was not readily apparent. However, the morale effect on the men of this battalion was of considerable value because after the howitzer was fired our lines advanced approximately 75 yards by 1900. By 2000 our lines were consolidated and a platoon of "G" Company was used to fill a gap between "E" Company and "F" Company (see overlay attached). The strength as of 1600 was as follows:

- "E" Company - 4 Officers, 156 Enlisted.
- "F" Company - 3 Officers, 114 Enlisted.
- "G" Company - 2 Officers, 130 Enlisted.
- Hq. Company - 10 Officers, 141 Enlisted.
- Navy - 2 Officers, 29 Enlisted.

### 1 March, D / 10.

Slight enemy infiltration during the night.

The Second Battalion continued the attack at 0830 with "E" Company on the right, "F" Company on the left in order to seize O-1B. Initially "E" Company was to hold and support with fire the movement of "F" Company. The right flank of "F" Company advanced 100 yards through heavy machine gun and knee mortar fire by 1200.

At 1430 "G" Company relieved "E" Company and no additional ground was gained. By 1700 the lines were consolidated (see overlay attached) and "E" Company established a secondary line of defense. The strength as of 1600 was as follows:

- "E" Company - 4 Officers, 151 Enlisted.
- "F" Company - 3 Officers, 95 Enlisted.
- "G" Company - 2 Officers, 121 Enlisted.
- Hq. Company - 10 Officers, 123 Enlisted.
- Navy - 2 Officers, 27 Enlisted.

### 2 March, D / 11.

There was little enemy action during the night although five Japs were killed trying to infiltrate through "F" Company lines.

This battalion continued the attack at 0800 with "F" Company on the left and "G" Company on the right in order to seize O-1B. "E" Company in reserve. Through machine gun fire and accurate sniper fire the right platoon of "G" Company reached a point 50 yards short of the O-1B line by 1600. However, due to the rugged terrain and heavy enemy resistance "F" Company was able to advance only about 50 yards thus causing a bend in our lines and a gap between "F" Company and "G" Company. By 1700 2 platoons of "E" Company filled this gap and lines were consolidated for the night. (see overlay attached). The strength as of 1600 was as follows:

- "E" Company - 4 Officers, 139 Enlisted.
- "F" Company - 3 Officers, 64 Enlisted.
- "G" Company - 2 Officers, 85 Enlisted.
- Hq. Company - 14 Officers, 121 Enlisted.
- Navy - 2 Officers, 26 Enlisted.

### 3 March, D / 12.

Little enemy action took place during the night.

Prior to King hour, (0745), Regimental Combat Team Twenty-five was relieved by the Twenty-third Marines. The First Battalion, Twenty-fifth was passed through

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by the First Battalion Twenty-third and the Second and Third Battalions Twenty-fifth remained in their present positions and were attached to the Twenty-third.

This battalion with "F" Company on the left, "E" Company in the center, and "G" Company on the right initially was to maintain its present location and advance in conformance with the First Battalion, Twenty-third on the left and support its attack by fire.

During the day the frontage of this battalion was shifted due to the fact that the Twenty-third extended its boundaries to the right and "F" Company, less one platoon attached to "E" Company reverted to battalion reserve. Therefore, "F" Company went into battalion reserve. By 1700 our lines were consolidated with "E" Company plus one platoon of "F" attached on the left and "G" Company on the right. (see overlay attached). The strength as of 1600 was as follows:

"E" Company - 4 Officers, 141 Enlisted.

"F" Company - 3 Officers, 63 Enlisted.

"G" Company - 2 Officers, 77 Enlisted.

Hq. Company - 14 Officers, 121 Enlisted.

Navy - 2 Officers, 24 Enlisted.

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4 March, D / 13.

No enemy action occurred during the night.

This battalion attached to the Twenty-third with the Third Battalion Twenty-fifth on the right, First Battalion Twenty-third on the left continued the attack at 0730 with "E" Company on the left and "F" Company on the right. "F" less one platoon attached to "E" in reserve.

The First Battalion Twenty-third made small gains, but did not come abreast of our left flank. However, "E" Company on our left advanced about 50 yards and straightened our lines. "G" Company lines did not change. Our lines were consolidated at approximately the same location as the night before (see overlay attached). The strength as of 1600 was as follows:

"E" Company - 4 Officers, 138 Enlisted.

"F" Company - 3 Officers, 62 Enlisted.

"G" Company - 2 Officers, 60 Enlisted.

Hq. Company - 2 Officers, 120 Enlisted.

Navy - 2 Officers, 23 Enlisted.

5 March, D / 14.

No enemy contact reported during the night.

At 0730 the Second and Third Battalions were released from Twenty-third control. King hour was at 0930. This battalion held and defended its front with "E" Company on the left, "G" Company on the right, and supported the attack of the Twenty-fourth attacking in a SE direction across our front.

Slight gains were made by the Twenty-fourth but at 1700 our lines remained the same as of D / 13. The strength as of 1600 was as follows:

"E" Company - 4 Officers, 134 Enlisted.

"F" Company - 3 Officers, 61 Enlisted.

"G" Company - 2 Officers, 56 Enlisted.

Hq. Company - 14 Officers, 121 Enlisted.

Navy - 2 Officers, 23 Enlisted.

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6 March, D / 15.

No enemy action occurred on front lines but several enemy mortar shells fell in the vicinity of the Battalion Command Post, Target Area 1838 during the night.

At 0700 the Twenty-third and Twenty-fourth continued the attack and the battalion held its position of the day before. During the day our lines were consolidated for defense and supported with fire the advance of the Twenty-fourth. The strength as of 1600 was as follows:

"E" Company - 4 Officers, 126 Enlisted.  
"F" Company - 3 Officers, 61 Enlisted.  
"G" Company - 2 Officers, 58 Enlisted.  
Hq. Company - 14 Officers, 121 Enlisted.  
Navy - 2 Officers, 23 Enlisted.

7 March, D / 15.

No enemy activity was reported during the night.

At 0730 the Twenty-third and Twenty-fourth continued the attack and our front lines and disposition of troops remained the same as of D / 14. However, this battalion continued to support the attack with machine gun and mortar fire, and with the assistance of the engineers mopped up the rear area in rear of the battalion's front lines. The strength as of 1600 was as follows:

"E" Company - 4 Officers, 126 Enlisted.  
"F" Company - 3 Officers, 85 Enlisted.  
"G" Company - 2 Officers, 79 Enlisted.  
Hq. Company - 14 Officers, 120 Enlisted.  
Navy - 2 Officers, 24 Enlisted.

8 March, D / 17.

During the night "E" Company killed six Japs, two of whom were officers, attempting to infiltrate through our lines.

This battalion once again held and defended its same boundaries and prepared to move out and continue the attack on order.

At 1100 "G" Company sent out a patrol of 6 men about 200 yards to its front. The patrol returned at 1300 and reported that no enemy resistance was encountered. "E" Company blew up a large cave in their area and killed 8 Japs.

At 1700 our boundaries and disposition of troops remained the same as for D / 17. The strength as of 1600 was as follows:

"E" Company - 4 Officers, 126 Enlisted.  
"F" Company - 3 Officers, 84 Enlisted.  
"G" Company - 2 Officers, 78 Enlisted.  
Hq. Company - 14 Officers, 120 Enlisted.  
Navy - 2 Officers, 24 Enlisted.

9 March, D / 18.

During the night "E" Company killed 28 Japs in front of their lines.

"F" Company relieved "L" Company, Twenty-fifth at 0700 and established contact with "E" Company, Twenty-fifth on the right and Division Reconnaissance Company on the left. (see overlay attached). The Twenty-third and Twenty-fourth continued the

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attack at 0800 and this battalion held and defended the position throughout the day and consolidated at 1700.

Nine Japs were captured in a cave 100 yards to the left of the Battalion Command Post in Target Area 183X at 1700. The cave was immediately blown closed by the Engineers. The strength at 1600 was as follows:

- "E" Company - 4 Officers, 121 Enlisted.
- "F" Company - 3 Officers, 82 Enlisted.
- "G" Company - 2 Officers, 77 Enlisted.
- Hq. Company - 14 Officers, 120 Enlisted.

10 March, D / 19.

No enemy activity was reported during the night.

This battalion was ordered to continue the attack at 0800. It was planned that "E" Company and "G" Company would attack straight to the front and that the left flank of "E" Company would make contact with the right flank of "I" Company, Twenty-fifth. Simultaneously the Division Reconnaissance Company and "F" Company, Twenty-fifth were to attack in a westerly direction and so reduce the pocket thus created behind the actual front lines.

This plan started well but "I" Company, Twenty-fifth advanced so rapidly that "E" Company, failed to make contact. Consequently "G" Company was ordered to swing its left flank forward to make contact with "I" Company, Twenty-fifth. At about 1700 the lines were consolidated for the night with "G" Company, Twenty-fifth on the right, "G" Company and "I" Company Twenty-fifth on the left in Target Area 184NSX. (see overlay attached)

Meanwhile the Division Reconnaissance Company and "F" Company, Twenty-fifth had completed mopping up just to the east of the pinnacle. At 1400, "F" Company, Twenty-fifth was ordered to move into position on the right of "E" Company and in conjunction with "A" Company, "C" Company, Twenty-fifth to surround and eliminate the pocket in the vicinity of Minami Village which had been caused by the rapid advance of the Third Battalion across the front and also the swinging of "G" Company to meet the Third Battalion's right flank. Even though the front lines were as given above, "E" Company and "F" Company were disposed in Target Area 184 RS. (see overlay attached)

At 1600 Major Shoop, Commanding Officer of "E" Company, Twenty-fifth was wounded and evacuated and Lt. Bellan took over. The Division Reconnaissance Company was released to the First Battalion, Twenty-fifth at 1730. The strength as of 1600 was as follows:

- "E" Company - 3 Officers, 103 Enlisted.
- "F" Company - 3 Officers, 81 Enlisted.
- "G" Company - 2 Officers, 76 Enlisted.
- Hq. Company - 14 Officers, 120 Enlisted.
- Navy - 2 Officers, 23 Enlisted.

11 March, D / 20.

During the night 40 Japs were killed.

At 0800 "E" Company and "F" Company in conjunction with "A" and "C" Companies, Twenty-fifth continued the attack in a north easterly direction, cleaned out the pocket in Target Area in 184MNSR, and advanced 100 yards by 1100. The pocket thus

cleaned out was about 200 yards behind the front lines as they existed at that time and necessitated the employment of the bulk of this battalion and about half of the entire Regiment. "G" Company, Twenty-fifth with "I" Company, Twenty-fifth on the left attacked to the east at 0800 and reached the RJ in Target Area 184T.

By noon "E" Company in mopping up reached "K" Company, Twenty-fifth, the left Company of the Third Battalion, Twenty-fifth, who had attacked across our front to the south, or toward the sea. At 1300 "F" Company moved to Target Area 184J and was committed between "K" Company, Twenty-fifth on the right and "K" Company, Twenty-fourth on the left with their front generally facing the sea. The Command Post displaced forward at 1500 to S.W. corner of Target Area 184U. By 1700 the line held by this regiment was horse-shoe shaped and the enemy was completely surrounded. (see overlay attached). The strength as of 1600 was as follows:

- "E" Company - 2 Officers, 101 Enlisted.
- "F" Company - 3 Officers, 76 Enlisted.
- "G" Company - 2 Officers, 69 Enlisted.
- Hq. Company - 15 Officers, 120 Enlisted.
- Navy - 2 Officers, 23 Enlisted.

12 March, D / 21.

Slight infiltration took place during the night.

At 0700 "E" Company, Twenty-fifth passed through "K" Company, Twenty-fifth and "G" Company Twenty-fifth was relieved by "B" Company, Twenty-fifth. "G" Company was committed between "I" Company, Twenty-fifth on the right and "E" Company, Twenty-fifth on the left. By 0830 this battalion had three companies abreast on the high ground facing the sea in Target Area 184JINS.

At 0900 this battalion with "G" Company on the right, "E" Company in the center, and "F" Company on the left continued the attack under heavy sniper, machine gun, and knee mortar fire. Although casualties were heavy the battalion advanced about 100 yards. At 1700 the battalion had a frontage of 300 yards. Contact was made with "I" Company, Twenty-fifth on the right, but "F" Company with a platoon of "L" Company, Twenty-fifth and the second platoon "A" Company, Fourth Engineers attached could not reach the right flank of the Twenty-fourth Marines. Therefore, a gap of approximately 150 yards existed during the night. (see overlay attached) The strength as of 1600 was as follows:

- "E" Company - 2 Officers, 90 Enlisted.
- "F" Company - 3 Officers, 51 Enlisted.
- "G" Company - 2 Officers, 50 Enlisted.
- Hq. Company - 15 Officers, 120 Enlisted.
- Navy - 2 Officers, 20 Enlisted.

13 March, D / 22.

Slight enemy resistance was reported during the night.

At 0800 this battalion with three companies abreast continued the attack. The right platoon of "G" Company advanced about 100 yards and neutralized two pill boxes, but the left platoon of "G" Company and "E" Company could not advance due to heavy sniper and machine gun fire. The left platoon of "G" Company advanced about 125 yards thus creating a bend in our lines.

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At 1130 "L" Company, Twenty-fifth relieved "E" Company and Lt. Bellan was relieved as Commanding Officer of "E" Company. Captain Kendall took command of "E" Company. No gains were made in the afternoon, although by 1600 two gaps existed in the battalion's front lines. The one gap between "F" and "L" Companies was filled by one platoon of "A" Company, Twenty-fifth and one platoon of "E" Company. The second platoon "A" Company, Fourth Engineers were drawn out at this time and returned to their parent organization. It was impossible to relieve this platoon prior to darkness because of heavy enemy fire. By 2000 the battalion lines were consolidated for the night. (see overlay attached) The strength as of 1600 was as follows:

- "E" Company - 2 Officers, 78 Enlisted.
- "F" Company - 3 Officers, 49 Enlisted.
- "G" Company - 2 Officers, 51 Enlisted.
- Hq. Company - 15 Officers, 120 Enlisted.
- Navy - 2 Officers, 20 Enlisted.

14 March, D / 23.

"F" Company killed six Japs in front of their lines. No other enemy action was reported.

At 0630 "K" Company, Twenty-fifth relieved "G" Company, Twenty-fifth who went into reserve in Target Area 184K. The two platoons of "E" Company who were used to fill the gap the night before reverted to "E" Company control. At 0730 "E" Company went into the line between "F" Company on the left and "K" on the right.

At 0900 "K" Company, Twenty-fifth on the right, "E" Company, Twenty-fifth in the center, and "F" Company, Twenty-fifth on the left continued the attack. "K" Company and the right flank of "E" Company advanced about 125 yards, but the left flank of "E" Company and "F" Company only advanced about 30 yards and were pinned down by heavy sniper and machine gun fire. Therefore, by 1300 a gap existed between "F" Company and "E" Company and a platoon of "G" Company, Twenty-fifth was used to fill the gap.

"G" and "F" Companies of the Twenty-fourth were ordered to relieve "F" Company and "G" Company at 1500. Due to heavy enemy fire this relief was not completed until 2300. "F" Company, Twenty-fifth less one platoon detached, and "G" Company, Twenty-fifth, less one platoon detached then went into reserve in the battalion assembly area in Target Area 184H. "E" Company with one platoon of "G" Company, Twenty-fifth and one platoon of "F" Company, Twenty-fifth attached remained on the line (see overlay attached). The strength as of 1600 was as follows:

- "E" Company - 1 Officer, 75 Enlisted.
- "F" Company - 2 Officers, 47 Enlisted.
- "G" Company - 2 Officers, 47 Enlisted.
- Hq. Company - 15 Officers, 120 Enlisted.
- Navy - 2 Officers, 20 Enlisted.

15 March, D / 24.

No enemy activity reported during the night.

"E" Company with a platoon of "G" Company, Twenty-fifth and a platoon of "F" Company, Twenty-fifth attached attacked at 0830 but did not advance although the right flank of "E" Company could have moved. Therefore, no gain was made in the morning as the Twenty-fourth on the left did not move.

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At 1400 "A" Company, Twenty-fifth in conjunction with "E" Company, Twenty-fourth attempted a double envelopment of the area of greatest resistance in Target Area 184T, 185P. This plan was not executed as planned, but the pocket of greatest resistance was by-passed by "A" Company, Twenty-fifth and this made the enemy's position untenable. The right platoon of "E" Company had moved out and reached the beach road by 1600, and tied in with "A" Company, Twenty-fifth who had also reached the beach road. At 1700 "E" Company lines faced generally to the N.E. in Target Area 185PK. (see overlay attached). The strength as of 1600 was as follows:

- "E" Company - 1 Officer, 74 Enlisted.
- "F" Company - 2 Officers, 46 Enlisted.
- "G" Company - 2 Officers, 40 Enlisted.
- Hq. Company - 15 Officers, 119 Enlisted.
- Navy - 2 Officers, 20 Enlisted.

16 March, D / 25.

"E" Company killed 15 Japs in front of their lines during the night.

At 0800 "E" Company, Twenty-fifth with "A" Company, Twenty-fifth on the left continued the attack and reached the beach road in Target Area 185P by 1030 thus securing the zone of action assigned this battalion.

Commencing at 1300 the three rifle companies abreast mopped up the rear areas assigned this battalion. By 1630 this mission had been accomplished and a perimeter defense was established in Target Area 183ST around the battalion Command Post for the night. At 2000 the battalion received orders to move to Blue Beach Two at 0800 the next morning to board ship. The strength of the battalion at completion of the operation was as follows:

- "E" Company - 1 Officer, 89 Enlisted.
- "F" Company - 2 Officers, 77 Enlisted.
- "G" Company - 2 Officers, 83 Enlisted.
- Hq. Company - 15 Officers, 117 Enlisted.
- Navy - 2 Officers, 20 Enlisted.

17 March, D / 26.

At 0800 the battalion left the assembly area and moved to Blue Beach Two to board an L.S.T. for further transfer to an A.P.A. However, the battalion did not commence embarkation until 1500, and by 1630 all troops and equipment were embarked. The L.S.T. took the battalion to the U.S.S. LANDER, APA 178 and all troops were aboard the APA by 1900. By 2400 all equipment was transferred to the U.S.S. Lander.

#### SECTION V - COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

##### A. COMMENTS.

1. The way in which replacement personnel were handled before the last operation was very unsatisfactory as far as the final result was concerned. First, the replacements were never properly trained with units they later replaced. Second, replacements were sent forward to the battle area as a unit but as a group of a certain number of men.

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Replacement units should be assigned in the rehabilitation area trained along with and during the training of the regular established assault units. Later on during combat if replacements are necessary for a particular unit then the replacement personnel who trained with that unit should be used to rebuild it.

B. It is recommended that : -

1. A rocket for use in aircraft be developed; such a rocket to be heavier than the 4.5 inch now generally in use. Aircraft rockets are very potent weapons and on certain targets are preferable to bombs. For use on emplacements we can expect to encounter in the future a heavier rocket is needed.

2. The 155 mm mortar be issued to Fleet Marine Force units as soon as possible. In the operations on Iwo Jima it was found that mortars were very effective. A heavier mortar than the present 81 mm mortar is needed. This recommendation is not to be construed as criticism of the 81mm.

3. Spare 81 mm mortars be carried in the Regimental dump. In the event that the situation permits--in an operation such as Iwo--these mortars could be manned by battalion landing team personnel now available. In the event that it is impractical for the Regiment to carry spare mortars it is recommended that the allowance of 81 mm mortars for each landing team be increased to six (6) guns for an operation similar to Iwo Jima. It is recognized that the ammunition problem for higher echelon would be increased considerably but it is felt that in the future fire power from weapons such as these should be substituted, insofar as is possible, for the flesh and blood of the infantryman.

4. A gun be developed with sufficiently high muzzle velocity to breach pill-boxes and blockhouses similar to those encountered. Neither the 75mm gun mounted on the M-4 tank nor the 75mm gun mounted on the half-track had sufficient penetrative power to breach many of the fortifications encountered on Iwo.

5. A floating dump of two (2) LST's with mixed cargo be established for each assault regimental combat team. It would have to be imperative that these ships remain close to beach regardless of presence of enemy planes or ships in the vicinity. Such a plan should relieve the assault battalion landing team Commander's mind on the subject of supply for the critical first two days and nights. It is realized that such a commander is responsible for the supply of his unit for that period but I believe that supplies should be put ashore in sufficient quantity to make it unnecessary for him to have to commendeer transportation and then chase down the closest ship before obtaining the desired supplies.

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# BATTALION LANDING TEAM 2-25 OPERATION REPORT

## ADMINISTRATION

### SECTION I - PLANNING AND PREPARATION.

#### (a) Organization.

##### Forward Echelon:

Adjutant - First Lieutenant.  
Sergeant Major.  
1 Chief Clerk - Corporal  
2 Clerks, 1 Corporal, 1 Pfc.

##### Rear Echelon:

Personnel Officer - First Lieutenant.  
Chief Clerk - Sergeant.  
Pay Section - 1 Sergeant, 1 Corporal.  
Master Roll - 1 Corporal.  
Change Sheets - 1 Sergeant.

1. Chief clerk of rear echelon prepared all routine correspondence.
2. Forward echelon made arrangements to prepare SMR's, for payment of enlisted personnel in the echelon, dispatched the delivery of mail. Made arrangements for holding of religious services aboard ship.
3. Prepared and kept up to date embarkation, debarkation rosters and casualty cards of Second Battalion. Kept up to date embarkation and debarkation rosters of units attached to Battalion Landing Team.
4. Prepared personnel cards with information as follows:  
Name, rank, serial number, date of birth, date of enlistment, awards, previously recommended and/or received, record of previous convictions, amount of money personnel permitted to draw monthly, military speciality number, and next of kin.

#### (b) Training of Personnel:

1. Rear Echelon received by mail copies of paid SMR's, change sheets, court memorandums, and other pertinent information. This personnel trained to keep records of battalion current with information sent.
2. Forward Echelon trained to correct and keep up to date embarkation and debarkation rosters, casualty cards, SMR's, change sheets, procedures of courts, and routine correspondence. To record unit journals, war diary, and current field records, telephone and radio orders.

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3. Sergeant Major is kept informed of the situation and routes messages within the command post.

4. Instructions given to all company officers and first sergeants pertaining to the proper procedure of making daily reports and reports of casualties. Casualty cards maintained and prepared in the Battalion Command Post for delivery to higher echelon.

5. One NCO remained aboard ship at time for final debarkation to report all personnel evacuated to the vessel, regardless of organization and instructed as to what information to obtain and forward to Division and Regimental Command Posts.

#### SECTION II - MOVEMENT TO OBJECTIVE.

1. While enroute to the objective from 28 December, 1944 to 18 February, 1945, the following administrative work was performed.

2. Daily change sheets, including current changes were made up to and including 18 February, 1945. Original change sheets were submitted to higher echelon at each port of call, and duplicate copies forwarded to rear echelon; extra copy was kept in battalion files in case duplicate did not reach the rear echelon.

3. Two battalion SMR's were prepared and troops paid on 5 January, 1945 and 21 January, 1945.

4. Two Summary Courts Martial and eleven Deck Courts awarded by Battalion Commander were typed, approved, published, and forwarded to higher echelon. Service record book copies of Summary Court and Deck Court Memorandums were forwarded to rear Echelon via official mail.

5. Routine guard orders and memorandums pertaining to ship's guard, sea and sky lockouts, fire watches, liberty, laundry, conserving of fresh water, keeping decks and compartments clean and religious services, were typed and routed to units of the battalion and various attached units.

6. While in port and liberty prevailed, schedules for fifty percent liberty for troops were made and carried into effect. Special liberty passes were made in compliance with existing regulations.

7. Embarkation rosters, casualty cards and personnel cards of this battalion and attached units were continuously checked and kept up to date. Few changes were made due to sick personnel being transferred to hospitals at various ports.

#### SECTION III - SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT.

1. The Battalion Adjutant, Sergeant Major, and two clerks were embarked aboard the same LCVP at 0700, 19 February, 1945. No radio contact with Battalion Commander was possible because the command post radio was in another LCVP with the Battalion Executive Officer. Visual messages were sent prior to going to line of departure. The Battalion One Section landed on the beach in the fourth wave at 1309, 19 February, 1945.

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## SECTION IV - NARRATIVE OF OPERATION.

1. From D plus one to 17 March, 1945, upon re-embarkation of the battalion aboard ship, a cumulative casualty report was submitted to Combat Team 25 prior to 1430 daily, by telephone, and dispatched in writing by message center by 1600. This report was broken down to show to date, the total officers and enlisted, KIA, W&E, SK&E, W&NE, MIA, plus total casualties. This report also included the effective strength of all companies of this battalion, plus attached units.

2. Companies submitted to the battalion command post daily, by 1200, a detail report of all casualties by name and number, including effective strength of company.

3. Casualties submitted by companies were entered on the daily change sheets; for the change sheets casualty cards were properly filled out with all available information, signed and submitted to Combat Team 25, via message center, at or about 1600 daily.

4. Companies submitted a strength report by number to the battalion command post each day between 1700 and 1800; this information for the battalion commander.

5. On 26 February, 1945, the battalion joined one (1) officer and 150 enlisted replacements. The replacements were about equally distributed to all rifle companies, bringing rifle companies to a strength of 140 men each. The replacement officer was assigned to Company "F", bringing each rifle company to four (4) officers.

6. On 28 February, 1945, the battalion joined 65 enlisted replacements and two officers. The replacements were assigned as follows: Co "E", 30 men; Co "F", 20 men; Co "G", 15 men, bringing companies up to 150 men each. The two officers were assigned to Co "E" and Co "G", bringing rifle companies to four (4) officers each.

7. On 2 March, 1945, the battalion joined four officers. The officers were assigned to HqCo, with duties as Bn-1, Asst Bn-3; Liaison Officer and Burial Officer.

8. On 3 March, 1945, the battalion joined forty replacements. The replacements were assigned as follows: Co "F", 20 men and Co "G", 20 men, bringing their strength to 125 enlisted men each. Co "E" remained with a strength of 135 enlisted men.

9. Upon re-embarking on 17 March, 1945, the effective battalion strength from a sight muster was as follows:

	USMC		NAVY	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
Hq Co.	13	117	2	20
Co "E"	22	89		
Co "F"	3	77		
Co "G"	2	83		
-----				
Total	20	366	2	20

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casualties suffered by this battalion, with burial reports, evacuation reports and other reports received to date is as follows.

	KIA	W&E	W&NE	SK&E	MIA	TOTAL
Off., USMC	7	14	2	0	0	23
Enl., USMC	205	422	56	95	1	779
Enl., USN	5	13	0	5	0	23
-----						
Total	217	449	58	100	1	825

(b) The above casualty report is subject to changes as information yet to arrive will change the status of men.

#### SECTION V - COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. It is recommended that when replacements are sent to the battalion command post for further assignment to companies that they be accompanied by an officer or responsible NCO, and that a roster with name, rank, serial number and qualifications, (rifleman, mortarman, etc.), or casualty cards on each man be sent with each group of replacements. Considerable disadvantages had to be overcome with the first group of replacements received at dusk on 25 February, 1945. Rosters containing all necessary information had to be made at night, so that needed replacements could be sent to companies early next day. This unnecessary delay prevented companies from getting their necessary information prior to their companies jumping off. Eleven (11) replacements were unaccounted for on the morning of 26 February, 1945, and it was only through careful and constant checking for three days with various units in the vicinity, that these replacements or their status was located by this battalion.

2. Replacements received on 27 February and 7 March, 1945, even though in much smaller groups, could and were handled easier and dispatched to various companies within a short time. This was possible because replacements arrived in the early afternoon and had sets of casualty cards, complete with necessary information, on the person of the NCO in charge.

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AKER TO

BATTALION LANDING TEAM 2-25 OPERATION REPORT

INTELLIGENCE

1. Maps, Photographs, and Supplementary Intelligence.

(A) The following maps, charts, and photographs were received prior to the landing on 19 February, 1945:

- 75 copies Situation Map, colored, 1:10,000
- 985 copies Landing Information Sheets
- 30 copies Photo Map, 1:10,000
- 25 copies Air and Gunnery Target Map, 1:20,000
- 30 copies Assault Map 1:5,000
- 10 copies Special Air and Gunnery Target Map, 1:5,000
- 6 sets Propaganda Sheets (six in series)
- 7 copies Information Bulletin, CinCPAC-CinCPOA
- 20 copies G-2 Special Study
- 1 copy Relief Map (FMF), 1:7,000
- 3 copies Water and Beach Profiles
- 1 copy East and West Beaches (each)
- 14 sets Aerial photos from sorties, June to November
- 6 copies Special Air and Gunnery Target Map, 1:10,000
- 20 copies "G-2 Special Study"
- 20 copies Enemy Installations Map
- 2 sets Fifty-Seven low obliques, photographed 10 February
- 3 sets Eight verticals, photographed 15 January

(b) It was not until 25 January that aerial photographs of sufficient quality were received to prove of any value to battalions. These were enlarged obliques of the beach area. Vertical photographs received prior to "D minus 5" were either of poor quality or taken from too high an elevation to prove of value to ground troops in briefing. Those received on 14 February were of excellent quality with an RF of 1:5,000. The low obliques received the same day were also excellent in briefing troops.

The photo maps reproduced by lithograph were valueless.

The enemy information provided in the "G-2 Special Study" was excellent.

The relief map made by FMF was of sturdy construction and withstood the unavoidable rough treatment in transporting it. It was excellent for use in briefing troops.

Only one map was received during the operation: "Enemy Installations Map, captured and translated by the 3rd Marine Division."

Aerial photographs made available during the operation were either taken several weeks prior to the landing and, therefore, of no tactical value or were poor in quality and of too high an altitude to prove of any value because of the extremely rough terrain in our sector.

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(c) Hydrographic information received prior to the landing was excellent and sufficient.

(d) The bulk of information received by the battalion during the operation consisted of Division Intelligence Periodic Reports. The main value of these reports was to aid in giving a complete picture of the progress of the operation. Some reports of other units contained in the periodic Reports were of immediate value.

## 2. Intelligence Functioning.

(a) The battalion information collecting system, consisting of a scout team of two men with each rifle company, was disrupted on "D Day" because of casualties and the remaining team attempted to cover the battalion front and the observation post twice daily. Because of the large number of caves that had to be searched, the scouts were further handicapped. Company Commanders were very cooperative in reporting and confirming information received.

(b) Dissemination of information was covered by telephone to Regiment as events occurred. Two daily reports were made by phone at 0645, covering the night's activity, and at 1530, covering the twenty-four hour period.

(c) Telephone communication was the only organic equipment and proved satisfactory.

(d) Liaison with adjacent units was maintained by telephone and with cooperation of Regiment all information was exchanged.

(e) The one sergeant interpreter attached from Regiment was used mainly for evaluating documents. His training appeared sufficient and when available his help was invaluable. Nevertheless, at times he could not be located, and some material which should have been dispatched to Regiment immediately was unnecessarily delayed while time was spent in locating him.

The sergeant photographer attached from Division Intelligence, however, cooperated wholeheartedly with the section and, in addition to his duties, aided in searching caves, scouting, bringing documents to the rear, and participated in the capture of the only prisoner this battalion made.

## 3. Prisoners.

(a) Only one prisoner was captured by this battalion and he was taken to Regiment immediately following a brief questioning by the attached interpreter.

## 4. Captured Documents and Materiel.

(a) A large quantity of documents was taken by this battalion due in many instances to the excellent cooperation of the front-line troops.

At times the section was greatly handicapped in carrying documents to Regiment because of the large quantity and delay was encountered when some captured material had to await the regular

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Small Arms, with the exception of two knee mortars, were destroyed by the enemy or front-line troops. A large number of broken and stripped rifles were reported during the operation. Heavier weapons found were reported to Regiment.

5. Propaganda.

(a) Written propaganda omits effects were not encountered by this battalion. Vocal propaganda used in our sector was under the supervision of Division. As far as is known no results were obtained.

6. Counter-Intelligence.

(a) Although there were no reports of any cases in this battalion, it would have been possible for the enemy to compromise the password. The repetition due to the length of the operation provided many opportunities.

7. Public Relations.

(a) One combat correspondent attached to Regiment was available during the operation and covered newsworthy events reported to him.

8. The Enemy.

(a) The enemy organization followed the familiar pattern previously encountered. When separated from their units there were only few cases in which the enemy did not attempt to resist. Those killed in rear of our lines during the night appeared well supplied and were attempting to rejoin their units.

(b) Special enemy tactics observed:

To withdraw to caves and when our troops had advanced beyond to fire on them from the rear in an attempt to cause disorganization.

To withdraw in an orderly manner during darkness to new positions just in rear of the old ones.

Absence of any fanatical "banzai" charges.

Strict adherence to well conceived defense plan, even to virtually the last man.

Extraordinary use of snipers from well selected positions.

Withheld mortar fire until a good target presented itself.

The use of ultra-heavy mortars at close range.

The use of rockets which were fired until the positions were overrun.

(c) Enemy equipment was new and of sufficient quantity. A large amount was carried to the rear as the enemy withdrew. Supplies were well dispersed.

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9. Recommendations.

(a) That some form of transportation be available to rush important documents to Regiment.

(b) That when heavy vegetation is to be encountered every possible effort be made to place landmarks on situation maps when they are prepared.

(c) That the same password and countersign not be used for more than one period during an operation.

10. General Comments.

(a) Difficulty was encountered in attempting to accurately locate the front lines on the situation map at times because of the inaccuracy of the contour lines. Heavy vegetation prevented accurate interpretation from aerial photographs. Attention should be given to this problem before the next operational maps are made.

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ANNEX CHARLIE TO

BATTALION LANDING TEAM 2-25 OPERATION REPORT


OPERATIONS

1. Battalion Landing Team Two, Regimental Combat Team Twenty-five, was scheduled to be boated in 38 LCVP's and 3 LCM's and to arrive at the LD at H plus 1 hour, whereupon it was to land, on order of Regimental Combat Team Twenty-five Commander, with two companies abreast, ("F" on the left, "E" on the right, "G" in the rear) on Blue Beach One or as directed. Forward companies were to clear the beach by 250 yards, rear company to clear beach by 150 yards, detailing men to assist in landing vehicles and supplies of Battalion Landing Team Two, Regimental Combat Team Twenty-five. All units to assume approach march formation and dig in awaiting orders. Plan of Naval gun fire and aviation does not apply to Battalion Landing Team in reserve status. No artillery plan available until mission assigned. No tanks, rockets, war dogs attached initially.

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2ND BN, 25TH MARINES  
4TH MAR DIV

IN THE FIELD, FEB. 19/45

PROGRESS OF THE ATTACK OVERLAY

APPENDIX 1 TO SECTION 4

MAP: SPECIAL AIR & GUNNERY TARGET, TWO J

SCALE: 1:20,000

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ANNEX DOG TO

BATTALION LANDING TEAM 2-25 OPERATION REPORT

SUPPLY

1. The following are comments and recommendations of the supplies and the supply situation as encountered by this battalion during the operation on Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands.

(a) Supply:

1. The adequacy of all types of mounting out supplies was quite satisfactory except for the shell, illuminating, 60mm mortar, M83A1. The Second Battalion was shorted 162 rounds in the loading of its ship.

2. Adequacy of Resupply.

Class I - On numerous occasions, this Battalion received "C" rations dated September and October, 1942. These rations had stale biscuits and the meat had dried out considerably. Recommend closer supervision so that older type rations would not be brought on operations.

Class II - This Battalion only received one complete change of clothing in the operation, which was insufficient for the length of time clothing had to be worn. It would be desirable for front line troops to have one clean change of clothing per week. This change should include two pairs of socks instead of one.

3. Shore Party.

During the first three days, particularly D-day, there was practically no organized unloading of supplies on Blue Beaches #1 and #2. Consequently, supplies were of necessity obtained from whatever source possible. The shore party had only one bulldozer operating on Blue Beaches D-day, and there was no beach matting laid, which made the moving of rubber-tired vehicles impossible. On D-nite, it was very nearly impossible to get men to unload any of the LCV's coming into the beach. All incoming LVT's were immediately dispatched to the front line companies. By use of flashlight, these LVT's were directed into the beach throughout the night.

The Twenty-fifth Regimental supply section during this entire operation established no ammunition, water, or ration dump. This, in many respects, hindered the Battalion supply functions in that time was lost and efforts wasted while endeavoring to procure these supplies from many of the beach dumps.

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Upon submitting a supply request to the Regiment, it would, in turn, request from Division, since Regiment had no dumps to draw from. This was not a favorable situation.

#### 4. Salvage and salvage collection.

This Battalion turned into Regiment and Division salvage all unserviceable weapons, clothing, and 782 equipment. Over 300 weapons of all types were submitted and also a great deal of clothing. Quartermaster personnel made it a practice to comb all company areas after the companies had moved forward so that all equipment was salvaged.

#### 5. Transportation.

The cargo carrier M29C (Weasel) used by this Battalion proved to be very valuable during the entire operation. This vehicle could be heavily loaded and could attach a fully loaded one-ton trailer without difficulty. It was able to haul the entire load up steep and sandy roads. It is recommended that the Battalion have at least two or more of these type vehicles during any operation.

The LVT's were also helpful in bringing supplies from the beach to Battalion dump during the first few days, but these vehicles could not be brought directly to the front lines because of the huge target they presented and also because of their slow speed.

The 1-ton truck proved useful in moving large quantities of supplies swiftly. This vehicle should be retained by the Battalion in camp. Two 1-ton trucks would greatly help solve the Battalion transportation problem in a combat operation.

#### (b) Ordnance:

No. Days Used -	No. Used -	No. Lost *	Type Weapon
X	18	15	Gun, Mach. Cal. 30 Bng. M1917A1
X	18	18	Gun, Mach. Cal. 30 Bng. M1919A1
X	13	4	Mortar, 60mm, M2
X	5	1	Mortar, 81mm, M1
X	589	365	Carbine, Cal. .30, M1
X	560	446	Rifle, Cal. .30, M1
X	81	74	Rifle, Auto., Brng. M1918A2
X	30	22	Pistol, Auto., Cal. .45, M1911
X	9	8	Launcher, Rocket, AT2.36 M1A1
X	52	30	Launcher, Grenade, M8
X	57	42	Launcher, Grenade, M7
X	27	15	Flame Thrower, M1

\* The number of weapons turned into Division and Regimental salvage has not been deducted from these figures.

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1. By having two companies at the Second Battalion, Twenty-fifth Marines dump, it was possible to keep all the companies supplied at all times with serviceable weapons. A stock of serviceable weapons were kept on hand for any emergency by salvaging casualty equipment. Extra flame throwers completely refueled and ready for use were kept in the dump and were readily available upon company call over radio or phone.

2. The Battalion Table of Allowance allotment of four 81mm mortars is at many times inadequate to fire a necessary mission. A desirable increase in this allotment from four to six would accomplish this purpose.

(c) Combat Vehicles:

No. Days Employed In Battle	No. Lost or Damaged	No. Used	Type Equipment
25	2	7	Jeeps $\frac{1}{4}$ ton.
25	5	9	Jeep trailers $\frac{1}{4}$ ton.
25	0	1	Truck, 1 ton.
20	0	1	Trailers, 1 ton.
0	2	2	TCS Jeeps.
23	0	1	Jeep, ambulance.
19	0	1	Carrier, Cargo, M29C

1. Spare parts and maintenance after the first five days was excellent. Company "A", Motor Transport was set up and all types of repairs were performed to keep the vehicles in running order. All the vehicles will have to be completely overhauled, however, because of the amount of work they did on the soft sandy roads.

(d) Ammunition:

1. Below is a complete list of ammunition expended by this Battalion:

10,575 rds cart., ball, cal. .45.  
70,350 rds cart., carbine cal. .30.  
292,000 rds cart., cal. .30 M2 Belted (4-1)  
172,226 rds cart., cal. .30 ball, 8 rd clip.  
149,000 rds cart., cal. .30 ball, 5 rd clip.  
4,500 rds cart., cal. .30 tracer 5 rd clip.  
6,900 rds cart., carbine, cal. .30 M6.  
38,300 rds shell, HE M49A2 - 60mm.  
5,460 rds shell, illum., M83A1 - 60mm.  
11,464 rds shell, HE M56 - 81mm.  
5,732 rds shell, HE M43A1 - 81mm.

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- 561 rds shell, smoke M57 WP - 81mm.
- 500 rds shell, #00 Buckshot, 12 gauge.
- 360 rds rockets, AT, 2.36", M6.
- 156 rds rockets, AT, 2.36", WP.
- 370 Grenades, rifle, AT, M9A1.
- 3,050 Grenades, hand, frag. MkII.
- 125 Grenades, hand, incen., frag.
- 400 Grenades, hand, smoke, HC.
- 1,025 Grenades, hand, smoke, WP, M15.
- 2,500 Grenades, hand, illum., Mk-I.
- 120 Grenades, rifle, green star.
- 80 Grenades, rifle, assorted.
- 400 rds shell, smoke HCT8 - 60mm.
- 125 Grenades, colored T8E1.
- 120 rds signal, ground assorted.
- 320 rds shell, smoke WP - 60mm.
- 208 Flares, trip, parachute M48.
- 1,800 Flares, trip, M49 (Used as illum. hand grenades).
- 250 Grenades, adapters T2.
- 220 Grenades, adapters M1.
- 268 Explosive, C2 Composition (cases)
- 300 Lbs. TNT.
- 80 Torpedo, Bangalore M1.
- 22 Explosive, shaped charge T3.
- 28 Explosive, chain charge (cases)
- 3,100 ft. Primacord
- 2,500 ft. Fuse, time.
- 400 Caps, blasting, special non-electric.
- 100 Fuses, 15-second delay.
- 180 Mines, anti-personnel, M2, complete w/fuse.

2. Difficulty was encountered in the initial disposition of all types of ammunition prior to debarkation. It is suggested that the loading of ammunition be more closely supervised so as to insure the proper segregation into the holds. Ultimately then, this ammunition could be distributed more quickly and more efficiently.

3. By the use of a bulldozer the ammunition in this Battalion dump was completely revetted.

4. It is recommended that the 60mm mortar ammunition shell HE M49A2 packed in tin cans, 8 rds per can be water-proofed. This could be accomplished by putting a rubber ring about  $\frac{1}{2}$  inch in diameter between the can and lid or by using a cardboard container around each round and placing 8 rds in can without the wooden frame inside.

Fragmentation grenades could be packed in such a manner that 5 grenades (5 packages in a case) be packed in a portable carrier, thereby allowing a rifleman a method of carrying an ample supply.

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5. Change in Unit of Fire - 81mm M43A1 should be the only type ammunition used. There is very little use for 81mm M56. The only reason it is used so extensively is that no other 81mm ammunition was available. There was a great difficulty in providing 60mm illuminating ammunition in the later stages of the operation.

(e) Enemy Material:

1. Weapons.
  - 2 Heavy MG turned into JICPOA, (cal. .60).
  - 8 Rifles, cal. .25.
2. Ammunition.

Over 160 rds of 150mm mortar turned over to JICPOA and to bomb disposal located at boat basin.

  - 27 cases small arms ammunition.
  - 9 cases magnetic (sticky) mines.
  - 14 cases frag. grenades (serrated).
  - 2 cases frag. grenades (smooth).
  - 8 cases knee mortar shells.

APPENDIX I, ANNEX DOG TO

BATTALION LANDING TEAM 2-25 OPERATION REPORT

MEDICAL

1. Embarkation:
  - (a) Personnel - 51 Corpsmen and 2 Doctors.
2. Aboard Ship:
  - (a) Sickness - routine number of minor disabilities. No epidemics. One emergency appendectomy performed.
  - (b) Sanitary conditions:
    - (1) Heads - Satisfactory.
    - (2) Living Quarters - Satisfactory.
    - (3) Messes - Satisfactory.
    - (4) Galleys - Satisfactory.
    - (5) Cooks & Messmen - Satisfactory.
  - (b) Special precautions - none necessary other than routine. All troops provided with impregnated clothing. Impregnation consisted of Dimethylthallate solution and DDT combined in a basic soap solution.
3. Debarkation:
  - (a) Personnel.

Sixteen corpsmen attached to rifle company platoons landed in first three Battalion waves with the platoons to which they were assigned. Twenty-four corpsmen were divided into two groups and with a Doctor in

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corpsmen landed in separate boats of the fourth Battalion with the corpsmen, consisting of an attached collecting section landed in the fifth Battalion wave. Landing was made from 1230 to 1300 on 19 February, 1945.

(b) Material of Medical nature landed consisted of:

(1) Company aid mens' personal first aid kits.

(2) Ten sea-bags of Medical supplies carried by corpsmen.

(3) Ten stretchers carried by corpsmen.

(4) Several cases of back-up-Medical supplies boated with quartermaster gear and brought into beach in seventh wave at 1700 on 19 February, 1945.

(5) One ambulance jeep pre-loaded with Medical supplies landed in 5th wave, bogged down on beach in water and Medical gear on it was either stolen or lost in heavy surf. Another ambulance jeep due to land when boats were made available was never seen again by this Battalion Medical unit. No personnel were lost in the landing phase of the operation.

#### 4. Ashore-Assault phase:

(a) Medical installations.

(1) Aid station personnel advanced inland to temporary Battalion Command Post treating casualties, and evacuating same to beach, as they progressed. Formal Aid Station not organized until 1600 on 19 February, 1945, being constantly on the move. At this time, Battalion Aid Station was finally set up in target square 166 Fox in direct approximation to an unimproved beach road. Dispersion was practiced as much as possible. Cover was impossible to obtain. Other Medical installations were in vicinity due to small beach head. Front lines were about 200 yards in front of the Battalion Aid Station and casualties naturally drifted into the general vicinity of the station. Local security at night was provided by Battalion Command Post and Aid Station itself during this phase of the operation. On D plus 2 at 1000 Battalion Command Post and Aid Station moved forward to target square 183 Victor at the base of the first ridge off the beach. An advanced, casualty collecting station was established between Aid Station and front-lines to expedite evacuation of wounded personnel. Aid Station located in dugout and protected area adjacent to a main road and in direct line with natural drift of walking wounded. Trails led from front lines to central point on top of ridge directly above the Aid Station. No lights used at night. Blackout tent made by Battalion Aid Station was

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with medical gear on beach. Local security at night provided by Medical Unit itself. Battalion Aid Station remained in this location throughout the remainder of the campaign. The front lines were never further than 2500 yards forward of the station and the road network peculiar to this area made this location of the Aid Station a strategic, and therefore a desirable, one.

(b) Hospitalization was not a function of this Battalion Aid Station.

(c) Evacuation was effected slowly in the early stages of the assault phase by means of hand stretcher-carry and via LVT's when available. On D plus 2 an ambulance was made available to the Aid Station by a rear area installation and evacuation was even more expedited when our own ambulance jeep was repaired and put into operation. Evacuation was inadequate on D-day and D plus 1, but became adequate on D plus 2, and was excellent throughout the remainder of the campaign.

(d) Approximately 800 casualties were treated by the Battalion Aid Station. Injuries of the Head, Neck, Chest and Abdomen were in the majority while wounds of the extremities were not as frequent as would normally be expected.

(e) Sanitation was supervised as well as possible in the usual manner. Slit trenches were dug around Command Posts and other semi-permanent installations. No hot food was served except individual canned rations. Water was all obtained from our own distillation units. Uneaten food and refuse was buried.

(f) Disposal of Dead.

(1) Companies gave approximate location of the bodies to the Battalion Command Post. The Battalion Burial Officer with a detail from Headquarters Company proceeded to each Company area and removed the bodies to the nearest crossroads or directly to the Battalion Command Post. The Division Burial Officer was notified of the location of our dead and they in turn picked the bodies up in a 6x6 truck. At times it took as many as three phone calls and a few days waiting to have the bodies removed from the area. The Battalion Burial Officer assisted the Division Burial Officer in identifying the dead.

(2) Enemy dead were buried at the location the body was found.

(3) Ponchos and other types of covering were used to cover our dead. No sanitary precautions were taken because material for such were not available to the Battalion.

(g) No epidemics or unusual diseases were noted in the troops of this Battalion. A few days prior to leaving

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the island a few mild cases of Dysentery developed, but these were easily controlled.

(h) Dental Service - No comment - Not Applicable.

(i) Care of Civilians - No civilians seen by this Medical unit.

(j) Prisoners of War - No prisoners cared for by this Medical unit.

(k) Medical Organization.

(1) The present Medical organization as it exists in the Infantry Battalion is well suited to small-island assault operations.

(2) Suggested changes - employment of two Battalion Surgeons is a waste of highly-trained Medical Officers. One Medical Officer per Battalion is more than adequate.

(1) Medical Personnel.

Inadequate as to number of stretcher bearers but adequate otherwise. Suggested change and employment of personnel as follows:

(1) An advanced, close-to-the-front-line, collecting section consisting of eleven corpsmen and thirty Marines specifically assigned and trained for stretcher-bearing from the front-lines to an ambulance on the nearest road, should be made available and organized prior to embarkation for combat.

(2) One high-rated, capable, corpsman should be in charge of the group and in communication with front-line Companies, Battalion Command Post, and Sick-Bay.

(3) One corpsman and three Marines should man each of ten stretcher teams. Emphasis should be placed on quick-efficient, evacuation of casualties to the Battalion Aid Station rather than hasty, inadequate, unwise, immediate, front-line treatment. The purpose of this organization is NOT to allow the Battalion Aid Station to lag behind the assaulting companies, but is to cut the period of time required to evacuate a casualty from the front-lines to the Aid Station where PROPER Medical care can be given under fairly adequate conditions. There is nothing so important to a serious casualty as a short time-elapse between being wounded and receiving correct, and life saving first aid. This collecting-section should remain intact as a unit following very close behind the front-lines in both slow-moving and fast-moving combat operational procedures.

(4) Radio communication via SHORT specific messages should be used between collecting-section and the fast moving, front-line companies while telephonic communications could be used during slowly advancing combat. Two more radios should be allotted each Battalion, one for the above noted collecting-section and one for the Battalion Aid Station.



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(5) Losses amounting to 51% were incurred in this Battalion Medical Unit. Five (5) corpsmen were killed and sixteen (16) were wounded and evacuated. Replacement was inadequate.

(6) The training of regularly assigned Infantry Battalion Corpsmen was adequate. Training of the eleven collecting-section Corpsmen received by this Battalion Medical unit for use during the past operation was adequate as to Medical knowledge, but completely inadequate as to Marine Infantry operations and field procedures. Furthermore, they were psychologically not prepared for what lay before them and their efficiency suffered for this lack of training in the initial phase of the past operation. Medical Company personnel (collecting-section) apt to be attached to an Infantry Battalion should be thoroughly trained With Such A Battalion during the training period prior to each operation.

(m) Field Medical Equipment.

(1) Sixteen (16) stretchers carried and used.

(2) Ten sea-bags filled with Morphine, Battle Dressings, Sulfonamides, Plasma, Serum-Albumin, Basswood splints, Triangular bandages carried and used.

(3) Individual Corpsmen kits renovated and used by each man. Thomas splints, blankets, gas warfare units, and sick-call unit were brought ashore in pre-loaded jeep. All other equipment thought unsuitable for field use in combat was left in rear echelon. Quartermaster of Battalion brought in back-up supplies for Aid Station.

(4) Suggested changes as follows:

Cardboard splints capable of being molded to suit the need, should replace or supplement basswood splints.

All stretchers should be of new light, aluminium-framed, type.

More Serum-Albumin to Battalion Aid Stations, less Plasma.

Chest-kit for "sucking" wounds of thorax should be routine issue consisting of the following:

- a. Metal container.
- b. Pressed, small sterile gauze flats.
- c. Boxes of rubber condoms.
- d. Tubes or jars of rubber glue or cement.

Large amounts of DDT should be made available to front-line units with sprayers both powder and liquid types. Very effective.

Light, highly-portable, small, blackout tents should be issued to Battalion Aid Stations.

(5) Re-supply was adequate via Regimental Surgeon.

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(n) Medical Supplies - No comment other than already made.

(o) Motor Vehicles.

Battalion Aid Station was issued on ambulance jeep prior to combat. Another ambulance jeep was attached to Battalion Aid Station upon embarkation. The use of two or more hospital jeeps eased the acute problem of Battalion Aid Station evacuation markedly and should become standard operating procedure.

(p) Quartermaster equipment and supplies - No comment.

(q) Malaria Control and Epidemic Control Equipment and Supplies - No comment.

5. Ashore - After Completion of Assault Phase:

(a) No comment. This Battalion departed from island immediately after completion of assault phase.

(6) Recommendations:

(a) See body of report as noted above.

APPENDIX II, ANNEX DOG TO

BATTALION LANDING TEAM 2-25 OPERATION REPORT

TRANSPORT QUARTERMASTER

1. This Battalion loaded at Kahului aboard the APA-190 with 508 s/tons of cargo, including 98 vehicles, and 1433 troops and 87 officers. The loading began at 2400 on 26 December, 1944 and completed at 0830. The embarkation began at 0830 and completed at 1000. The entire loading and embarkation taking 34 hours.

The only difficulty in loading came through the use of inexperienced troops for loading details. They had no idea of how to handle the necessary equipment needed in loading or how to stow the cargo once it was aboard.

Listed below are a few recommendations that I think will help in loading transports:

(a) That experienced troops be used as working parties for loading ships and that they be given thorough instructions in handling equipment and cargo.

(b) The number of men needed to load the C-3 class are as follows:

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(2) Two officers in addition to T.O.M.  
(2) Eighteen (18) NCO's. Hold captains divided into two reliefs - four on each relief, in charge of holds to control stowage of cargo, and four to control the loading of cargo from docks.

(3) 175 men for working parties and divided into two reliefs, with ten men in each of the four holds and ten men on the docks for loading nets, totaling 160 men on working parties on the two reliefs and 15 men for supernumeraries.

<u>Break Down</u>			
#1 Hold	#2 Hold	#4 Hold	#5 Hold
1st Relief	1st Relief	1st Relief	1st Relief
2 NCO-20 men	2 NCO-20 men	2 NCO-20 men	2 NCO-20 men
2nd Relief	2nd Relief	2nd Relief	2nd Relief
2 NCO-20 men	2 NCO-20 men	2 NCO-20 men	2 NCO-20 men

15 men for supernumeraries - total 175 men.  
2 NCO's for supernumeraries - total 18 NCO's.

(c) That all crates be marked with list of equipment in the crate as well as the organization number and line number.

(d) That cargo nets be used in loading Jeeps and trailers that are combat loaded. This prevents the loss of cargo if the vehicle should be tilted.

## 2. Recommendations for unloading.

(a) The use of cargo nets for unloading Jeeps and trailers, when the craft alongside is an L.C.M. or larger craft. This will prevent loss of cargo when the ship is rolling and tilts the vehicle. When loading only a Jeep into an LCVP the cargo net should be used as there is plenty of room to manuever the Jeep out of the net.

(b) The unloading of the APA-190 was started early the morning of the 19th of February 1945, and completed at 1700 the 28th of February, 1945. There were numerous and lengthy delays because of the conditions on the beach and lack of suitable landing craft. The unloading of the high priority vehicles was accomplished within the specified time. All the planned cargo loads ordered by the Landing Team QM and the Combat Team Q were unloaded from ship, but due to the rough surf and steep incline of the beach they sank while attempting to unload on the beach. General unloading started at 2300, with a 20 hour delay due to putting to sea for the night of February 27th, and there were no craft available for unloading until 1300, 28 February, 1945.

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(8) Due to the construction of the C-3 type of transport, Hold #2 is not suitable for loading vehicles larger than  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton (4x4) and  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton trailers. The forward Willin Davits are alongside #2 hatch and when using the boom it must be raised to a vertical position in order for the vehicle to clear the davits. This position cuts the lifting capacity of the boom to one half its original power. The additional strain of a rough sea would further increase the strain to such an extent that the lifting power would be no more than a yard and stay rig.

Hold #4 is divided into four sections and will not take vehicles except on the hatch covers and is far more suitable to stowage of gasoline and broken stowage. The ammunition locker in this hold is so small and so hard to work that it should not be used except as a last resort for stowage of cargo.

The ships should have the whole responsibility of furnishing the material and the lines necessary for lashing and blocking of vehicles for the following reasons:

- a. The ship is responsible for the correct and proper stowage of all cargo aboard.
- b. Troops that are used as loading details lack the technical knowledge needed.
- c. When troops are re-embarking after an operation they have no facilities for preparing blocks for the vehicles or for acquiring line for lashing. Consequently some of the vehicles could be damaged for lack of proper stowage.
- d. This responsibility should not be divided but placed on one organization instead of two.

3. The equipment now in use aboard the Transports is adequate if used properly. The "yard and stay" rig should be used at all times as it is much faster than the use of the boom and much safer. The use of a small cargo net of 5 inch hemp under the front wheels, in place of a wire sling when loading heavy trucks, prevents the crumpling of hood and fenders.

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ANNEX EASY TO

BATTALION LANDING TEAM 2-25 OPERATION REPORT

COMMUNICATIONS

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## SECTION I - PLANNING AND PREPARATION.

1. Specialized communication training for the operation consisted mostly of practical work, mainly CPX's. Camouflage discipline and digging in were emphasized. In several CPX's, CP's were established in locations entirely devoid of cover and concealment, in order to prepare communication personnel for the problem presented by the bare beaches of the target.

2. Due to a shortage of radio operators, line duty men from the headquarters platoons of rifle companies were trained to operate the SCR-536 and SCR-300. In all battalion field problems these line duty men were used as radio operators. They trained daily with the battalion communication platoon. Another consequence of the shortage of radio operators was the training of all communication personnel in operation of the SCR-300 and SCR-610; three wiremen and one former radar operator were converted to regular radio operators.

3. Training was handicapped by the fact that the communication platoon was not brought up to strength in personnel until late in the training program. Most replacements did not arrive in time for the regular basic training program. Training of these men was of necessity rushed.

4. Radio operators were trained in the use of remote control units, and experiments were conducted using horizontal wire antennae in place of regular antennae. The purpose of this training was to avoid unnecessary exposure of radios to view, since it was recognized that radios and radio antennae would draw fire.

5. No difficulties with communications were encountered in the rehearsal.

## SECTION II - MOVEMENT TO OBJECTIVE.

1. At the port of embarkation, all communication equipment was tested, and the supply of batteries and other expendibles was brought up to strength.

2. At the port of embarkation, the regimental SCR-300 net was operated on an hourly schedule until dark each day. Since the regimental and battalion headquarters were all separated aboard different ships, this net greatly facilitated communications, and made it unnecessary to use messengers and boats for comparatively minor details.

3. Aboard ship, communication personnel were briefed on the communication plan, including call signs, codes, frequencies, and the special problems of communication which were to be expected in the operation.

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SECTION III - SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT.

1. In the ship to shore movement, communication personnel were boated in two separate, complete echelons, one of which landed with the BLT commander in the third wave, the other landing in the fourth wave. All radios, telephones, and switchboards were carried in rubber bags. All spare batteries were water-proofed.

2. Initial supply was based on the following plan; two  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton trailers, each loaded with the following equipment and supplies;

- 1 crate (12) SCR-300 batteries.
- 1 chest loaded with (15) sound-powered telephones and other telephone equipment.
- 1 switchboard, BD-71.
- 4 EE8-A telephones, in rubber bag.
- 1 high speed coil of wire, W-130.
- 2 breast reels of wire, W-130.
- 4 drums of wire, W-110.
- 1 rubber bag of SCR-536 batteries.
- 1 crate of miscellaneous batteries.

Six SCR-536's, which it was contemplated would not be immediately needed, and a crate of miscellaneous batteries were loaded with high priority supplies which were to be landed on call as soon as possible.

3. There were no deviations in the communication plan from the standard infantry set-up, with the exception that no radio was available for the BLT commander in the free boat for the boat control net. This was not deemed necessary, because the BLT commander would be aboard the control boat with the RCT commander, who would have all necessary communications with the boat group commander. Rifle companies were to use SCR-536's, each company sharing its frequency with correspondingly lettered companies during the day, and wire at night. Communication with regiment and other battalions was to be by SCR-300, TBX, and SCR-610. The alternate channel on the SCR-610 was on the division voice command frequency.

4. All communication personnel and portable equipment were landed safely. All nets were established immediately, except for the regimental SCR-610 net, which was not used because of equipment and personnel casualties in the two assault battalions. However, the SCR-610 was used on the division voice command net. Standard wire communications were established before night.

5. Two TCS's and one trailer-load of communication supplies were lost in the landing. Also, the spare SCR-536's and batteries in the call boats were lost in landing.

6. Casualties D-day consisted of two workmen and one radioman killed.

SECTION IV - NARRATIVE OF OPERATION.

1. After D-day, very little use was made of radio for contacting regiment or the other battalions, although at all times there was contact with these units on at least two, and sometimes three nets.

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This was mainly due to the fact that wire communications held up better than expected. There was a minimum of wire trouble caused by vehicles, and also lines on the beach were overheaded.

2. Although the battalion command net was secured every night at dark, the battalion CP maintained a continuous listening watch on the battalion channel. Whenever a rifle company's wire could go out, this company would check in by radio and maintain this contact until wire communications were restored. This system worked very well.

3. The greatest difficulties for the first four days was with battery supply and radio repair. One trailer-load of supplies was lost in the landing, and, due to confusion and road conditions on the beach, the other trailer did not arrive at the battalion CP until D plus twoday. The regimental communication platoon was able to furnish a resupply of batteries, but for the first four days the supply was dangerously low. However, there were no communication failure due to lack of batteries.

4. Some SCR-300's and SCR-536's failed. Since maintenance equipment for the SCR-300 is not issued battalions, and since the maintenance equipment for the SCR-536 was to be landed in general unloading, the battalion radio repairman worked under a great handicap, having only a few spare tubes and a simple multimeter with which to work. However, he was able to repair enough sets to maintain essential communications.

5. It is to be noted that this battalion had a full supply of batteries and wire loaded aboard ship, but, except for the supplies loaded in trailers, none of these supplies were landed in time to be of help when the need was most urgent, i.e., in the first few days before the division signal quartermaster was able to function. Also, division signal repair facilities were not available during this period when reliable communications were most essential.

6. At the end of the operation this battalion had its original number of SCR-300's, nine, but only four of these were sets which were landed D-day. There were seventeen SCR-536's of which eight were original. One SCR-536 was lost. Approximately sixty per cent of the original SCR-536's and SCR-300's had to be repaired.

#### SECTION V - COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. The SCR-536's were of very great value to the rifle companies. However, there was interference from the other companies using the same frequencies. These company SCR-536 nets are so important that each company should have its own exclusive frequency.

2. The horizontal antennae worked well for the TBX and SCR-610. Experiments and research should be conducted to develop horizontal antennae for all field radios, particularly the SCR-300. A horizontal antenna would serve to make vital CP's safer.

3. All personnel, not merely officers and NCO's should be trained in the use of the SCR-536 and the SCR-300, and all personnel in company headquarters platoons should be trained to lay listening posts. In this operation, casualties in officers and NCO's forced leadership on corporals and privates first class who were not as well indoctrinated in communications as they should have been.

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4. The 81mm. mortar platoon should have radios for forward observers. This should be an exclusive channel for each platoon. Either the SCR-300 or SCR-610 would fit this need well. The 81mm. mortars should not be forced to rely solely on wire for communication, as is now the case.

5. The rocket detachments which are in support of battalions should have their own SCR-300 channels. During the operation, the FO for the rockets had to use the battalion channel for communication with his trucks. This system clutters up a highly important, operational net. The various rocket detachments' transmissions could probably be brief, and not continuous.

6. It is a great mistake to rely on general unloading for supply of batteries, wire, and maintenance equipment. A three-days' supply of batteries and wire should be given a priority equal with ammunition, food, water, and medical supplies, and should be handled by the battalion quartermaster. An alternate solution would be to have a regimental floating signal supply dump, to be landed on call from the regimental communication officer. General unloading is too slow; on the other hand, landing a large supply of signal supplies in trailers on D-day involves a great risk on a hot beach. This three-days' supply should be landed no later than noon of D plus one day.

7. The present system of signal repair is inadequate for the needs of assault landings in the first three days. One solution would be to let the battalions have the necessary maintenance and repair equipment, to be landed no later than noon of D plus one day. The other solution would be to have signal repair teams landed with the regimental CP. Under the present system, division signal repair is not available before D plus three, and battalions and regiments, while having repair personnel in their organizations, do not have the necessary equipment. The present system endangers communications during the most critical phase of the operation, and should be remedied.

8. The air warning system was adequate in passing the word on conditions red. However, no word of condition white was ever passed down to this battalion. It is very important that battalions be informed when condition red is over, in order that front line troops may have illumination when needed.

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HEADQUARTERS, THIRD BATTALION  
TWENTY FIFTH MARINES, FOURTH MARINE DIVISION,  
FLEET MARINE FORCE, c/o FLEET POST OFFICE,  
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX HOW TO FOURTH MARINE DIVISION,  
OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA, VOLCANO ISLANDS.

BLT-3 - RCT-25

OPERATION REPORT

IWO JIMA,  
VOLCANO ISLANDS.

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Appendix 8

Operation Report

BLT/3/25

### Section I Planning and Preparation

The rifle companies of BLT 5/25 were organized on the basis outlined in the current table of organization. The rifle platoons consisted of two rifle squads and one demolition squad. The rifle squad was made up of three fire teams of four men each (team leader (M-1), automatic rifleman, assistant automatic rifleman (M-1), and rifleman (M-1)). The demolition squad contained three teams of four men, each team with a separate function. The "pin-up" team of four men was heavily armed with the bazooka, two automatic rifles, and the M-1. Generally, its mission was to bring a large amount of fire to bear upon a particular target such as an embrasure of a pillbox, entrance to a cave, etc. and to protect by fire the movement of the demolition team. The "demolition" team was equipped with two sections of bangalore torpedo and at least four demolition charges, its mission being to demolish by the use of explosives enemy defensive positions such as pillboxes, machine gun emplacements, cave entrances, etc., The "flame thrower" team was made up of two flame thrower operators and two protective riflemen. Supplementing the work of the "pin-up" group this group was to deny by flame the enemy's use of pillbox embrasures fire slits, etc. as the "demolition" team placed its charges.

Attached to each rifle platoon was one machine gun section consisting of two machine gun squads, each squad manning and serving the light machine gun. The heavy machine gun remained with the supply section of company headquarters for use on the FPL and in the night defenses.

The 60mm mortar section was redesignated a platoon of two mortar sections consisting of two mortar squads, each squad manning and serving one 60mm mortar. The fourth mortar was acquired from the Battalion 81mm mortar platoon. This departure from the ordinary mortar section set up was designed to permit the mortars to echelon forward one section at a time, in continuous support of the attack, thus insuring the use of at least two mortars at all times.

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Attached to Headquarters Company was the "Scout Sniper Platoon" consisting of a platoon leader and three squads of ten men armed with rifles, BAR's, Thompson sub-machine guns and shot guns. Its mission was to search out and destroy by-passed enemy snipers, provide CP protection, and act as a small reserve force.

Our training began with emphasis being placed on the training of the individual. Each man was thoroughly trained in the functioning, care and tactical use of the weapon with which he was armed. The rifleman also received training in the use of the automatic rifle and the light machine gun and was taught the rudiments of immediate action with both weapons. His versatility was further increased by training in the preparation and use of demolition charges and the functioning of the flame thrower. Attention was then shifted to small unit training. Particular stress was placed on the importance of the fire team. The "Team spirit" was emphasized as much as possible, the members of each team being billeted together and assigned to working and guard details together.

A phase of small unit training that received considerable attention was the technique of assaulting fortified positions. A series of fortified positions including barbed wire entanglements, pillboxes, trench systems, and individual emplacements were constructed in area 5A & B where fire problems were conducted by each company. As a net result of this type of training each man became acutely aware of his importance to the team; and the timing and coordination between fire teams, assault teams, machine guns, and mortars were considerable improved.

So great was the stress laid on the training of small units (up to the size of platoons) that company and battalion training problems were held to a comparative minimum. On a company vs company basis, night problems were conducted on the average of twice a week. The defending company would set up a typical hasty defense position within a given area and the attacking company by the use of patrols would attempt to locate the defending company's outposts flanks, the positions of machine guns, and the location of CP's. This would be followed by an attempt to infiltrate through the lines. The purpose of this particular phase of our training was two fold: to teach the individual the importance of night security and remaining alert; and to train groups in the ability to move at night maintaining contact and control during such movement.

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Such company and battalion problems as were held were conducted with reference to the scheme of maneuver proposed for the coming operation. This scheme of maneuver contemplated a turning movement to the right by BLT 3/25, pivoting on the right flank, and, upon the completion of the turn, a continuation of the attack with two companies in the assault, one in reserve. Two extended problems employing all units of the task organization were conducted in which the aforesaid scheme of maneuver was practiced and perfected.

On 22 November, 1944, BLT 3/25, embarked aboard LST's and the USS Pickens (A PA 190) at Kahului, Maui, and participated in regimental exercises in rehearsal for the coming operation. The rifle companies executed one landing from the LST's using LVT(2)'s, reembarked aboard the USS PICKENS and conducted all other landings therefrom, using LCVP's and LCM's. Insofar as practicable boat assignment tables remained the same for both types of landing, two LVT boat groups being combined to make one LCVP boat group. Following the CT landing we returned to camp.

#### Section II - Movement to Objective

On 26 December, 1944, loading details of BLT 3/25 moved to the docks and began to load our gear aboard the USS SANBORN (APA 193) and on 27 December, 1944, we completed loading and embarkation of all units. On 28 December, we left Maui and arrived in Honolulu the following day. Alternate liberty was granted and those remaining aboard availed themselves of Army athletic facilities on Sand Island.

Beginning 6 January, 1945, the transport division, of which the USS SANBORN was a part, engaged in small boat exercises in the vicinity of Maalea Bay, Maui, and returned to Honolulu on 9 January.

On 13 January we again returned to Maalea Bay and participated in rehearsal exercises at the close of which the rifle companies together with a portion of the staff of BLT 3/25 returned on 16 January, 1945, to Camp Maui. The balance of the staff together with Headquarters Company remained aboard the SANBORN. The three rifle companies were to proceed to the tar-

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get on LST's under the commands of their executive officers. They were to be joined by their commanders at the staging area. 20 January, "I", "K" & "L" companies embarked aboard the LST's 713, 684, and 731, respectively, at Kahului, Maui arriving at West Lock Anchorages the following morning. The company commanders together with that portion of the staff that had gone ashore at Maui returned to APA 193.

The following day Captain Pitetti, BLT 3/25 Intelligence Officer, delivered to each LST copies of the BLT operation order, maps, aerial photographs, C-2 studies, and a large relief map of Iwo Jima. The company executive officers were instructed to brief their men on all phases of the operation enroute to the target.

On 22 January the LST's left for Saipan. They were followed on 26 January by the APA's. During the voyage the daily routine consisted, generally, of briefing the troops, physical drill, weapons inspection, guard detail, and the cleaning and servicing of equipment. Unit commanders conferred frequently with the CO, BLT 3/25, and among themselves. Every inch of the terrain within the Division's zone of action as shown in various aerial photographs was minutely studied and compared with the operation map. The solution of every contingency that might conceivably arise was also discussed. For the operation, the expeditionary troops consisted of the Fourth Marine Division and the Fifth Marine Division with the Third Marine Division in floating reserve to be on call D + 1.

Iwo Jima was to be invaded on 19 February; H-Hour was set for 0900. However the condition of the surf was an important factor in determining D-Day.

The island had been receiving sporadic bombing by land based bombers for a period of sixty odd days, and the navy had on two occasions blasted enemy positions on Iwo Jima. Heavy air strikes were to be carried out beginning D-20 and the Navy moved in on D-3 remaining in position firing methodically at known emplacements.

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The landing was to be made on the SE side of the island, two Marine Divisions abreast, Fourth Marine Division on the right.

The Fourth Marine Division was landing with CT 23 and CT 25 abreast, CT 25 on Blue Beaches on the right. Within the 25th zone of action BLT 1 and BLT 5 were abreast, BLT 1 on the left and BLT 3 on the right. BLT 2 was in reserve. BLT 3 would land in a column of companies, "I", "K", & "L" in that order, reorganize on the line O-X, prepared to continue the attack with "I" Company on the right, "K" Company on the left and "L" Company in reserve. The plan was to push NW across the island with LT-3 anchoring on the extreme right flank pivoting and taking the high ground overlooking the East Boat Basin and as the line reached a NW-SE direction to continue the drive north-northeast. Six days was the time expected to secure the landing; however we expected a longer fight and the troops were not briefed on a six day basis.

An alternate plan had also been devised in case the preferred plan was not feasible. It called for a landing on the SW Beaches with the Fourth Division on the north and the Fifth Division on the south. The sweep would then have been across the island with a pivot to the left and continuation of the attack to the north.

We reached Saipan, the staging area, on 11 February and the Company Commanders were transferred to their LST's. Final rehearsals of ship to shore movement were held off Tinian on 13 February.

The LST convoy got underway on 16 February with APA's to leave the following day. These last three days enabled the Company Commanders to brief their men on the latest information and to complete the final unit planning with his platoon leaders.

The underwater demolition report received on the 18th of February relieved some minds on the matter of mines, but we were disturbed by the information concerning the height and gradient of the terraces. Although the last two days aboard ship were uncomfortable because of rain and rough weather the men were in good spirits when they turned in for a good nights sleep on D-1 after a last big meal of steak.

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### Section III Ship to Shore Movement

#### A. Tactical Plan for Landing.

"I" Company and "K" Company used LVT (2)'s to boat their personnel together with one artillery F.O. party for each company. "L" Company, the Platoon of Engineers and the 81mm Mortar Platoon, boated their personnel in LVT (4)'s. Tanks and tank personnel, the Scout-Snipers Platoon, supply personnel, the four 37mm guns of Regimental Weapons Company and their crews used LCVP's to carry their personnel. 75mm half-tracks, bulldozer, and the one ton trucks were carried in LCM's. With the exception of the two 81mm mortar jeeps and trailers which were placed in LVT (4)'s all other jeeps were carried in LCVP's.

The first wave consisted of seven LVT(A)(4)'s which were to land at H-Hour. Landing Team 3/25 landed in a column of companies--"I", "K", and "L". The second, third, fourth, and fifth waves of seven LVT(2)'s each was comprised of "I" and "K" Companies. The sixth wave of six LVT(4)'s contained personnel of "L" Company. A "six Able" wave of ten LVT(4)'s contained the balance of "L" Company, the 81mm Mortar Platoon and the Engineer Platoon.

The seventh wave consisted solely of the LSM's carrying the tanks. The eighth wave of eight LCVP's carried Headquarters and Pioneer personnel. The ninth wave of four LCVP's and three LCM's consisted of Regimental Weapons Company and Pioneer personnel. The tenth wave of four LCM's and four LCVP's carried jeeps, trucks, and supplies.

The waves proceeded to the line of departure under naval control where they were dispatched to the beach on signal from the Control Boat. They landed as follows:

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	<u>crossed LD</u>	<u>Landed</u>
Wave #2	0832	0904
" #3	0837	0906
" #4	0842	0911
" #5	0847	0920
" #6	0852	0928
" #6A	0855	0936
" #7	1005	
" #8	0955	
" #9	1155	
" #10		

For some unexplained reason beginning with wave five all succeeding waves were echeloned slightly to the left so that "L" Company and all proceeding waves landed in the sector of Landing Team 1/25.

Considering the large volume of fire received on all beaches the landing followed the plan suprisingly closely.

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Section IV - Combat Narrative

BLT 3/25

D-Day

19 February, 1945.

	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Hq	16	229
I	7	218
K	7	220
L	7	212
Total	37	879

Troops were awakened at 0430, fed, and given time in which to prepare to enter LVT's. From the decks of the LST's the outline of Iwo Jima could be dimly seen. Heavy salvos of naval gunfire were being hurled along the landing beaches from Mt. Suribachi to the northern end of the island. At 0730 the LVT's began to enter the water and by 0815 the assault units of LT-3 were completely water borne. As the waves began to form in the rear of the LD an occasional splash in the water indicated that some sort of fire was being received from the island. At 0830 the first wave of "I" Company crossed the line of departure and subsequent waves were dispatched on schedule. As "I" Company neared the beach its CO, Captain Woods, reported to LtCol. Chambers that they were not receiving any appreciable amount of fire. At 0902 the first wave hit the beach.

"K" Company was the next to land. Its CO, Captain Witherspoon, reported that they were receiving an increasing volume of small arms and mortar fire. By the time "L" Company and the remainder of LT-3/25 had reached the beach the entire landing beach area from Blue Beaches south and inland to the eastern edge of the air strip #1 was under heavy and consistent enemy mortar, rocket, and artillery fire. A considerable portion of the landing team had landed too far south of its assigned area on Beach Blue #1 and much of its personnel was interspersed with that of LT 1/25. Control was rendered extremely difficult as the men sought shelter from the mortar fire in large bomb craters and only the repeated entreaties by the officers and NCO's could induce them to leave their shelters and move to their assigned positions. The situation was as follows:

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complicated by the high casualty rate among the officers. As an instance, the command of "K" Company passed rapidly from Captain Witherspoon, who was wounded on the beach, through Lt. Coogan, (wounded and evacuated), Lt. Linzenbold, (wounded and evacuated), Lt. Wildman, (killed in action), to WO Chipps, who was in turn wounded and evacuated. Captain Breckenridge, assistant Plans and Training Officer, was called in from the Control Boat and put in command. Throughout this time the SCR 300 operator was separated from his company and orders from LtCol. Chambers to "K" Company were verbally relayed by the CO of "L" Company upon receipt over his SCR 300.

The advance echelon of LT 3/25 CP had likewise suffered heavy casualties. Major Rulison, Plans and Training Officer, was wounded as he attempted to leave his LVT. Captain Pitetti, Intelligence Officer, was killed shortly after landing. Doctor Murray, Battalion Surgeon was wounded and evacuated. Lt Fogarty, Bn-4 was wounded and evacuated. Surviving elements established a CP in a large bomb crater in TA 166 G.

By 1200 the situation was about as follows: "I" Company had turned to the right with its right flank on the Beach and its line extending to the left generally along the O-X bending back, tied in with elements of "L" and "K" Companies. Contact with BLT 1/25 on the left was visual and a gap of approximately 100 yds between our left and BLT 1/25 right was covered by a platoon from "L" Company. Tanks landed to our rear and immediately became the target for the enemy's large rockets. A bulldozer tank struck a mine and its blade was completely blown off. A tank following it was disabled when a large rocket hit its turret. The 37's and 75 half-tracks were unable to get off the beach.

Heavy small arms fire was being received across our entire front from the base of the high ground east of the road in TA 183 V. We returned the fire with our own, supplemented by 60mm mortar fire, and several Japs were seen running out of trench lines, seeking shelter in the caves to their rear. Most of them were killed by accurately placed machine gun fire.

At 1300 BLT 2/25 had landed and entered the line between our left and BLT 1/25's right. By 1545 through the process of

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fire and movement our lines had moved up to a point approximately 100 yards short of the O-A. BLT 2/25 attempted to move with us but were unable to do so due to the large volume of fire being received from the high ground to their front and left (TA 183 LHC).

At 1630 "L" Company was ordered to attack to its front and seize the high ground above quarry #1 (center of TA 183 W). "K" Company, in reserve, was to favor the left and maintain contact between our left flank and right flank of BLT 2/25. "I" Company, on the right, was to move forward slowly, cover the southern approaches to the East Boat Basin and protect the right flank. At approximately 1830, Captain Headley reported that two platoons of "L" Company had reached the top of quarry #1. At 1900 he further reported that elements of LT 2/25 had gained the high ground to his left and reestablished contact. Japs estimated to be about 100 in number were reported in the general area of TA 183 S concealed in caves, trenches, and pill boxes. The accuracy of their small arms fire inflicted heavy casualties upon our troops that had gained the high ground. Lt. Pantages, "L" Company platoon leader was killed. It became increasingly apparent that unless relieved by a full strength unit our chances of holding the high ground against any organized assault by the enemy were exceedingly slim.

At 2330 "B" Company, 24th Marines, relieved "L" Company on the high ground and "A" Company, 24th Marines, relieved "I" Company on the low ground to the right. At 0100 the relief by BLT 3/24 had been completed and BLT 3/25 withdrew to TA 166 A where we set up an all around defense and waited until dawn. Little or no enemy activity was noted throughout the night. However, our supply dump on the beach was destroyed by a direct hit from a large type rocket. WO Henderson, LT Quartermaster together with several of our Quartermaster personnel was wounded and evacuated. Lt. Williams, LT Burial Officer, was assigned the duties of Bn-4 and quartermaster.

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D / 1  
20 February, 1945.

	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Hq	11	166
I	2	120
K	2	163
L	5	145
Total	20	604

Assigned as Regimental reserve we remained in the same area to which we had withdrawn and improved our positions. At 0800, LtCol. Faul, LT executive Officer, assumed the duties of CO of BLT 2/25, vice LtCol. Hudson, wounded and evacuated. Captain Headley, CO of "L" Company reported to the CP as BLT 3/25 executive officer and Lt. Ing assumed command of "L" Company. A new BLT dump was being formed on Beach Blue #2. A sniper was located in one of the beached Jap LS's and killed by the Anti\*Sniper Detachment.

D / 2  
21 February, 1945.

	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Hq	10	168
I	2	127
K	2	149
L	3	144
Total	17	588

At 1430 LT 3/25, less "I" Company which was to act as Regimental reserve, was committed taking up a position between BLT 2/25 on the right and BLT 1/25 on the left. "K" Company was on the right, "L" Company on the left. Our lines extended generally to the left from the northern center of 183 W through the south west corner of 183 R, to the vicinity of AJ-184, (183 P), where we tied in with BLT 1/25. Considerable difficulty was experienced getting into the line due to heavy small arms fire from the front, and sniper fire from Japs by-passed in caves to our immediate rear. The rear areas were mopped up before nightfall, and the companies dug in for the night.

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across their entire front. The CP moved to the base of the cliffs in 183 V and wire communication strung to the companies. The night was comparatively quiet with the exception of sporadic enemy mortar fire.

D / 3

22 February, 1945.

	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Hq	10	168
I	2	122
K	2	134
L	3	127
Total	17	551

CT 21 landed and passed through CT 23 with orders to continue the attack at 0830 and straighten the general division line. While waiting for this to happen we fired a rocket barrage on the sides of the hill in 183 C D. Large numbers of Japs were seen to come out of their holes and many were killed by machine gun fire. It is estimated that over 200 were killed in this manner. It rained all day and the resultant lack of visibility denied us the use of air and naval gunfire. At 1530 LtCol. Chambers, Lt. Sipp, Air Liaison Officer, and one member of the BLT intelligence section were wounded by enemy machine gun fire when leaving the OP and were evacuated. Captain Headley reported to the OP, assumed command of BLT 3/25, and, upon informing himself of the situation, ordered the companies to prepare for the night in the positions they then held. Captain Antink, BLT 3/25 Headquarters Company CO, assumed the duties of BLT Executive Officer. The morale of the troops was very low as a result of the loss of LtCol. Chambers, the constant sniper and mortar fire, and the continued inclement weather.

During the night several attempts at infiltration were made in the zone of action of both front line companies and it was estimated that at least 100 Japs were killed.

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D / 4  
23 February, 1945.

	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Hq	8	158
I	2	112
K	2	109
L	3	115
Total	15	494

At 0600 we were relieved by BLT 3/24, the relief being completed by 0900. We were designated as Division reserve and moved into our assembly area in 165 J. A sight muster was held and strength reports submitted. The weather had cleared and the troops were given an opportunity to dry out their clothing. 10 in 1 rations were issued and the men had hot chow and coffee for the first time since D-Day. They were given access to their packs and their moral was soon restored to a high level. The companies were ordered to dig in, redistribute such organic weapons as flame throwers, BAR's and bazookas, and reorganized their platoons into self-sufficient combat units. Some enemy planes flew overhead at 1815 but dropped no bombs and except for occasional rocket fire the night was uneventful.

D / 5  
24 February, 1945.

	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Hq	9	159
I	2	114
K	2	109
L	3	113
Total	16	495

The entire day was devoted to the cleaning and servicing of weapons and equipment. An interior guard was established and a ringing telephone watch permitted, to allow as much rest as possible. The night was uneventful.

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D / 6  
25 February, 1945.

	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Hq	9	159
I	3	130
K	2	123
L	3	128
Total	17	540

At 1300 we received a warning order to be prepared to relieve BLT 1/24 whose lines were reported to stretch from the beach in 167 B inland along the north side of the road in 184 N and P. At 1500 Captain Headley accompanied by his company commanders proceeded to the CP of BLT 1/24 located at the base of quarry #1 (bottom part 183 W). At that time the CO of BLT 1/24 was unable to give any clear statement as to the exact location of his troops either on the ground or on the map. He stated that to the best of his knowledge his troops were across the road in the eastern half of 184 P and U but thought their position was untenable by reason of heavy mortar fire and he was recommending to CT 24 that BLT 2/24 be directed to set up a line to the rear of his troops permitting his troops to retire through that line. After reconnoitering routes of approach, Captain Headley and his company commanders returned to the BLT 3/25 CP where in the presence of all unit commanders and members of the staff a tentative attack order was issued. Passage into the lines was to commence at 0700 and be completed by 0800. BLT 3-25 would continue the attack and seize the high ground in its zone of action east of the road running north and south through 184 P and U, "L" Company on the left, "I" Company on the right, and "K" Company in reserve. Scheme of maneuver: "L" Company to push ahead of "I" Company seizing the high ground overlooking the east Boat Basin. "I" Company was then to secure the Boat Basin and having done so, move to the high ground in 167 A. Attached units were to carry out normal supporting missions as directed. King Hour: 0915. At 1800 Captain Headley and his company commanders returned to the CP of BLT 1/24 where it was learned that BLT 2/24 had relieved that unit.

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The CO of BLT 2/24 was then contacted, the position of his troops noted, and arrangements were made for effecting the relief of that unit at 0700 the following morning. At 2000 Captain Headley confirmed the attack order heretofore issued. During the day several replacements were received and assigned to the various companies for duty. A quiet night was passed.

D / 7  
26 February, 1945.

	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Hq	9	178
I	4	171
K	5	165
L	4	167
Total	22	681

At 0700 the relief of LT 2/24 commenced and was completed by 0800, all units reporting themselves to be in position by that time. These positions were approximately as follows: "I" Company extended from the beach, (dividing line between 166 H & I) to the road (middle of 166D) where their left flank tied in with the right flank of "L" Company. "L" Company, in turn, extended northwardly through the westerly portion of 183 W where contact was initially made with BLT 2/25. The CP was moved to the southwest corner of 183 X. BLT 3/25 jumped off at 0915 and was immediately met with considerable resistance in the form of machine gun and rifle fire coming from the high ground to our left and from caves and pillboxes within "L" Company's zone of action. Progress was slow but steady. "I" Company, supported by two medium tanks and by LVT (A)'s was methodically clearing the East Boat Basin of enemy. "K" Company mopped up behind "L" Company using demolition charges and flame throwers on every position that could conceivably contain the enemy.

At 1630 the lines extended along the high ground east of the road in 184 P & U. The enemy, located in positions in the high ground to the left of BLT 2/25, covered each draw with considerable machine gun and rifle fire that was proving costly and accurate as we attempted to cross. BLT 2/25 was unable to keep abreast of us and, while visual contact was maintained,

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"K" Company was utilized to cover the boundary between battalions, taking up positions favoring our left rear. Having gained approximately 300 yards, and, being on the most favorable ground, we dug in for the night. At 1810 a heavy barrage of large caliber mortars was received and many casualties resulted. During the day's fighting Lt. Nelson was killed and Lt. Long wounded and evacuated. During the night several attempts to penetrate our lines by infiltration were repulsed and in all known cases the Japs so attempting were killed.

D / 8  
27 February, 1945.

	Off	Enl.
Hq.	9	180
I	5	166
K	5	166
L	4	155
Total	23	667

At 0800 we continued the attack in the same formation; i. e. "L" Company on the left, "I" Company on the right, with "K" Company in reserve. By 1000 we had advanced 200 yards to a position located generally along the easternly edges of 184 V and 167 B. Here we were requested by BLT 2/25 to hold up as they were experiencing trouble from enemy strong points located to their front and left. At 1500 it became apparent that the units on our left could not expect to move. By this time "I" Company had secured the East Boat Basin and was ordered to move to the high ground in 167A and tie in with "L" Company's right flank forward of the road junction (southern part of 184 U). "I" Company lacked sufficient personnel to cover the frontage assigned and, upon our request, K/24 was attached to us. (BLT 3/24 had been attached to CT 25 as CT reserve). One platoon was used to strengthen "I" Company's line and the remainder of the company was placed in the East Boat Basin in reserve with the specific mission of defending that area against attack from the ocean. Being on the most favorable ground we requested and received permission to dig in for the night. During the night sporadic attempts to infiltrate our lines were made and nine Japanese killed.

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D / 9  
28 February, 1945.

	Off	Enl
Hq	9	178
I	5	170
K	3	162
L	4	163
Total	21	673

At 0700 at a meeting of all unit commanders the Battalion CO issued the order to continue the attack to the line O-1B (a line running northwardly through 167 E, 184 Y, into 184 T). "K" Company was to be on the left and "I" Company on the right with "L" Company and K/24 following respectively in reserve mopping up all rear areas; "L" Company to favor the battalion left to cover any possible gap that might appear on the LT left. King Hour: 0815.

The companies jumped off on time and by 1000 had progressed 100 yards over the rough terrain when they were forced to hold up and wait for BLT 2/25 on the left which was in turn waiting for BLT 1/25 on the left. No further progress was made for the balance of the day and we dug in for the night in the positions then held.

At 2200 and again at 0230 the enemy made large scale attempts to penetrate our lines in the "K" Company zone of action. These were repulsed by accurately placed artillery fire supplemented by fire from our 81mm and 60mm mortars. It was estimated that over 200 of the enemy were killed.

D / 10  
1 March, 1945.

	Off	Enl
Hq	9	178
I	5	170
K	5	163
L	4	161
Total	23	672

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The RCT King hour was 0830 but we were directed not to advance until the units on our left had come abreast. At 0850 we moved a tank into position at the road junction in 184 U to fire northwardly up the draw upon a position believed to be in 184 K. This fire was with the knowledge and consent of BLT 2/25 and resulted in the destruction of two enemy machine guns. Little or no progress having been made on the left, at 1700 we prepared for the night. During the night a few individual Japs attempted to infiltrate but were killed.

D / 11  
2 March, 1945

	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Hq	9	177
I	4	170
K	5	149
L	4	160
Total	22	656

Although the RCT King Hour was 0630 we were again directed not to advance until the units on our left had come abreast. Throughout this period of time we were suffering casualties from enemy mortar fire and our failure to advance while suffering casualties had a depressing effect upon the morale of the troops. At 1630 BLT 2/25 and BLT 3/25 made an advance of 300 yards without resistance to the next commanding ground and dug in for the night. Our position at the time ran from the beach (lower center 167 D) northwardly through the easterly portions of 184 X into the southeast corner of 184 S where our right tied in with the left flank of BLT 2/25. The night was uneventful.

D / 12  
3 March, 1945

	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Hq	9	177
I	4	168
K	5	146
L	5	157
Total	23	648

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BLT 3/25 attached to RCT 23, RCT 25 less BLT 2 & 3 in Division Reserve. At 0630 CT 23, attacking in a column of BLT's, passed through and relieved LT 1/25. We had no information as to progress being made on the Division left. By 1600 it became apparent that no movement could be expected on our immediate left so we prepared for the night. The night was uneventful.

D / 13

4 March, 1945

	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Hq	9	177
I	4	169
K	5	145
L	5	159
Total	23	650

There being no change on our immediate left the situation in our zone of action remained the same throughout the day. By this time the engineers had demolished all known enemy positions and caves in the areas passed through by us, had constructed a road running from the Quarry to our front lines, and had removed a large mine field in the East Boat Basin. The road made our supply and evacuation considerably less of a problem. The night was passed without incident.

D / 14

5 March, 1945

	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Hq	9	177
I	4	164
K	5	145
L	5	157
Total	23	643

RCT 25 relieved RCT 23. BLT 2 & 3 reverted to RCT 25. At 0600 "L" Company was detached from LT 3/25, combined with The Division Reconnaissance Company, and, under the command of Major ASBILL of LT 1/25 moved into position on the left of

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generally along an east-west line running through the center of 183 O. The mission of this detachment was to act as a holding and containing force to prevent any movement by the enemy southwardly and westwardly out of the pocket of resistance that had developed in the general vicinity of MINAMI. BLT 2/25 and BLT 3/25 extended their positions to the left and were ordered to prepare strong defensive positions. It was our mission to prevent any break-through by the enemy in response to the anticipated drive by the Division across our front to the sea. Accordingly, we strung two lines of barbed wire about 75 yards apart across our entire front. Between the two lines of wire were placed anti-personnel mines, trip flares, and booby traps. Three 37mm guns were placed in the line prepared to fire canister and natural avenues of approach were covered by machine gun fire although the fields of fire were considerably limited. All 60 mm mortars in the BLT were combined into one battery and registered in for close defensive fires. Defensive fires were likewise registered in by 81mm mortars and artillery. An overlay of our defensive positions submitted to CT 25. By 1800 our work was completed and we felt that we could successfully withstand anything in the way of a counterattack the Japs had to offer. The night was quiet.

D / 15 and D / 16  
6 & 7 March, 1945

	Off	Enl
Hq	9	177
I	4	160
K	5	146
L	4	152
Total	22	635

	Off	Enl
Hq	9	178
I	4	158
K	5	147
L	4	149
Total	22	632

We remained in position and devoted the time to making further improvements of our defenses. The nights were uneventful

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- D / 17  
8 March, 1945

	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Hq	9	177
I	4	157
K	5	148
L	4	151
Total	22	633

Our position remained unchanged. At 1300 we were warned by CT 25 that there was a strong probability that we would be relieved the next day by BLT 2/24 and sent to the CT left to relieve BLT 1/24. At 1800 we were notified by CT 25 that we would be relieved at 0600 by BLT 2/24 the following morning. The CO of BLT 2/24 accompanied by his Bn-3 appeared at the CP and was informed as to our position. Arrangements were made to provide guides to aid in effecting the relief. He was informed of the presence of the mine field to our front and at his request we agreed to leave the personnel who had been instrumental in laying the field, to show his engineers where they were.

Special note must here be made of the mental condition and morale of our troops. We had been in the assault for a period of ten days during which we had shown a gain of approximately 800 yards. Initially, we had relieved troops whose position on the ground was far short of the position they showed themselves to occupy on the map. Throughout that assault we had suffered heavy casualties. One company commander and two platoon leaders had been killed in action. While it was true we did not move from D / 11 to D / 17 nevertheless throughout that period of time enemy mortar fire of various calibres fell in our zone of action inflicting occasional casualties. On D / 8 without warning a strafing and napalm strike was made behind and in our lines, although our front line panels were clearly displayed. On D / 11 a TBF accidentally dropped a bomb behind our lines. On D / 12 without being warned in any way a rocket barrage, apparently

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a rocket jeep, fell directly on our left flank platoon. Once a short naval gun fire round fell on our right flank. All of this contributed to make our troops a large percentage of which were inexperienced replacements, extremely "jittery". It was common knowledge that we were relieving a unit which had been unable to accomplish it's mission, the same unit we had relieved on D / 7.

Most of the night was quiet although we continued to receive sparodic enemy mortar fire. The rifle companies reported killing approximately 35 Japs who had attempted to infiltrate our lines.

D / 18  
9 March, 1945.

	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Hq	9	177
I	4	157
K	5	149
L	3	150
Total	21	633

At 0600 we were relieved by BLT 2/24, assigned to Division reserve, and moved to our assembly area at 182 O and 183 K and L. Here "L" Company joined us. Lt. Ing, "L" Company commander was evacuated. Second Lieutenant Simlik, a replacement officer assumed command. A reconnaissance of the positions held by BLT 1/24 was made by the BLT 3/25 30 and his company commanders at 1200 and again at 1500. The day was devoted to preparing the LT for the attack. At 2000 Captain Headley issued the following order: Beginning at 0530 "K" Company on the left and "I" Company on the right would pass through and relieve BLT 1/24, the relief to be effected by day light. "L" Company was to be in reserve and follow the assault companies at a distance of approximately 200 yards favoring the LT left mopping up the entire LT rear. At 0800 this LT would jump off in the attack with LT 1/25 on our right and K/24 on our left. Direction of attack: 135°. Upon reaching the road

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running generally east and west through 184 M, I, N, J, we were to hold up, reorganize and then push forward in the same direction, seeking to gain contact with the left flank of BLT 2/25 and squeezing out BLT 1/25 which was to remain behind and mop up the pocket of resistance in and about 184 G and H, Once that contact was gained we were to continue to the sea.

D / 19  
10 March, 1945.

	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Hq	8	175
I	4	157
K	5	150
L	3	146
Total	20	628

The troops were awakened at 0430 and prepared to move out. At 0600 all companies reported themselves in position and relief of BLT 1/24 completed, King Hour being at 0800. Our front lines (the LD) extended along a ridge running in an east-west direction from the center of 184 B to the center of 184 D. By 0845 the troops were moving nicely against relatively light opposition. However, resistance increased the further we progressed and by the time we reached the road at 1100 our entire front was receiving mortar and small arms fire. Casualties in "K" Company had been so great as to necessitate the committing of one platoon of "L" Company. Progress on both flanks was considerably slower than ours, making contact difficult. K/24 insisted it was in our zone of action and continued to echelon to the left so that it became necessary to commit another platoon of "L" Company to enable us to cover our frontage. Our right flank bent back to contact C/25 which was to our right rear approximately 100 yards. At 1400 by the use of patrols, sent out for that purpose, contact was made with G/25. C/25 reporting itself able to move, "I" Company was ordered to break contact and swing its right flank forward and tie in with G/25. This was accomplished at 1600 and in as much as the companies were on the most favorable

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ground they were ordered to dig in for the night. Our lines at that time were approximately 100 yards south of the road running east and west through 184 N, I, J. Supply and evacuation for "K" & "L" Companies was via the road running south through 184 C, D, & I; that for "I" Company was via the beach road, hence by carrying parties to their position. The CP was moved to the Boat Basin in 166E there being no suitable place for its installation in the rear of the LT. It should be mentioned that due to the irregularity of our lines (CT 23 was reported to be considerably ahead of us on the left) practically all supporting fires (81 mm, artillery, air and naval gunfire) were of necessity from henceforth to be denied. We were forced to rely on our 60 mm mortars, bazookas, and anti-tank grenades for both defensive and close supporting fire.

In view of the intense resistance encountered during the day, the night was surprisingly quiet. Individual attempts on the part of the enemy to infiltrate our lines were repulsed. Telephone lines were severed at one time but quickly repaired.

D 4 20  
11 March, 1945.

	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Hq	8	167
I	3	151
K	3	114
L	3	125
Total	17	557

At 0730 the companies were ordered to move out and continue the attack. As it attempted to do so "K" Company was forced to come out into some open ground that afforded neither cover nor concealment. They were immediately met with a considerable volume of small arms fire from a high ridge to their left front quickly followed by heavy mortar fire that was believed to be coming from the general vicinity of 185 K. One platoon of "K" Company was completely wiped out as the result of a direct hit by a large type rocket.

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In fact so great were our casualties in the left sector of our zone of action that the CO of BLT 3/25 ordered an immediate reorganization consolidating "K" and "L" Companies into one company under the command of Lt. Morton of "K" Company. K/24 was requested to move abreast of us to reduce some of the pressure, but they demurred on the ground that a gap had opened on their left and that they too were pinned down by fire coming from the reverse slope of the same ridge from which we were receiving fire. Thereupon, as the only logical alternative, "I" Company was ordered to pivot on its left flank and capture the crest of a ridge that ran parallel to the aforementioned ridge. This was with the knowledge and consent of CT 25 who ordered G/25 and BLT 2/24 to move as our right flank moved. The reverse slope of the ridge up which "I" Company was ordered to move was strongly defended by the enemy. However, "I" Company gained the high ground shortly before dark in a skirmish that was featured by the liberal use of hand grenades. Lt. Ward, "I" Company platoon leader was shot through the helmet by a machine gun, and dazed to such an extent that it was necessary for him to be evacuated. He returned to his command the following morning. "K" Company, however, was still unable to move although small elements had progressed a hundred yards to the front. At 1700 "K" Company captured a prisoner who, through an interpreter, informed us that there were approximately 300 Japs in caves along ridges to our front with plenty of food and small arms. He estimated that they had in their possession nine large type mortar. The prisoner was then returned to regiment for further questioning.

"K" Company was thereupon directed to occupy the same position held the night before with the exception of its right flank which was to bend forward and tie in with the left flank of "I" Company. As darkness fell "I" Company continued its efforts to get more of its men up on the high ground and at 2200 reported it had been successful in doing so.

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There was considerable activity in "I" company's area throughout the night. The enemy continually attempted to approach their positions over the high ground but were repulsed by a liberal use of hand grenades.

D / 21  
12 March, 1945.

	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Hq	8	165
I	2	117
K	3	115
L	3	126
Total	16	523

No ground was gained this day due to: (1) the failure of the units on our left to move (2) excessive casualties, making it next to impossible for us to cover the assigned frontage. At 1000 BLT 2/25 moved into position on our left taking over the position occupied by "K" company. The latter thereupon was ordered to move to the rear of "I" company, separate itself from "L" company and both companies were directed to reorganize. BLT 1/25 moved up on the right flank of "I" company and in turn tied in with BLT 2/24 which extended its lines to the sea. "I" company reported trouble making contact with G/25 on its left which was slightly to the left rear and a small gap of 50 yards was thereby left to be covered by fire.

Throughout the entire day "I" company fired continuously their 60mm mortars, bazookas, anti-tank grenades, and fragmentation grenades with grenade adapter. While no specific target could be seen it is significant to note here that later over 500 dead Jap bodies were counted in front of "I" company's lines and in the draw immediately below. This type of fire had one disadvantage, to wit: "I" company was facing at right angles to the general direction of attack and while they knew the position of troops on the left and to the front and maintained a safe margin of fire in the front of these troops, nevertheless the latter failed to recognize it as friendly fire, believed it to be enemy fire and were extremely hesitant to advance toward it.

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At 1700 BLT 2/25 reported increasing difficulty maintaining contact with LT 3/24 on its left. One platoon of L/25 was sent to LT 2/25 to be used to cover any gap that might appear on its left.

At 1800 BLT 3/25 was ordered to dig in for the night in the positions it then held and "I" Company was especially directed to strengthen its positions by the use of additional wire. "I" Company continued to throw hand grenades down into the draw below them throughout the night. At 2200 what was believed to be two ammunition dumps exploded in caves beneath "I" Company.

D / 22  
13 March, 1945

	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Hq	8	167
I	3	117
K	3	97
L	2	103
Total	16	484

King Hour: 0700. BLT 2/25 was ordered to press the attack across our front toward the sea. "F" Company reported some progress on the left of BLT 2/25 but "E" Company failed to move out in the center. At 1130 L/25 was ordered attached to BLT 2/25 and was immediately employed relieving "E" Company. However, no progress was made throughout the day and BLT 3/25 dug in for the night in the same positions.

At a meeting of LT Commanders at CT 25 CP that night a new scheme of maneuver was directed. "I" Company was directed to echelon to the left and relieve "G" Company. BLT 1/25 was directed to relieve "I" company with one of its companies. "L" company was to be relieved by a company of BLT 2/25 and revert to BLT 3/25. Furthermore, the CO's of BLT 2/25 and BLT 3/25 were ordered to meet on the ground the following morning and agree upon a boundary between battalions. As soon as this was accomplished the attack was to be continued.

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During the night "I" company had its usual grenade battle with the Japs to their front and killed approximately 35.

D / 23  
14 March, 1945

	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Hq	9	167
I	2	104
K	3	93
L	2	93
Total	16	457

At dawn B/25 relieved "I" Company which in turn relieved "G" company. "E"/25 took over a portion of "L" company's sector on the left and the balance was taken over by one platoon of "K" company. By mutual agreement between the CO's of BLT 2/25 and BLT 3/25 the boundary between LT's was to be the high ridge running to the sea to our left front. The crest of the ridge plus approximately a platoon frontage on our side was to be within the zone of action of BLT 2/25. The remainder of the west slope, all of the draw, and that portion of the east ridge occupied by "I" company was to be in our zone of action. It is believed the area thus described may be located on the map as follows: West ridge beginning in the southwest corner of 184 J, thence running in a southeasterly direction through the westerly portion of 184 O, thence into the center of 185 P; East ridge beginning at a point in the western half of 185 F, then running in a southeasterly direction through the center of 185 K into the northeast corner of P.

The draw was divided by a ridge running parallel to the east and west ridges. "K" company protected by the advance ahead of it by E/25 down the east ridge, was to move down on to the center ridge and protect the movement down the draw of the elements of "K" company and "I" company and those troops actually committed to the draw itself were to move echeloned to the rear of and under the protection of those troops occupying the west center, and east ridges. "L" company in reserve was to cover the entire zone of action and mop up all rear areas.

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At 1300 the troops were in position and plans were completed. "K" company was ordered to move with "E" company keeping slightly to the right rear so as to take full advantage of the protection against fire from the east ridge thereby afforded. "E" company moved up slowly and "K" company advancing 200 yards to take possession of the center ridge, was, at times, as much as 75 yards ahead of "E" company. Considerable knee mortar and sniper fire was received throughout the day and large caliber mortars fell in the zone of action of BLT 2/25. Progress was measured in terms of inches. "E" company commander complained that it was unable to move because units on its left were pinned down. At 1600 it became apparent that no further movement could be expected. The companies were ordered to dig in and prepare strong defensive positions. At 1700 BLT 2/25, less "E" company, was relieved by BLT 2/24 and retired to positions in the rear as CT reserve. Our troops being in sight of the final objective were disappointed at the failure to move and decidedly impatient. Fortunately our zone of action had been inspected by the CG 4th Division, D-3, D-2, all of whom appreciated the difficulties involved.

We were informed late in the afternoon that there would be no naval illumination for the night. At 2200 approximately 25 Japs were seen moving in a column up the draw to our front. They were all killed by grenades.

D / 24  
15 March, 1945.

	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Hq	9	168
I	2	103
K	3	85
L	2	85
Total	16	441

At 0900 2 Japs surrendered and were taken prisoners. CT 25 dispatched interpreters to our positions in an effort to induce further surrenders. Pending this attention progress

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...for two hours. Five Japs escaped as they came out of a cave and disappeared down the draw as we were requested not to fire on them. It is significant that shortly after their escape we began to receive heavy mortar fire in the draw.

At 1100 BLT 3/25 was ordered to move out and attack to the beach road. At 1430 the objective was reached. At 1700 the CO of BLT 3/25 informed CT 25 that its zone of action had been secured. All caves, except one in the draw, were blown shut by "L" company and the engineers. In one large cave a Jap officer dressed in a blue uniform was seen to commit suicide just as the walls of the cave fell in on him. Elements of "E" company reached the road shortly after we did. We set up a defense for the night tying in with "E" company on the beach road on the left and bending back and tying in with Regimental Weapons company for the night. Some sniper fire was received from the high ground in the zone of action of BLT 2/24. The night was uneventful.

	D / 25	
	16 March, 1945.	
	Off	Enl
Hq	9	160
I	2	101
K	3	81
L	2	81
Total	16	423

At 0800 the CO of BLT 3/25 ordered a detail from "I" & "K" companies to de-activate and remove all anti-personnel mines placed by them in TA 184 S, X, and 167 D. One platoon of "I" company was ordered to return to the east ridge, mop up, bury all Japanese dead, and bring all Marine dead to the beach road. "L" company was ordered to return to the head of the draw, make another sweep through the draw, mopping up as they proceeded, burying all Japanese dead, and moving all Marine dead to the beach road. "K" company was ordered to remain in position. The engineers were ordered to demolish all remaining enemy positions particularly the one cave in the draw which had not been destroyed the day before because of darkness.

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At 1200 "L" companies had completed their missions. However, the engineers encountered considerable difficulty in their attempts to demolish the cave, although at dawn a patrol passed this cave without incident. The engineers found it to be strongly defended by rifle men situated in crevices covering all approaches. One platoon of "L" company and one platoon of "K" company were sent to the high ground to assist the engineers in their attempt to approach the cave. At 1800 this cave was finally demolished by bulldozing a road in from the beach road to a point approximately 50 yards short of its mouth. The bulldozer was withdrawn and a flame thrower tank sent in closely followed by engineers equipped with demolition charges. Both the tank and the engineers were completely protected by riflemen. The tank expended its entire load of napalm and the engineers collapsed the entire mouth of the cave by a series of large demolition charges. It was estimated that approximately 50 Japs were killed.

In the meantime the balance of BLT 3/25 had formed a line running from the beach to a point in TA 184 S and together with BLT 2/25 and BLT 1/25 on its right at 1300 began a concentrated drive westwardly, mopping up, moving all equipment, ammunition, water, etc., to the beach road and searching out all positions that could possibly house the enemy. This work was completed at 1700 and BLT 3/25 went into an assembly area in 184 U, V, and 167 A, where the companies set up perimeter defense. "L" company provided a strong outpost on the beach in 167 D.

The night passed without incident.

D / 26  
17 March, 1945.

	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Hq	9	160
I	2	101
K	3	81
L	2	81
Total	16	423

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All anti-personnel mines were brought to the dump in the East Boat Basin and in turn delivered to CT 25.

At 1530 LT 3/25 embarked aboard LST 634 having discarded all ammunition still retained in the Beach Blue 2 salvage dump.


At 1900 all hands, tired but happy were embarked aboard USS Grimes (APA-172).

#### RECAPITULATION OF CASUALTIES

	Total Casualties (Third Battalion plus replacements)			Total Casualties (Third Battalion only)	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>		<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
KIA	10	179		9	138
WE	23	497		18	412
MIA		7			7
SE	1	56			40
WNE	5	54		5	51
Total	39	793	Total	32	648

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199



168

BLT-3/25  
2000 19 FEB. 45  
D-Day


181

(11)  
3725

168

BLT-3/25  
1800 FEB. 20, 1945  
D+1

194





(L)

167

D+2  
D+3

BLT - 3/25  
21 FEB 45  
D+2  
D+3  
22 FEB 45

BLT 3/25  
1800 26 FEB 45  
D+7



Dr.

903

L Co. 25th.  
D+16-D+17  
7-8 Mar 45  
2  
3  
0-18

149

BLT 3/25  
D+7-D+17  
26-28 Feb. 45  
1-8 Mar. 45

199


DLT 3/25  
1000 27 FEB 45  
D + 8



1000

167

DLT 3/25  
28 FEB 7 1 MAR 45  
D + 9 + 10



203


165

1000  
D + 10

129

203

BLT - 3/25  
2 MAR. 45  
D+11




D+11



BLT - 3/25  
5 MAR 45  
D+45

203


165



D+14




165



203

BLT 3/25  
10 Mar 45  
D+19

166



203

BLT 3/25  
13 Mar 45  
D+22



203

166

23  
25

BLT. 3/25  
14 Mar 45  
D+23

220

166

24  
25

BLT. 3/25  
15 Mar 45  
D+24

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## Section V Comments & Recommendations

BLT 3/25

### 1. Personnel.

- (a) Provide a 10% increase before combat in officer and enlisted strength to permit units remaining at planned strength for longer periods.
- (b) Train replacements as units to replace units. Thus a squad would replace a squad. When an individual replaces a casualty he is unfamiliar to the members of the unit to which assigned and they to him. Ordinarily when replacements are needed whole squads are needed.

### 2. Training.

- (a) Make available in training in greater quantity the types of ammunition to be used in combat; i.e., 60mm HE and illuminating, hand grenades, anti-tank grenades, illuminating grenades, bazooka rockets. Only by their use in training can the individual learn their potentialities and limitations.

### 3. Weapons.

- (a) The individual weapons (.30 cal. rifle, carbine, BAR, .45 cal. pistol) were excellent. The waterproof covers for weapons were ideal and some were still in use at the end of the operation. The TBA should be amended to make them standard issue with a liberal replacement allowance. The supply of lubricate for the M-1 and a heavier oil for all automatic weapons should be increased.
- (b) Substitute a shoulder stock light machine gun with bipod for the present light machine gun. The latter cannot be fired as an individual weapon and provides too high a silhouette. More often than once by reason of casualties in the crew, the tripod was not available for use with the gun.
- (c) It is recommended that the anti-tank grenade launcher be considered an accessory with each M-1 and carbine. The anti-tank grenade with its penetration effect proved an invaluable weapon. It was even used as a sort of

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knee mortar and we were limited in its use only by the scarcity of launchers.

- (d) Discard as obsolete the large bayonet. After four operations we have yet to use it against the enemy. Issue in its place, the short type bayonet which can be used as such, if necessary, and also as a combat knife. This would obviate the necessity of also carrying the combat knife.
- (e) The bazooka men, flame throwers, and radio operators should be provided with the .45 cal. pistol to permit greater freedom in the handling of their basic weapon or load. The Thompson .45 cal. sub-machine gun should be issued on the basis of one for every two wiremen.
- (f) Amend the TBA to increase the allowance of 81mm mortars per landing team to six. Increase the unit of fire to 140 rounds of HE light, 60 rounds HE medium, and 60 rounds WP. Time and again effective use could not be made of these weapons, which are among the best we have because of scarcity of ammunition. Further, the reserve supplies were limited, and near the end of the operation were reported nearly exhausted. Obtain delayed fuse ammunition for the 81mm medium.
- (g) It is recommended that the 155mm mortar be included as a regimental weapon. We need a projectile of that size whose trajectory will get it into deep defiles and pack a greater wallop than the 81mm mortar.
- (h) The 75mm half track and 37mm anti-tank gun of Regimental Weapons Company have outlived their usefulness and should be discarded in favor of the self propelled 105mm howitzer and 37mm gun.

#### 4. Transportation.

- (a) It is recommended that the TBA be amended to provide for each Landing Team:

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- 1 jeep and trailer per rifle company  
 2 ambulance jeeps  
 1 wire jeep  
 2 TCS jeeps  
 1 6x6 truck for 81 mm mortar platoon  
 2 6x6 trucks for supply

These changes will provide, organically, enough transportation to carry ammunition, water, food, spare machine guns, and demolitions, for each rifle company; moving supply of 81 mm ammunition and quick transportation of the guns and ready ammunition; more ambulance capacity for the wounded and preclude the necessity of carrying aid station equipment in the ambulance; transportation for wire switch boards, TBX radios, etc; and does not contemplate any vehicles for other than strict utility.

#### 5. Communication.

- (a) Too much credit cannot be given the SCR-300 for the success of the past operation. It is recommended that they be issued on the following basis:

6 per battalion-----	4 to companies
2 per 81 mm mortar platoon	1 to battalion CO
1 per engineer platoon	1 to battalion CP
1 per half-track platoon	
1 per 37mm platoon	
1 battalion reserve (essential for replacement)	
1 Bn-4	

- (b) SCR-536; Absolutely essential to the proper control of platoons. The minimum requirement is 21 for each battalion -- 6 per company with one on each channel in battalion reserve.

- (c) TCS Jeeps should be continued on the basis of 2 per Landing Team, plus the addition of the 610 radio for the Regimental net.

#### 6. Supply.

- (a) The new type "C" ration is excellent and was preferred to the exclusion of the old type and to the "K" ration. Troops will often go hungry rather than eat either of the latter. The can should be painted an O.D. color. In

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spite of efforts to maintain camouflage discipline there often isn't time to bury or conceal the shiny can. The 10 in 1 ration and fruit juices are excellent aids in the maintenance of morale in addition to their nutritive value. Contrary to past experiences, their supply was adequate throughout the operation.

- (b) Provide and furnish automatically 1 pair of socks and 1 set of underwear each week; 1 set of utility garments for each two weeks; and 1 pair of shoes per month. Get them in and up to the assault troops, without requisition, based on their effective strength.
- (c) Eliminate the unpalatable strength of water in water cans.
- (d) Increase salvage activities in rear areas recovering fallen and damaged weapons. Repair them and have them immediately available for re-issue.

7. Air Support.

- (a) Too much cannot be said on the subject of air support of ground troops. A radical change both in theory and practice is in order. It was obvious at the time we were attempting to establish a beach head (if not before) that the enemy had elected to defend in force on the high ground in the northern half of the island. That entire area thereupon should have been literally "drenched" with 2000 pound bombs armed with a delayed action fuse.
- (b) Strafing and rocket firing on anything other than targets of opportunity appeared to be a waste of time and ammunition.
- (c) The high number of duds demonstrates the need for a new type fuse in the napalm bomb. The effectiveness of this type bomb at best is a matter of conjecture.
- (d) Likewise, the effectiveness of the 100 and 200 pound bomb on positions such as were encountered on Two Jima is open to doubt. They seemed too light to accomplish the desired result.
- (e) Repeated dummy runs over targets must have destroyed the elements of surprise. It is recommended that they be held to a minimum.

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- (f) Direct communication on VHF on the SAD net between the Landing Team Air Liaison Officer and the Air Coordinator is strongly recommended. Mistakes can be quickly corrected. Location of front lines can be quickly given. Marking of targets with white phosphorous can be better coordinated.

8. Artillery.

- (a) The practice of landing forward observers with assault units should be discontinued. Until their batteries have landed there is no need to expose them uselessly to fire.

9. Tactics.

- (a) Have more direct contact and reconnaissance by higher echelon.
- (b) Make it a point of honor among units to report where they actually are and not where they would like to be or where they think they can get.
- (c) When attacking down corridors artillery should be emplaced to fire down corridors. This was requested prior to the attack on D / 19 and refused.

JAMES G. HEADLEY.

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ANNEX "A" TO BLT3/25 BASIC REPORT

### ADMINISTRATION

1. The casualty cards proved to be an excellent means of reporting casualties during the past operation. They afford the Officer or NCO reporting casualties a means of getting his reports to Regimental Headquarters with a minimum of mistakes and time lost.

The Quartermaster should make boxes to carry these cards which should be waterproof, large enough to carry for all members of a landing team plus room for blank cards and at the same time be small enough to carry in a haversack.

### TOTAL CASUALTIES (THIRD BATTALION PLUS REPLACEMENTS)

	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
KIA	10	179
WE	23	497
MIA		7
SE	1	56
WNE	5	54
Total	<u>39</u>	<u>793</u>

	<u>REPLACEMENTS</u>	
KIA	1	41
WE	5	85
SE	1	16
WNE		3
Total	<u>7</u>	<u>145</u>

2. This battalion found a large number of men who were reported missing in action through reports from ships that received casualties, therefore it is recommended that all ships continue to keep one NCO aboard ship when reaching a target for the purpose of reporting all casualties that are evacuated to the ship to which he is assigned.

3. Reports from the Division Headquarters showing grave numbers etc., were a great help to this battalion in obtaining information that is required for our reports, letters of condo-

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lence etc. It is recommended that the date of burial be shown on these reports so that Commanding Officers would receive all information pertaining to deaths at the same time.

4. Replacements joined this battalion without rosters of any type. Each man had to be interviewed personally to get the information on each man that must be on record. At the same time we were receiving mortar and sniper fire and getting set for the night ahead. It is recommended that the battalion be furnished with information on some type of a roster when they join replacements.

5. It is recommended that all NCO's be given more school on reporting of casualties during combat. When the original Platoon Sergeant and Sergeants were evacuated, the First Sergeants found it very difficult to obtain correct reports from their platoons. The junior NCO's did not place enough importance on casualty reports.

6. This battalion headquarters and all company headquarters carried three sets of records in on D-day and this proved to be the wise thing to do as a number of records were lost through casualties. After D-day only two sets of records need to be kept.

7. It is recommended that the TBA be amended to provide two (2) portable type-writers for use by Battalion Headquarters enroute to, at, and returning from the objective. The standard typewriter is too fragile to withstand rough handling. Unless we have access to typewriters belonging to the transports we are at a distinct disadvantage in handling necessary administration work.

8. The morale of the troops of BLT 3 were commensurate with the success of the operation. A failure to keep moving and take ground contributed more than any other factor towards lessening our morale.

The delivery of mail to troops in the front lines is very conducive to a high state of morale. However, its distribution must be judicious for fear of impairing a state of alertness.

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An adequate supply of 10 in 1 rations and the new type "C" ration is also very conducive to high morale.

9. A short communion service volunteered by the Catholic Chaplain of CT 23 was the extent of religious services held by this Landing Team during the operation. Religious services should be arranged aboard LST's enroute to the target either by assigning a Chaplain to each LST or arranging for Chaplains to go aboard and hold services at all way points.

10. The providing for sale of post exchange supplies aboard LST's enroute to the target was highly successful. However, a post exchange officer should come aboard at the staging area, receive the proceeds of the sales, and arrange for the disposition of all unused articles.

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HANLEY BAKER to BLT 3/25 BASIC REPORT

## INTELLIGENCE

### 1. Maps, Photographs and Supplementary Intelligence.

- (a) The maps received were partially incorrect with reference to contours etc. It is recommended in the future that enemy gun emplacements and other installations be left off operations maps. Information of that sort can be furnished through the medium of overlays and situation maps. The 1:50,000 map was used most during this operation. The 1:25,000 was used for instructional purposes only as this map was too large for use in the field.
- (b) The photographs received were entirely satisfactory, but they only covered the ground from the beach to the OL line in this battalion's zone of action. It is recommended in the future that low altitude photographs be taken from day to day during the operation and be issued to the battalions with their combat orders showing their respective zone of action.
- (c) The hydrographic information concerning the beach was for the most part incorrect. Ninety percent of the vehicles that landed in the assault waves of this battalion were lost due to the soft sand on the beach. Hydrographic information indicated we could land vehicles without difficulty.

### 2. Intelligence Functioning.

- (a) Every morning intelligence men went to the front line companies to search the enemy dead and to pick up any other intelligence matter that could be found within our zone of action. This material was sent immediately to R-2.
- (b) (above)
- (c) Communications were excellent.

### 3. Prisoners, without delay, were rushed from the frontlines to the R-2.

### 4. See 2. above.

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5. Propaganda was almost useless, although one prisoner states that he had heard the loud speaker which was used asking the enemy to surrender.
6. No counter intelligence.
7. No comment on public relations.
8. The enemy.
- (a) Iwo Jima was divided by the enemy into zones of defense each of which were defended to the death.
  - (b) The enemy abandoned his former tactics of "dying for the Emperor" in wild banzai attacks. No large scale counter-attacks or attempts at infiltration were noted by this Landing Team. The enemy seemed content to take up the best defensive positions possible and exact as high a toll as possible before being overrun.
  - (c) No new type equipment or weapons were noted with the exception of the large rocket shell.

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Annex "CHARLIE" to BLT 3/25 Basic Report

### OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

#### 1. Rehearsal exercises.

(a) The exercise held on 13 February, 1945, off Tinian was satisfactory although it only covered the ship to shore movement.

Closer adherence to the plan to be used in the actual operation is to be recommended. For example, this Landing Team disembarked from LST's and landed on Iwo Jima in LVT(2)'s and LVT(4)'s. With but one exception, in all rehearsal exercises held prior to that off Tinian we disembarked from APA's and landed in LCPV's. The resultant confusion in boat assignment tables, landing diagrams, wave schedules, etc., is obvious.

(b) Troops were indoctrinated in details of the operation successively by the Landing Team CO, Company CO, and Platoon Leader. Thus the individual could see the parts to be played by himself, his platoon, company and Landing Team. Maps, aerial photographs, and the relief map were made readily accessible to all who desired further study.

2. Tanks had difficulty getting inland because of the ledges along the beach. Their initial penetration was accomplished with the aid of a bulldozer tank that soon after had its blade blown off by a mine.

3. The weapons found most effective against fortified positions were the flame thrower, bazooka, and anti-tank grenades. This anomaly is explained by the fact that in all our contacts with fortified positions we were too close to use air, artillery, or naval gunfire support; the terrain was unsuitable for tanks or other tracked vehicles; and the 37mm gun could not be man handled into position because of intense enemy fire.

4. Portable flame throwers were used to the utmost and with excellent results against pillboxes, gun emplacements, caves, and other fortified positions. If possible the range should be increased.

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Effective use of the tank flame thrower was denied by the difficulties of terrain.

5. Tanks were used as assault guns against positions in the East Boat Basin and were essential to the securing of that area..

LVT(A) (4)'s were used in beach defenses at night. They made two firing runs along the beaches in TA 185 and 186 in which they fired .75 WP and HE into caves at a range of 300 yards. Results could not be observed.

6. Infantry-tanks coordination was virtually nil due to the fact that most objectives were inaccessible to tanks.

7. Enemy anti-tank measures. Several areas in our zone of action were heavily mined.

8. War dogs were used satisfactorily as sentry duty at night around the Landing Team CP. Two dogs were sent out with Anti-Sniper patrols, but seemed to be too shaken by mortar fire to be of much use.

9. Anti-Tank grenades and bazooka rockets were used effectively in all phases of fire and movement. They were even used as a sort of knee mortar against snipers hiding behind the rocks.

10. Contrary to our experience in the Marshalls and Marianas, the enemy remained in his defensive positions until finally over-run. Large scale counter-attacks and attempts at infiltration in large numbers were not attempted in our zone of action.

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Annex "D" to BLR 3/25 Basic Report

Supply

(j) Transport Quartermaster.

It took thirty six (36) hours to unload Landing Team #3, it's equipment and gear from APA-193. This time could have been shortened if more experienced winch crew's had been available.

Too many pallets were used. This should be avoided, due to their bulkiness. They are hard and slow to handle and take up more room than they are worth.

Gasoline in 5 gallon cans should not be palletized. They should be handled free to store them in gas lockers aboard APA's.

At least two LST's should be combat loaded with infantry ammunition and equipment only, thereby making a ready supply of ammunition that can be transported by LVT's and DUKW's from ship to front line troops without unloading on beach. This caused a big delay in the Iwo Jima operation where LCVP's could not land due to wave and beach conditions. AFM's had to send LCVP's to control vessels and there transfer their cargo to tractors.

The only unloading difficulty encountered was due to the fact that cargo could not be transferred because of the inability of LCVP's to land on beaches because of surf conditions and weather.

Double hook slings were used on all winches and no trouble was experienced in unloading cargo into small boats.

(k) Ordnance

(1) Weapons.

a. Number, type and caliber of weapons used.

M-1's	- - - - -	510
Carbines	- - - - -	380
IMG	- - - - -	18
HMG	- - - - -	18
60mm	- - - - -	12

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81mm - - - - - 6  
BAR's - - - - - 81  
Bazookas - - - - - 9  
Flame throwers - - 9  
.45 Automatics - - 18

b. The number of days battle use varied from one to twenty-six.

c. Number, type and caliber of weapons lost.

M-1's - - - - - 371	81mm - - - - - 0
Carbines - - - - - 96	BAR's - - - - - 63
LMG - - - - - 3	Bazookas - - - - - 6
HMG - - - - - 6	Flame Throwers - 4
60mm - - - - - 4	.45 Automatic - 16

d. No serious malfunctions.

e. Adequacy of spare parts and accessories. Spare parts were inadequate prior to and during the operation. During the operation it was necessary to strip weapons of the casualties in order to replace parts.

f. Recommendations as to modifications of existing types and for new types. See "Comments and Recommendations" in Basic Report.

## (2) Combat Vehicles.

a. Number and type of combat vehicles used:

Nine 4X4  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton vehicles. (Jeeps)

b. Number days battle employment:

Varied from one day to twenty-six.

c. Number and type lost or damaged beyond repair:

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Four 4X4  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton vehicles (Jeeps)

d. Malfunctions:

No serious malfunctions.

e. Principle items of maintenance difficulty:

None.

f. Adequacy of spare parts and accessories:

Fair.

g. Recommendations for new type vehicles:

See "Comments and Recommendations" in Basic Report.

(3) Ammunition.

a. Number of rounds, by exact nomenclature, expended (rounds lost):

Cartridge, Cal. 30, belted - - - - -	42,000
Cartridge, Cal. 30 - - - - -	37,000
Cartridge, AP, Cal. 30 - - - - -	36,000
Cartridge, Carbine, Cal. 30, M-1 - - - - -	6,500
Cartridge, Cal. .45, ball- - - - -	450
Rockets, AT, 2.36", M6A1 - - - - -	785
Rockets, smoke, W. P., 2.36" - - - - -	180
Grenades, AT, M9A1 - - - - -	1,950
Grenades, hand, fragmentation, MK11A1- w/fuse M10a3 - - - - -	4,950
Grenades, hand, smoke, WP, M15 - - - - -	1,275
Grenades, hand, smoke, HC- - - - -	150
Grenades, hand, illuminating, MK1- - - - -	800
Grenades, hand, smoke, colored, assorted - - - - -	37
Shell, HE, M49A2, w/fuse timefused, PDM52 60mm mortar - - - - -	19,900

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Shell, smoke, WP, T6, 60mm mortar	- - - -	5,800
Shell, illuminating, M83, w/fuse time-		
fired, M65, 60mm mortar	- - - -	650
Shell, HE, M56, w/fuse PDM 52, 81mm mortar	-	7,500
Shell, HE, M56, w/fuse, PDM53, 81mm mortar	-	3,200
Shell, smoke, WP, M57, w/fuse, PDM52, 81mm mortar	- - - -	300

b. Method of supply was by vehicle from Regiment to Battalion; By vehicle from Battalion to company; Man-handled by working parties from the company dumps to the front lines.

c. No problems of storage.

d. Adequacy:

Shortages of illumination in Mortar ammunition.  
Types and packaging adequate.

e. Recommend changes in U/F:

See "Comments and Recommendations" in Basic Report.

f. New types desired:

A delayed action 81mm medium.

(4) Miscellaneous Ordnance Equipment:

No Comment.

(5) Enemy Material.

No Comment.

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MEDICAL

- (1) Embarkation:  
a. Personnel.

All the personnel of the Third Battalion Hospital Corps embarked on the USS SANBORN at Maui, T. H. on December 23, 1944. This group included:

- 35 Third Battalion Hospital Corpsmen.
- 1 Chief Pharmacist's Mate (3rd Gr).
- 2 Battalion Surgeons.
- 12 Collecting Section Corpsmen from "A" Med. Co., 4th Medical Battalion.

One Corpsman embarked two days earlier with gear. Therefore, the total hospital personnel was 51. After Division maneuvers, 15 of the corpsmen went aboard LST's with the line companies leaving 35 of the hospital personnel aboard the AFA 193.

- b. Material.

Medical supplies were loaded two days previous to embarkation and were under the personal supervision of a hospital corpsman. Nomenclature of all material was in possession of the supervisor. The medical gear included:

- Two cases of Saline Glucose.
- Two pre-loaded jeeps and one trailer.
- Six seabags of aid station supplies for carrying ashore in the assault waves.
- Two cases of serum albumin.
- Units (medical) #5a, #5b, #8, #10, #11a, #11b, #12a, #12b, #15, #17 (Contents of units to be discussed later).
- Each corpsman was fully equipped with his personal medical units.
- Three cases of Plasma.

- (2) Aboard Ship:

- a. Sickness.

Only minor ailments prevailed among the troops. There was no major surgery done on any of our troops enroute. No epidemics occurred.

- b. Sanitary Conditions.

- 1. Heads: Heads were above board in cleanliness. Head facilities were far superior than previously encountered.

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2. Living quarters: Fairly comfortable in spite of the fact that the entire mass was over crowded. Ventilation was adequate in most all compartments.
3. Messes: Food aboard the USS SANBORN was superior in its preparation, quality, and variety than previously encountered.
4. Galleys: As far as cleanliness, they were excellent. The facilities for eating (standing, wet decks, and heat) weren't much improved over previously traveled ships.
5. Cooks and messmen: Previous to entering the galley, all cooks and messmen were given a routine physical examination. Daily checks were made by troop medical officers. Cleanliness prevailed during the entire trip.

c. Special precautions:

Daily inspections were made of troop compartments, galleys, cooks and messmen in the A. M. by troop officers and in the P. M. by ship's officers.

(3) Debarkation:

a. Personnel.

1. Wave: All medical personnel were in the 8th wave, except the fifteen corpsmen who were attached to the line companies and who landed in earlier waves with the assault troops (N.B. property man and jeep driver were left aboard ship).
2. How located: Personnel were divided into 3 boats--  
In 8-1 were the Sr. Medical Officer and seven Corpsmen.  
In 8-2 were the assistant Bn. Surgeon and seven Corpsmen.  
In 8-4 were the Chief PhM. and six Corpsmen.

While proceeding to the line of departure, the boat 8-2 began to sink, making it necessary to transfer the medical personnel to another boat (8-5).

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3. Time of landing: At approximately 1017 D-Day, the boats in the 8th wave hit the beach.

b. Material:

1. How transported: The medical material was equally distributed among the medical personnel and was loaded by same into their respective LCV's. All material and resupplies not necessary for the initial landing were left aboard ship and landed later on. (The jeep & trailer came ashore D/5 and the property man, with medical gear, landed D/11).

2. & 3. Time of Landing: Six seabags of varied supplies, three units of plasma (12 per unit), Unit 5A, and 12 stretchers were carried ashore by corpsmen in the 8th wave at 1017. See above for jeep and additional gear.

c. Losses of personnel and material:

One seabag of supplies was lost in debarking. No information regarding the ambulance jeep attached to the collecting section has been obtained. No personnel were lost in debarking. Our jeep driver and jeep were afloat in a Higgins boat for four days before being allowed to land.

(4) Ashore-Assault Phase:

a. Medical Installations.

1. When set up: Installations for proper treatment and evacuation were not established until 1630 D-Day. Explanation of this: The troops and the medical unit landing in the 8th wave landed on Yellow Beach #1 instead of Blue Beach #1. Shortly after landing, the CP moved moved up the beach to Blue Beach #1. In the confusion caused by the mortar, artillery, and rocket barrage, the aid station group was split up. The collecting section of 12 disappeared and weren't heard of again until D/5.

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Reaching the area of the CP on Blue Beach #1, the aid station group consisted of the two Battalion surgeons, the chief PhM., and four corpsmen, with this group was only one seabag of supplies and one case of plasma. This group carried on treatment and evacuation as best they could. By 1430 D-Day, this group consisted of the assistant battalion surgeon and two corpsmen. The battalion surgeon and one corpsman had been mortally wounded by mortar fragments, the chief PhM. had been critically wounded, and one corpsman developed hysteria and had to be evacuated. Treatment of patients carried on by this group was done directly on the beach without any cover.

The remaining group of corpsmen stayed on Yellow Beach #1 and operated as a group there. They had the bulk of supplies.

By 1600 D-Day, the CP and sick bay moved off the beach inland about 150 yards. The sick bay (composed of three) set up in a shell hole there.

At 1630 D-Day, the assistant regimental surgeon, the regimental Chief PhM., and two regimental corpsmen joined us. Approximately 30 minutes later our other corpsman and supplies reached us. It was then, that we began to function as an organized aid station.

From then on, the aid station was in, as the near proximity of, the third battalion CP.

2. Location with regard to:

a. Roads and Trails:

During the first two days of the battle, there were no roads in our field of action. All evacuation was done by stretcher bearers from

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front lines to the aid station and then to the beach evacuation party. On D/2, D/3, D/4, we were able to use a duck to transport patients from the aid station to the beach evacuation center. From then on, we were able to use ambulance jeeps to go from the aid station reasonably close to the front lines to pick up patients, and the roads back to beach evacuation center and later on to the Division hospital were good enough for our jeeps to travel on.

After our troops reached the high ground, the trails of evacuation to points at which the jeep could reach, were literally damnable. Stretcher bearers had a tough time of it.

- b. Cover: During the first three days of battle, the aid station had no cover at all. On the 4th & 5th days we were in a Jap dugout with the 2ndBn., 25th's aid station. We were then pulled back in reserve for two days near the Regimental CP. There was no cover there. Our next aid station was set up in a Jap dugout in the quarry--this was a God send to us. It aided greatly in giving better treatment to the patients. Where we were set up in the East Boat Basin area during the last days of the battle, we used a concrete pit for the aid station. This worked out very satisfactorily.
- c. Dispersion: Throughout most of the operation we maintained four corpsmen in each of the three line companies, one corpsman for the 81mm mortar platoon, and 20 corpsmen in the aid station. At times, due to heavy casualties in the groups this dispersion was altered. Due to the rugged terrain, we found it necessary to keep the line companies supplied with four corpsmen and operate with less in the aid station.
- d. Other medical installations: This included the (1) beach evacuation aid station which operated throughout most of the campaign, (2) the division hospital which began to function on D/12, (3) the V.P.C. hospital which was used

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during the last three days of our needs, (4) other battalion aid stations. I might say that the battalion aid stations cooperated very well in helping out one another. Often times the path of evacuation from front lines was closer to another aid station who took over the evacuation and treatment. This proved a great time saver and great advantage to the patients.

- e. Proximity to critical points: Except for the last 10 days of battle, our aid station was reasonably close to the front lines and the beach evacuation stations or Division hospital. From then on, evacuation was very difficult. Part of our companies casualties had to be evacuated over a road about  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles from our aid stations. It was then, that we called on the regiment for extra transportation. We also employed the use of other aid stations operating closer to the lines. The "Beach road" was perfect for evacuating casualties from "I" Company.
- f. Natural line of drift of walking wounded to the rear D-Day, it was apparent that there was much self-evacuation. The percentage of walking casualties was very small.

3. Protective measures taken:

- a. Local security: At all times the aid station maintained a 50% security watch.
- b.c.&d. Cover, concealment, shelters and dugouts: This has been discussed on page 10 under topic b. (cover).
- e. Blackout precautions: These were strictly adhered to. During the night when light was necessary to treat patients, a flash light was used under cover of poncho, blankets, or dugouts. Jeeps drove without lights.

b. Hospitalization:

Medical companies working in the division hospital did all the hospitalization except for those that were

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evacuated to hospital ships or by air to other islands.  
We did not hospitalize ourselves.

c. Evacuation:

1. How effected.

The first two days evacuation was carried out by stretcher bearers from front lines to aid station thence to the beach. During the first day there was a great deal of self evacuation of the walking wounded. From the beach, patients were evacuated by any available transportation to hospital ships.

On the third and fourth days, the evacuation was carried out by stretcher bearers to the aid stations and by amphibious ducks to the beach.

During the remaining days on Iwo the evacuation was carried on by jeeps from front lines to aid stations and from there to beach evacuation centers, and the division hospital.

2. Adequate or inadequate:

During the first four days evacuation was very poorly effected. The first day it was exceedingly poor. The corpsmen received no cooperation to speak of from the Marines, and the drivers of the means of transportation from beach to ships were very unfair--one practically had to beg on hands and knees to get the transportation to wait long enough to receive patients. I'm sure more cooperation would have saved lives, however, I'm well aware of the difficulties encountered by the vehicle drivers.

When our troops were in the high, rugged terrain, evacuation wasn't entirely adequate, due in part to the terrain itself and the limited personnel of the aid station. A collecting section was really indicated on this operation but ours failed to materialize. Replacements weren't available.

d. Casualties treated:

1. Number.

- a. Retained-----85 (minor wounds)
- b. Evacuated-----390 (wounded and sick).

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c. Died-----20 ( includes those received dead at the aid and those dying at the aid station).

N.B. It is estimated that our aid station personnel treated and evacuated an additional 150 to 200 patients D-Day of which we have no records due to circumstances beyond our control at the time.

2. Type:

During the first phase of the invasion, most of the wounds were due to fragments from mortar, rocket, and artillery shells. These wounds on the whole were very disabling and severe, such as legs and arms blown or torn off, and powder burns.

During the latter phase, the greatest percentage of wounds treated were bullet wounds inflicted by snipers. Amazingly enough, these wounds reflected the superior marksmanship of the Japs, for they were mostly located above the waist line and a goodly percentage were head wounds.

Other types of wounds were phosphorous burns and those inflicted by land mines and booby-traps.

Many of the casualties were grouped under the heading of "combat fatigue" cases. Under this heading were including just plain physically tired cases up to those who were violently hysterical.

3. Walking wounded-----30%)

of our casualties.

4. Stretcher cases -----70%)

e. Sanitation:

1. Special measures:

- 1) All the troops clothing was sprayed with DDT powder before debarkation. Clothing was also treated with "seet".
- 2) Bivouac areas were policed whenever feasible to do so.
- 3) Aid station and CP areas were sprayed with DDT powder on two occasions. Areas were sprayed by planes on several occasions, too.
- 4) Slit trenches or fireproof heads were available

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at all times.

2. Food:

Food in the field this time was far superior to that on Saipan or Tinian. In addition to K-rations, there were liberal supplies of fruits, fruit juices, better C-rations, and some IO in I rations which are good!

3. Water:

Water throughout the operation was furnished to the troops by the quartermaster in 5 gallon cans. It was reasonably palatable. At no time did the aid station lack for plenty of water.

f. Disposal of Dead:

1. Our: Although, disposal of the dead is primarily a function of the Division and regiment, the job was forced upon our own troops in great extent. Therefore, it wasn't too satisfactory for obvious reasons. More consideration to this problem should be taken by the Division primarily for sanitary reasons and secondarily it's bad on the morale of the troops to leave their own dead amongst them for days.

2. Enemy: Most of the enemy dead, not buried by the Japs, were buried by our front line troops.

3. Sanitary precautions taken: As rapid a disposal as possible.

g. Epidemics or unusual diseases in troops:

None were encountered. Toward the end of the assault phase, outbreaks of mild cases of diarrhea were a problem. Very few, however, required evacuation.

h. Dental service: None supplied.

i. Care of Civilians: None treated by us.

j. Care of P.O.W.'s: None treated by us.

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k. Medical Organization:

1. Suitability of present type.

As far as the battalion setup itself is concerned, I haven't much to say. However, I think the replacement personnel arrangement and quality of same are inadequate. We needed a collecting section badly and good replacements. The collecting section we did have failed us miserably by disappearing D-Day and making no attempt to notify us as to its fate until D+5. The quality and ability of the replacement corpsmen we received from the medical companies were far inferior to our qualifications and needs. The greater part of them exhibited cowardice, lack of training, and general unwillingness making them little more than useless to our cause.

2. Suggested changes:

Better indoctrination of the division hospital corpsmen reserves. Either a rotation plan should be effected among the division and regimental corpsmen, or the former should be made to train along with the battalion corpsmen.

1. Medical Personnel:

1. Adequate or inadequate:

Throughout the operation on Iwo Jima our battalion operated with less than their normal quota of corpsmen. This hindered to a certain extent our functioning to our fullest ability.

The quality of the replacements was discussed above.

2. Employment:

Our personnel was employed to get the fullest possible efficiency. The line companies are allowed three corpsmen, but all found it necessary to employ four to each. Had we more corpsmen, five per company could have been used very favorably.

3. Losses and replacements:

a. Of the two battalion surgeons, 1 chief, and the 36 corpsmen that left Maui the following facts occurred:

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- 1) Battalion Surgeon was fatally wounded. (D-Day).
- 2) Chief PhM. was critically wounded and evacuated. (D-Day).
- 3) Corpsmen killed-----3.
- 4) Corpsmen Wounded and evacuated-----11.
- 5) Corpsmen missing-----1.
- 6) Returning to Maui now there are 21 corpsmen and 1 Battalion Surgeon.

b. Replacements and losses:

- 1) We received 22 corpsmen and one M.D. during the operation.
- 2) The M. D. joined us on D+5 and stayed with us until our departure from Iwo. He was reverted back to the 24th support group. This was done to avoid the paper work necessary to transfer him to our battalion.
- 3) Facts concerning the 22 replacement corpsmen.
  - 1) Received 5 from A-MedCo. These five were originally in our collecting section. Two were wounded and evacuated. Three were transferred at my request.
  - 2) Received 17 from D and E Med. Companies:
    - 4 were sick and evacuated.
    - 8 were wounded and evacuated.
    - 2 were killed in action.
    - 3 returned to companies at the end of our mission.
  - 4) State of training: Topic discussed under heading K page 20.
  - 5) Specialties needed: This is a problem of the medical companies.

m.) Medical supplies and equipment.

n.) 1. Amount carried:

In the 8th wave, six seabags of medical supplies were carried ashore. Each consisted of battle dressings, sulfa-drugs, two units of plasma, triangular bandages, roller bandages, wood splints, morphine packets, tourniquets.

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There were enough supplies in these bags, exclusive of plasma, to last about 10 days. In addition there were three cases of plasma (12 units), a unit 5A (containing general sick call gear), and 12 stretchers were carried ashore.

Our ambulance jeep was pre-loaded with one case of plasma, a unit 5B (additional sick call unit), a unit 8 (containing leg splints, two cases of serum albumin, and five stretchers. The jeep with supplies reached us D/5.

We also had an ambulance jeep attached to the collecting section which contained 20 stretchers. We never received this jeep.

Left aboard ship was the following gear which we received on D/ 11.

Units 11a, 11b-- additional sick call supplies.

Units 12a, 12b,-- sterilizer and operating lamp.

Unit 15-----Blankets.

Unit 17-----Tent.

Unit 10----- (1,2,3,4,)--Chemical warfare equipment.

1 case plasma (24 Units).

1 case saline glucose.

1 box of resupplies to sick call unit, such as pargoric and adhesive tape.

2. Pilferage and losses.

No pilferage.

One seabag of gear was lost in landing.

3. Adequate, inadequate, and overage.

Our supplies were adequate as long as resupply from the regiment and beach was available.

In an operation of this type, I see no need for units 12a, 12b, 17--it's just excess baggage.

4. Re-supply.

For this operation, exclusive of D-Day our Resupply was adequate except there was a constant demand for stretchers which at times were difficult to procure.

o. Motor vehicles and rolling stock.

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in our type carried.

We had one jeep (ambulance) and trailer attached to the 3rd Bn aid station. This came ashore D+5.

An additional ambulance jeep was attached to our collecting section for use.

2. Losses: We never received the collecting section jeep after landing. Do not know its fate.
3. D-2&3 We had at our disposal an amphibious duck which was a great help. Ambulance jeep could not have operated in the sand.

From D+5 on, we had the use of two ambulance jeeps--our own and one loaned to us from a Med. Company. These jeeps operated as such (ambulances) throughout the operation.

We found that the trailer was of no use, for our jeep could not pull it over the terrain encountered.

4. Adequacy: The two jeeps were sufficient most of the time. We had available one or two jeeps from regiment on call. We used them on two separate days.
5. Improvements: A Weasel-ambulance jeep for sandy beaches as encountered on Iwo.

op. Quartermaster equipment and supplies.

1.2. & 3. Does not concern the medical dept.

4. Reclothing of patients--this was taken care of by the Division Hospital and Hospital ships.

5. & 6 Does not concern the Medical Dept.

q. Malaria and Epidemic control equipment and supplies.

This was all taken care of by the Division.

Not a problem on this operation.

- (5) Ashore---After completion of the assault phase: This topic doesn't concern us; for we boarded ship immediately following the assault phase.

(6) Recommendations:

- a. A collection section composed of at least 12 men trained with the battalion for combat. These men need not necessarily be corpsmen, for their assignment has mostly

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- to do with the transport of the patients.
- b. More adequately indoctrinated replacement corpsmen.
  - c. LVT's or Ducks assigned to the aid station specifically for ambulance use during initial phase of battle when ambulance jeeps cannot operate. A Weasel-type ambulance jeep would be a great help.
  - d. More efficient disposal of the dead. This should not fall upon the assault troops.
  - e. Adequate dental service set up in connection with the Division Hospital.
  - f. Recommend that the division hospital not finish operating until all Division troops are out of the assault.
  - g. Leaving behind unnecessary medical units which the past two operations have proved useless.
  - h. Highly recommend continued use of serum albumin even to the exclusion of plasma in the front lines. Reason: 1) it is practically as efficient as plasma for shock 2) Much easier and quicker to administer 3) Takes up much less space and can easily be carried by line company corpsmen.
  - i. Re-clothing of troops at more frequent intervals to prevent skin diseases and infection. A complete change of clothes once a week, or at least a change of socks that frequently.

Submitted by:

Lt. (jg) H. J. Hruze, MC, USNR.  
Bn Surgeon.

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Annex "E" to BLT 3/25 Basic Report

## COMMUNICATIONS

### 1. Planning and preparation.

During the early phases of training very little specialized communication training was possible due to the large amount of time spent in the field with the line companies. However a good deal of practical work was accomplished during this period. In the latter phases more practical experience was possible. In all CPX's, CP's were established in the open with camouflage discipline and digging in stressed due to the bare and open beaches expected of on the objective.

Six line men from each rifle company were trained in the use of the SCR-300. Of these two were chosen as regular operators, and the remainder were to be used as replacements.

Communication personnel replacements did not arrive in sufficient time before embarkation for the operation to adequately train them in battalion communications. These replacements had formerly been radar men and were of no immediate value other than messenger.

Telephone men were trained in overheading wire lines for great distances and the maintenance of these lines were stressed. Radiomen were trained in the use of and minor repair of the SCR-300, SCR-610, TCS, TEX-8. The installations and operation of the remote control units for these sets was stressed during this period.

### 2. Movement to objective.

Before embarkation all equipment was tested and found in good working condition. The supply of all expendable gear was brought up to strength. During transit to target, training consisted of the use of the shackle code, C. W. practice by our men working in the ships radioroom, and briefing of the men on the communication plan. The SCR-300 net held by Regiment while in port was helpful both from the standpoint of means of communication as well as training.

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3. Ship to Shore Movement.

The communication officer plus enough communication personnel to operate two SCR-300 sets was landed in the first boats just after the third wave with the BLT Commander. The remainder of the personnel were landed with the executive officer in the eighth wave. All communications gear was landed on the backs of men in water proofed rubber bags with the exception of wire and extra batteries which were in jeeps and trailers. All jeeps and trailers landed with the assault waves (1 wire jeep and trailer, 2 TC3's) were rendered useless and lost due to the condition of the beach. The only radio net this BLT was able to man after the landing was the SCR-300 net with the companies and the SCR-300 net with the Regiment. It was impossible to man other nets until later in the operation due to loss of personnel or equipment.

Casualties D-Day consisted of 5 wiremen and 7 radiomen.

4. Narrative of operation.

During the operation the radio was used very little to contact the adjacent units of this BLT at night due to the excellent wire communication which was used to great advantage to contact units.

At night wire was laid to all rifle companies with instructions for them to come up on their SCR-300's in case of emergency or wire trouble. The battalion CP maintained a continuous listening watch on the battalion net which proved satisfactory.

The greatest difficulties for the first several days were battery supply and radio repair. The only batteries this BLT were able to land were man-handled.

Some SCR-300's and SCR-536's failed. Since maintenance equipment for the SCR-300 is not issued and maintenance equipment for the SCR-536 could not be landed immediately the radio repairmen was handicapped in his work, having no maintenance equipment or spare parts.

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This battalion had a full supply of batteries and wire aboard ship but, except for the supplies landed by the men, none of these supplies were landed in time to help when the need was most urgent. Division signal repair and quartermaster facilities were not available during the period when communications were most essential.

5. Comments and recommendations.

(a) Each company should have its own individual SCR-536 frequency so as not to interfere or be interfered with by other companies.

(b) All officers and NCO's should be trained in use of the SCR-300 and SCR-536.

(c) All men in company headquarters should be trained in the operation and minor repair of the SCR-300 and 536.

(d) At least 6 men from Company Headquarters should be trained in the operation and minor repair of the SCR-300 and 536.

(e) Battalion communications platoons should be allotted more time during the initial training program to give specialized training.

(f) The 81 mm mortar platoon should have an exclusive channel for the SCR-300 used by the forward observers.

(g) The BLT's should be issued spare parts and maintenance equipment for the SCR-300 and 536, or have signal repair teams land with regiment.

(h) Some provisions should be made to land vital communication supplies along with ammunition, water and food in the early stages of an operation. This could be either under battalion or regimental control.

(i) The battalion communication platoon should be allotted a weasel to land vital communication gear on D-Day.

R. N. DAVIS, JR.

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HEADQUARTERS, FIRST BATTALION  
TWENTY FIFTH MARINES, FOURTH MARINE DIVISION,  
FLEET MARINE FORCE, c/o FLEET POST OFFICE,  
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

APPENDIX IX TO RCT-25 OPERATION REPORT OF IWO JIMA OPERATION  
REPORT OF OPERATIONS ON IWO JIMA OF THE FIRST PROVISIONAL  
BATTALION, RCT-25 FROM 5 MARCH TO 9 MARCH, 1945.

The First Provisional Battalion of the Twenty-fifth Marines, was formed by oral RCT order on D plus 14. The units comprising this Battalion, were: Co "L", BLT-3/25, plus one squad of engineers under the command of Lieutenant Ing; the Division Reconnaissance Company under the command of Captain Key; and, a platoon of medium tanks from Co "A", 4th Tank Battalion; plus changes and additions as hereinafter noted.

Major E. L. Asbill, Bn-X, BLT-1/25, was in command of the Battalion.

COMMUNICATIONS

(1) Radio: Radio communications was carried on by using BLT-2/25's channel, plus one radio on RCT-25 channel.

(2) Wire: Wire communications was maintained through BLT-2/25 switchboard.

SUPPLY

Initial supply was furnished directly by the RCT QM, and all subsequent supply was furnished by BLT-1/25.

PERSONNEL

The original strength of the units was as follows:

Co "L"	4 Officers	151 Enlisted
Reconn Co.	5 Officers	110 Enlisted
CP	1 Officer	9 Enlisted.

The CP personnel consisted of two (2) wiremen, two (2) radio operators, three (3) intelligence scouts, all furnished by BLT-1/25, and two (2) radio operators furnished by RCT-25.

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### MISSION

The mission of the First Provisional Battalion was to employ its two companies as a holding force in the assigned zone of action and to employ its tanks in an assigned zone to fire on enemy emplacements and to assist friendly units on the right and left to advance.

D plus 14, 5 March, 1945.

Co "L" replaced Co "L", BLT-3/23, and ReconCo, replaced "I" Co, BLT-3/23, taking over their positions in TA 183-I and O and TA 184-K. The changeover was completed at 1200. Co "L" suffered 1 man killed and 5 wounded during the changeover. This was caused by intense and accurate enemy sniper fire coming from well concealed positions to the front and both flanks. Physical contact on the right flank was with BLT-2/25, and visual contact was with BLT-1/25, in TA-183-J on the left.

At approximately 1030 a platoon of medium tanks of Co "A", 4th Tank Battalion reported under command of Lieut. Buntz. After a ground reconnaissance was made, two tanks made a run to the front of "L" Co's lines and fired on possible enemy positions. From 1200 until 1700, the tanks moved in front of the lines and fired at targets located to the immediate vicinity of the front.

At 1400 a flame thrower tank was committed in front of "L" Co, and began to burn the entire area directly to the front. At approximately 1500 another flame thrower tank reported that due to mechanical difficulty, it was unable to fire its fluid. At 1630, enemy anti-tank weapon located in TA 184-L, scored three hits on the platoon leader's tank without causing damage to the tank. The tank located the enemy anti-tank gun and immediately destroyed it.

During the entire day enemy light mortar fire fell in and around the Battalion area. Enemy sniper and automatic weapons fire was spasmodic, but extremely accurate and at times very heavy. However, as our tank activity increased, enemy small arms fire decreased noticeably.

For the night, one platoon of Co "B", BLT-1/25, and one section of 37mm guns were employed on the left flank to extend the lines to the high ground.

Total casualties for the day was 1 killed and 5 wounded.

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D plus 15, 6 March, 1945.

During the night, enemy mortars, heavy and light, continued to fall in and around the Battalion area. No physical contact was gained with the enemy.

At 0830, the platoon of medium tanks and flame thrower tank resumed its mission of firing on enemy installations to the front. During the day targets were designated to tanks by infantry troops firing tracers and by infantrymen spotting emplacements on the ground, then riding in tanks and designating the target to tank personnel. The flame thrower tank made four burnings during the day.

At 1200, an order was issued to the ReconCo, to move two platoons to the high ground on the right of BLT-1/25, and from there extend a line down the high ground to "L" Co. The ReconCo, moved to the vicinity of the SE cor of TA 184-F, encountering little enemy opposition. At this point murderous enemy small arms fire opened up from the front and both flanks inflicting heavy casualties. At this time Captain Key was wounded and Lieutenant Barbour, the executive officer, assumed command of the ReconCo. After an attempt to resume the advance failed, the order was given for the two platoons to withdraw to their original positions.

During the above advance, tanks were employed in the immediate vicinity to support the advance, but were unable to detect any of the enemy automatic weapons' or snipers' positions.

At 1500, a bull dozer tank was secured, and an attempt made to repair roads for the use of tanks in TA 184-F and L. The land masks and rocks were of such size, that the dozer tank was unable to make any repairs to the roads.

Throughout the day and night, enemy mortar fire fell intermittently in and around the Battalion area. All attempts to locate the positions from which this mortar fire was coming, were futile.

Total casualties for the day were, 10 killed (including 1 officer), 19 wounded, and 7 sick and evacuated.

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D plus 16, 7 March, 1945.

For the night, one platoon of Co "B", BLT-1/25, and 1 section of 37mm guns were employed to extend to the high ground to the left. No physical contact with the enemy was gained.

The lines remained the same throughout the day and tanks were employed the same as the previous day.

There was little enemy small arms fire during the day (a noticeable decrease as compared to previous days) and a decrease in enemy mortars was observed.

D plus 17, 8 March, 1945.

There was no physical contact with the enemy during the night. Lines for the night were set up the same as the previous night. No casualties were suffered during the day.

The same procedure as the previous day was carried out.

The set-up for the night was the same as the previous night, except a platoon from "C" Co, replaced the platoon from "B" Co, BLT-1/25.

D plus 18, 9 March, 1945.

Commencing at approximately 2000, the enemy in groups of two or three, attempted infiltration of our lines, starting on the right flank of "L" Co, and working along the entire front during the night. No attempts of the enemy to infiltrate were successful and all were killed or driven away.

Casualties suffered were 3 wounded and 4 sick and evacuated.

At approximately 0500 the enemy attempted to infiltrate in force, starting on the right and working its way across the entire front. Several of the enemy succeeded in reaching the left flank carrying several mines and shaped charges, and succeeded in placing or throwing the mines and charges on two vehicles of the 37mm guns. No damage was done to the vehicles. None of the enemy succeeded in penetrating our lines. At daylight, by actual count, 36 enemy dead were counted. The total enemy force was estimated at 50.

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"F" Co, BLT-2/25, replaced "L" Co. The change was completed at 0700.

Throughout the day the tanks were employed the same as previous days. After one burning by the flame thrower tank, it was released to "A" Co, BLT-1/25.

There was no additional activity during the day, except an occasional round of enemy light mortar.

At 1545, BLT-2/25, took command of "F" Co and the ReconCo. The CP personnel reverted back to BLT-1/25.

Casualties suffered were 4 wounded and 5 sick and evacuated.

#### S U M M A R Y

During the period covered by this report, the area of TA 183-O, TA 184-K-L-F-G, was burned over by the flame thrower tank. This means was very effective in destroying the enemy in his well constructed emplacements. The terrain was not conducive to tanks and all tanks were limited as to the area they could move over. The entire area in which the tanks operated was covered with shell holes which they could not negotiate. This condition also greatly added to the difficulty in locating enemy emplacements. The medium tanks participating fired over 1000 rounds in TA 183-O-J, and TA 184-K-L-M-F-G-H-J-C-D-E, during the period from D plus 14 through D plus 18. It is impossible to estimate the number of enemy emplacements destroyed or neutralized by tank fire but the fact that on D plus 19, friendly troops were able to advance through this area indicates that a great deal was accomplished towards destroying the enemy.

Throughout the period ground troops covered the tanks very effectively. At no time on the front lines could troops move freely or expose themselves above the foxholes, due to extremely accurate and deadly enemy sniper and automatic weapons fire. Enemy light mortars caused few casualties, but was dangerous, if troops were exposed and was very harassing.

*E. L. Asbill*  
E. L. ASBILL,  
Major, US

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